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The Wandering Officer
abstract. “Wandering officers” are law-enforcement officers ﬁred by one department, sometimes for serious misconduct, who then ﬁnd work at another agency. Policing experts hold disparate views about the extent and character of the wandering-officer phenomenon. Some insist that
wandering officers are everywhere—possibly increasingly so—and that they’re dangerous. Others,
however, maintain that critics cherry-pick rare and egregious anecdotes that distort broader realities. In the absence of systematic data, we simply do not know how common wandering officers
are or how much of a threat they pose, nor can we know whether and how to address the issue
through policy reform.
In this Article, we conduct the ﬁrst systematic investigation of wandering officers and possibly
the largest quantitative study of police misconduct of any kind. We introduce a novel data set of
all 98,000 full-time law-enforcement officers employed by almost 500 different agencies in the
State of Florida over a thirty-year period. We report three principal ﬁndings. First, in any given
year during our study, an average of just under 1,100 officers who were previously ﬁred—three
percent of all officers in the State—worked for Florida agencies. Second, officers who were ﬁred
from their last job seem to face difficulty ﬁnding work. When they do, it takes them a long time,
and they tend to move to smaller agencies with fewer resources in areas with slightly larger communities of color. Interestingly, though, this pattern does not hold for officers who were ﬁred earlier in their careers. Third, wandering officers are more likely than both officers hired as rookies
and those hired as veterans who have never been ﬁred to be ﬁred from their next job or to receive
a complaint for a “moral character violation.” Although we cannot determine the precise reasons
for the ﬁrings, these results suggest that wandering officers may pose serious risks, particularly
given how difficult it is to ﬁre a police officer. We consider several plausible explanations for why
departments nonetheless hire wandering officers and suggest potential policy responses to each.
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introduction
With all that has been said and written about the tragic death of twelve-yearold Tamir Rice in Cleveland, one fact attracts less attention than it should: the
officer who ﬁred the fatal shot had been “allowed . . . to resign” from his previous job in Independence, Ohio, after suffering a “dangerous loss of composure”
during ﬁrearms training.1 According to his supervisors, Tim Loehmann “would
not be able to substantially cope, or make good decisions” in stressful scenarios.2
A year or so later, however, the Cleveland Police Department failed to review
Loehmann’s personnel ﬁle before giving him a gun.3 Another Ohio department
later hired Loehmann after he killed Rice and was ﬁred by Cleveland.4
This story is not unique. Consider what happened in tiny Tulia, Texas. In a
massive early-morning raid on July 23, 1999, police arrested a full ﬁfth of Tulia’s
black adults.5 After parading them across the courthouse lawn in their nightclothes, Tulia authorities charged the arrestees—roughly forty out of ﬁfty of
whom were black—with felony drug offenses. The evidence in each case consisted of the testimony of a single undercover narcotics officer, Tom Coleman.
Coleman claimed he had purchased drugs, mostly powder cocaine, from each of
the defendants—over one hundred buys in total. Most were convicted, their sentences ranging from 20 to 361 years. The State crowned Coleman “Lawman of
the Year.”

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland Police,
Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/in-tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by
-police-then-a-fatal-one.html [https://perma.cc/QY2N-Y3ML].
Id.
Id.
Matthew Haag, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Is Hired by an Ohio Police Department,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/timothy-loehmann
-tamir-rice-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/V379-SDT2]. Loehmann ended up withdrawing his application, however, before commencing work. Amir Vera, Officer Who Shot Tamir
Rice Withdraws Application to Small Police Department in Ohio, CNN (Oct. 13, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/13/us/tamir-rice-officer-application/index.html [https://
perma.cc/TST3-BHKS]. He continues to contest Cleveland’s decision to terminate him. Jane
Morice, Appeal Filed on Behalf of Cleveland Police Union to Overturn Firing of Timothy Loehmann,
Ex-Cleveland Cop Who Fatally Shot Tamir Rice, CLEVELAND (Mar. 3, 2019), https://
www.cleveland.com/crime/2019/03/appeal-ﬁled-on-behalf-of-cleveland-police-union-to
-overturn-ﬁring-of-timothy-loehmann-ex-cleveland-cop-who-fatally-shot-tamir-rice.html
[https://perma.cc/U9FC-8KKW].
The following facts are drawn from NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND CORRUPTION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN (2005); and Vanita Gupta, Critical Race Lawyering in Tulia,
Texas, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2055 (2005).
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Under pressure from the media and postconviction litigation, Coleman’s
cases later began to crumble. Coleman, it turns out, had never recorded his buys,
nor were there any witnesses; most of the time, there was no corroboration of
any sort. No drugs, money, or weapons had been seized during the raid. Coleman’s written reports were vague. He misidentiﬁed suspects, some of whom had
rock-solid alibis. And marijuana and crack, not powder cocaine, were the prevalent vices in Tulia’s impoverished black community. By 2003, Coleman’s credibility was shredded. He was indicted for perjury. Seeing the writing on the wall,
the prosecutors eventually joined the trial judge in recommending that the convictions be vacated. In August 2003, the governor pardoned the Tulia defendants.
Much of what brought Coleman down stemmed from what the New York
Times called his “wretched work history.”6 His ﬁrst job was at a jail in the City
of Pecos,7 where he was “lazy and inattentive at work and in constant danger of
being ﬁred.”8 He “abruptly quit” and left the state, only to return and ﬁnd work
as a deputy at the nearby Pecos County Sheriff’s Office.9 After ﬁve years there,
Coleman again “abruptly left town . . . owing thousands of dollars in delinquent
bills.”10 After a “brief stint as a jailer” in Denton County, Coleman became a
sheriff’s deputy in Cochran County.11 He lasted about two years there, skipping
town after the county attorney witnessed him stealing gas from the county
pumps.12 He owed thousands of dollars to local businesses.13 The Cochran
County Sheriff sent an angry letter about Coleman to the State. “Coleman
should not be in law enforcement,” the sheriff wrote, “if he is going to do people
the way he did this town.”14
At this point, Coleman managed to join the regional task force that sent him
to Tulia. The task force hired Coleman despite a background check revealing that
he “was a discipline problem, that he was ‘too gung ho,’ that he had been accused
of kidnapping his son in a custody battle, . . . and . . . that he had . . . ‘possible

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Bob Herbert, Kafka in Tulia, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07
/29/opinion/kafka-in-tulia.html [https://perma.cc/DDD2-R24X].
Nate Blakeslee, The Color of Justice, TEX. OBSERVER (June 23, 2000), https://
www.texasobserver.org/611-the-color-of-justice [https://perma.cc/65FX-LNVB].
BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 97.
Id.
Blakeslee, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.; see BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 85.
BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 86.
Blakeslee, supra note 7.
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mental problems.’”15 During Coleman’s tenure with the task force, Cochran
County indicted him for stealing the gas and notiﬁed Swisher County, where
Tulia sits.16 The Swisher County Sheriff’s Office arrested Coleman—during the
undercover operation—but he never faced trial and the charges were dropped.17
Even after leaving Tulia, Coleman continued to bounce around. In the eighteen
months after departing, Coleman worked for three different task forces. He was
ﬁred from the third, in Waxahachie, for sleeping with a sex worker who was an
informant for his then-employer.18
Coleman is the archetypal “wandering officer,” or what those in policing circles have called a “gypsy cop.” These are police officers who are ﬁred or who
resign under threat of termination and later ﬁnd work in law enforcement elsewhere.19 And although Coleman and Loehmann are prime examples, there are
scores of others. Indeed, as the following examples show, wandering officers appear all over.
 While William Melendez was working for the Detroit Police Department in 1997, local prosecutors alleged that he had leveled false accusations of drug possession. The federal government later indicted him for
planting evidence, ﬁling bogus reports, and perjury (he was acquitted).
Melendez was forced out of the department in 2007 after his license
lapsed. Two other Michigan municipalities—Highland Park and then
Inkster—put Melendez back on the street. In 2015, while in Inkster,
Melendez brutally beat a motorist about the head, leading to a $1.4 million civil settlement and two criminal convictions.20
 While working for the St. Louis Police Department in 2006, Eddie Boyd
III pistol-whipped a twelve-year-old girl; a year later, he struck another
child in the face with his gun or handcuffs before falsifying a report.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 329 (quoting Pecos County Chief Deputy Sheriff Cliff Harris).
Id. at 86-87; Gupta, supra note 5, at 2061.
BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 87.
Id. at 233.
See, e.g., TOM BARKER, POLICE ETHICS: CRISIS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 56 (3d ed. 2011); Gordon
Dill, South Carolina Police Shortage Means Employment for “Gypsy” Officers, 7NEWS (Feb. 11,
2016, 11:00 PM), https://www.wspa.com/news/south-carolina-police-shortage-means
-employment-for-gypsy-officers/1018404454 [https://perma.cc/KT8S-VP72] (“A gypsy
cop! That’s been termed an officer that will jump from agency to agency. They have maybe
10 agencies under their belt within a 5 year period.” (quoting Florence McCants, South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy)).
Jim Schaefer & Gina Kaufman, How Problem Cops Stay on Michigan’s Streets, DET. FREE PRESS
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/07/09/how
-problem-cops-stay-street/414813001 [https://perma.cc/6CRU-6HUB].
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Shortly after he resigned his position with St. Louis, Boyd was hired in
St. Ann, Missouri, and later, again, in Ferguson.21
 Nicholas Hogan, an officer with the Tukwila Police Department in
Washington, pepper-sprayed a suspect who was restrained on a gurney
in a hospital in 2011. Hogan was federally indicted for the act and
Tukwila ﬁred him. In 2012, the police department in nearby Snoqualmie
hired him only to ﬁre him later for having an affair with the wife of a
fellow officer. He was also subsequently incarcerated for the pepperspray incident.22
 New Orleans Police Department officer Carey Dykes was “sued for alleged brutality, accused of having sex with a prostitute while on duty
and caught sleeping in his patrol car instead of responding to a shooting.”23 An internal affairs investigation found seventeen violations of department rules. New Orleans ﬁred Dykes in 2001. Later the same year,
Dykes found police work at the Delgado Community College in New
Orleans and then the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office.24
Additional examples abound, each as shocking as the last.25 Yet the scope and
nature of the wandering-officer phenomenon are difficult to pin down. Some
21.

22.

23.

24.
25.

Timothy Williams, Cast-Out Police Officers Are Often Hired in Other Cities, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/whereabouts-of-cast-out-police
-officers-other-cities-often-hire-them.html [https://perma.cc/3DP8-WP6M].
Mike Carter, Jail Time for Ex-Tukwila Cop Who Pepper-Sprayed Handcuffed Man in Hospital,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/ex
-tukwila-cop-sentenced-to-9-months-for-pepper-spraying-handcuffed-man-in-hospital
[https://perma.cc/G6WV-Z26R].
Kimbriell Kelly et al., Forced Out over Sex, Drugs and Other Infractions, Fired Officers Find Work
in Other Departments, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/investigations/forced-out-over-sex-drugs-or-child-abuse-ﬁred-officers-ﬁnd-work-in
-other-departments/2017/12/22/e0512774-d3a7-11e7-95bf-df7c19270879_story.html
[https://perma.cc/MCX4-8EXK].
Id.
See, e.g., Anthony Cormier & Matthew Doig, Embattled Officers Land on Their Feet, HERALDTRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.) (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20111208/special
-report-embattled-officers-land-on-their-feet [https://perma.cc/KF6X-CTTG]; Anthony L.
Fisher, Why It’s So Hard to Stop Bad Cops from Getting New Police Jobs, REASON (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://reason.com/archives/2016/09/30/why-its-so-hard-to-stop-bad-cops-from-ge
[https://perma.cc/MW5C-HFH6]; Jose Gaspar, McFarland’s Hiring of Four Police Officers
Raises Questions, CALIFORNIAN (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.bakersﬁeld.com/news/jose
-gaspar-mcfarland-s-hiring-of-four-police-officers-raises/article_9dfdf646-d669-5618-a3c7
-85ff0eeedb4e.html [https://perma.cc/6CFQ-NDCE]; Gary A. Harki, Still in Uniform: Problem Police Rarely Lose Certiﬁcation in West Virginia, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W.
Va.), Dec. 27, 2009, at A1; David Kroman, “Disqualifying Conduct” Rarely an Obstacle for Fired
Police to Get Rehired, CROSSCUT (Apr. 5, 2016), https://crosscut.com/2016/04/ﬁred-officers
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experts, from their own experience, or from anecdotes like these, insist that wandering officers are legion26—and possibly increasingly so.27 Others deny that
wandering officers exist28 or discern an exaggerated narrative cobbled together
-can-become-hired-officers [https://perma.cc/W5D2-MVK7]; Matt Lait, Convicted Cop
Hired as Police Chief, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/02
/local/me-maywood2 [https://perma.cc/KQA8-ZTGV]; Nomaan Merchant et al., Broken
System Lets Problem Officers Jump from Job to Job, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-police-officer-sexual-misconduct
-investigation-20151103-story.html [https://perma.cc/B2D8-7HD9]; Christopher N. Osher,
Colorado Laws Allow Rogue Officers to Stay in Law Enforcement, DENV. POST (July 11, 2015),
https://www.denverpost.com/2015/07/11/colorado-laws-allow-rogue-officers-to-stay-in
-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/3NQM-SMEM]; Push to Keep “Gypsy Cops” with Questionable Pasts Off the Streets, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27, 2016, 6:46 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/gypsy-cops-with-questionable-pasts-hired-by-different-departments-lack-of
-oversight-police [https://perma.cc/UC8N-UPT6]; Casey Toner & Jared Rutecki, The Revolving Door: Troubled Officers Get Frequent Career Chances, WBEZ (Jan. 8, 2018), http://
interactive.wbez.org/taking-cover/revolving-door [https://perma.cc/4QDT-4MX6]; Steven
Yoder, How to Keep Bad Cops on the Beat, AM. PROSPECT (July 11, 2013), http://prospect.org
/article/how-keep-bad-cops-beat [https://perma.cc/96XR-DQ5T].
26. See, e.g., BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 206 (“Everybody’s talking about Tom Coleman—well,
there are whole task forces of Tom Colemans out there.” (quoting Barbara Markham, former
narcotics task force officer)); Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certiﬁcation: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 545 (2001) (“Even
when [unﬁt officers] are terminated, these officers often go to work for other departments
within the state.”); Martha L. Shockey-Eckles, Police Culture and the Perpetuation of the Officer
Shuffle: The Paradox of Life Behind ‘The Blue Wall’, 35 HUMANITY & SOC’Y 290, 300 (2011) (“In
urban areas such as St. Louis, the officer who resigns rather than face licensure revocation
typically ﬁnds employment in a neighboring municipality with relative ease.”); Richard Abshire, Sheriff: Cases Show Staffers Not Above Law—Kaufman: He Faults Agencies That Let Officers
Become “Gypsy Cops,” DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, at 11B (“Sheriff Byrnes said too
many law enforcement agencies have quietly dismissed problem officers and not prosecuted
them for criminal conduct, enabling so called ‘gypsy cops’ to go from agency to agency, often
taking trouble with them.”); Dill, supra note 19 (“It happens every day. It’s happened here. It
happens everywhere.” (quoting Pacolet, South Carolina Police Chief Raymond Webb));
Candice Norwood, Can States Tackle Police Misconduct with Certiﬁcation Systems?, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/police-misconduct
-decertiﬁcation/522246 [https://perma.cc/F8DF-X9YJ] (“There are many cases around the
country where officers leave their departments because of misconduct and then they are rehired—sometimes knowingly, sometimes not—by other departments.” (quoting Professor
Roger Goldman)).
27. See, e.g., Schaefer & Kaufman, supra note 20 (describing former executive director of the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards as conceding that the wandering-officer
phenomenon is “a concern, and could be getting worse because of widespread cuts to police
pay and beneﬁts in recent years”).
28. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, How States Are Moving to Police Bad Cops, FRONTLINE (Apr. 8, 2016),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-states-are-moving-to-police-bad-cops
[https://perma.cc/Q4CH-GBKD] (“Skeptics of certiﬁcation . . . argue that no police chief or
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from cherry-picked anecdotes that distort broader realities.29 When the rhetoric
is swept away, “[i]t is unclear how far-reaching such problems may be.”30 As
policing expert Samuel Walker has remarked: “It is believed to be a problem
nationwide. The phrase ‘gypsy cops’ has come up. There’s not any solid research
on that. We don’t know how common it is.”31
The answer matters. If wandering officers are rampant and dangerous, identifying and stopping them should be a police-reform priority—especially because, by their nature, they touch new communities with each move. And
“[p]oor communities,” writes Monica Bell, “are more likely to hire ‘gypsy
cops’ . . . because their resource constraints make it more difficult for them to
discriminate between good and bad officers.”32 The answer also matters because,
for many individuals, policing represents—indeed, embodies—“the law.”33 Lawenforcement officers interact with tens of millions of American residents each
year,34 many of whom have little other contact with the state.35 And “[t]he be-

29.

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.

35.

sheriff would hire an officer with a tarnished record . . . .”); Heather Goldin, Bill Seeks Licensing for Massachusetts Police Officers, SENTINEL & ENTERPRISE (July 11, 2019), https://
www.sentinelandenterprise.com/2016/03/31/bill-seeks-licensing-for-mass-police-officers
[https://perma.cc/J7Q9-D4SC]; id. (“It’s not possible for an officer [ﬁred for misconduct]
to get another job in civil service.” (quoting Ray McGrath, Legislative Director, International
Brotherhood of Police Officers)); Yoder, supra note 25 (“[California] doesn’t need to cancel
certiﬁcates . . . because its training program and standards for entering the profession are
among the best in the country—rogue officers are kept out of the force from the get-go.”).
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 25 (“Police representatives maintain that these anecdotes are cherry
picked. [The International Brotherhood of Police Officers’ legislative director] says those who
support a national database [of officer decertiﬁcations] ‘use these wild examples’ of ‘somewhat outlandish’ cases ‘that happened years ago.’”).
Williams, supra note 21.
Harki, supra note 25; see Schaefer & Kaufman, supra note 20 (citing former executive director
of the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards as saying that the Commission
“does not know how many problem cops there are in Michigan, let alone how many jump
from job to job”).
Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054,
2137 (2017).
Montré D. Carodine, “Street Cred,” 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1583, 1593 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
See Elizabeth Davis et al., Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2015, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1
(Oct. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P4A
-4XFU].
See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 131 (2002).
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havior of individual police officers” in these encounters “communicates information to members of the public that they use to make judgments about the
nature of legal authority within their society.”36
If wandering officers are just scapegoats, however, they may distract from
other, more pressing problems in policing. After all, just because some wandering officers commit misconduct does not mean that, ex ante, they were any more
likely to do so than their peers. Plenty of officers who have never been ﬁred end
up breaking the rules. In some other labor settings, experts have recognized that
past experience does not predict future performance. “Malpractice claims against
physicians,” for example, “are simply too stochastic to lend them much credence
as an indicator of physician quality or risk.”37
This Article brings much-needed data to the debate. It presents the ﬁrst
large-scale empirical investigation of the wandering-officer phenomenon and
possibly the largest quantitative study of police misconduct of any kind.38 We
conduct our analysis using a novel data set that begins with employment records
of all 98,000 full-time law-enforcement officers employed in the State of Florida,
covering nearly ﬁve hundred agencies, over a thirty-year period. Crucially, our
data permits us to distinguish between officers who separated from their agencies voluntarily and those who separated because they were ﬁred. And for nearly
two decades, it also identiﬁes officers who resigned while under investigation.
Although we cannot know precisely why all of these officers were pushed out—
36.

Id. at 130. Tyler and Huo’s work “suggest[s] that personal experiences generalize to shape
broader views about the law and legal institutions,” id. at 135, as well as one’s “status in the
democratic community,” Vesla M. Weaver, The Only Government I Know: How the Criminal
Justice System Degrades Democratic Citizenship, BOS. REV. (June 10, 2014), http://
bostonreview.net/us/vesla-m-weaver-citizenship-custodial-state-incarceration
[https://
perma.cc/3FR3-XFNZ]; see also Bell, supra note 32, at 2067 (explaining how current policing
regimes “can operate to effectively banish whole communities from the body politic”); Tom
R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal
Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 757 (2014) (asserting that “personal experiences
with the police . . . are [a] key determinant of legal socialization,” which is “the developmental
process by which individuals internalize the norms of the law”). Experiences with the police
“are translated into common stories about who is an equal member of a rule-governed society
and who is subjected to arbitrary surveillance and inquiry.” CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED
OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 2 (2014).
37. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for
Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1616 (2002) (citing FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 176-78 (1991)).
38. In a previous study, touted as “perhaps the largest study of police misconduct ever conducted
in the United States,” Robert Kane and Michael White analyzed the careers of roughly 1,500
New York City officers (plus a 1,500-officer comparison group) across a twenty-year period.
See ROBERT J. KANE & MICHAEL D. WHITE, JAMMED UP: BAD COPS, POLICE MISCONDUCT, AND
THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 3-5 (2013). As we explain, our study covers more
officers, more jurisdictions, and more years than does the Kane and White study.
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something that can be difficult to ascertain, even with access to an agency’s personnel records—we do have a general indication, such as whether the ﬁring related to performance, training, or misconduct. The employment records also
contain demographic information about each officer—such as age, race, sex, and
education—enabling us to describe the wandering officer in detail.
We report three principal ﬁndings. First, wandering officers—deﬁned as ofﬁcers who have been ﬁred from a position in law enforcement or corrections before landing a law-enforcement job at another agency—are fairly common in absolute terms. In any given year, roughly 1,100 full-time law-enforcement officers
who had been previously ﬁred were working for other Florida agencies. And for
reasons we explain, we suspect that this is a low-end estimate, both for Florida
and for what it implies about other jurisdictions. At the same time, when viewed
in relative terms, the number appears more modest: no more than 3% of officers
employed in a given year in Florida during the study period were wanderers.
Second, assuming that many ﬁred officers are seeking new law-enforcement
work and are willing to move to another agency, they seem to face difficulty ﬁnding employment. Officers who were ﬁred from their immediately preceding job
subsequently obtain work in Florida law enforcement at half the rate of officers
who separate voluntarily, and the discrepancy is growing over time. Fired officers also take much longer to start another job and typically move to smaller agencies with fewer resources in communities with slightly higher proportions of residents of color. Interestingly, most of these discrepancies disappear for officers
who were ﬁred earlier in their career rather than from their immediately preceding job. We hypothesize that agencies view these officers as having redeemed
themselves.
Third, wandering officers are far more likely—than both rookies and veterans who have never been ﬁred—to be ﬁred from their next job. They are also
more likely to receive complaints at the state licensing board for “moral character
violations,”39 including complaints for violent or sexual misconduct and for integrity-related misdeeds. We cannot fully rule out the possibility that these elevated risks are due to the characteristics of the agencies that hire wandering ofﬁcers or to enhanced monitoring or discipline of these officers. Perhaps some
agencies even hire wandering officers on a de facto “probationary” basis, intending simply to terminate them if problems arise. For reasons we discuss, however,
we are doubtful that these are the principal explanations for our results.
We also explore whether certain officer or agency characteristics—such as
officer age or education or agency hiring and training requirements—predict
39.

As we describe in more detail below, “moral character violations” can include committing any
felony or certain enumerated misdemeanors (regardless of criminal prosecution) or committing other speciﬁed acts such as using excessive force or making false statements in a court
proceeding. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011(4) (2019).
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which wandering officers are most likely to fail. The idea is that agencies might
manage risk by screening for certain officer characteristics or adopting more
stringent hiring or training requirements in the event that, for whatever reason,
they choose to hire a wandering officer. Unfortunately, we ﬁnd little reason for
optimism on this front, although agencies may have information about officer
or agency characteristics that is more predictive than what we can observe here.
These ﬁndings present a puzzle: if wandering officers are so risky, why do
agencies hire them? Our data do not permit us to isolate a single causal mechanism, and the reality is that several are probably at play. First, agencies may hire
wandering officers because they fail to identify them as such, either due to inadequate background checks or candidates’ deliberate concealment of their disciplinary history.40 The favored solution seems to be improving the existing national decertiﬁcation database. This database records decisions by state agencies
to “decertify” officers, which prevent them from working elsewhere in the same
state. Coverage, however, is spotty. Likewise, in 2015, the President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing recommended expanding the existing database into a
comprehensive national register to address the problem of officers who are ﬁred
and decertiﬁed in one state and then move to another state and land a job in law
enforcement there.41 We discuss the importance, but also the substantial limitations, of the national decertiﬁcation database as a tool to stop wandering officers,
and we suggest potential improvements.
Second, agencies might know they are hiring a wandering officer but be unaware that such officers are, in general, risky hires. Some agencies might, for
example, think an officer who has been ﬁred will be more conscientious than others, if ﬁring acts as a deterrent sanction. As one official put it, “You think it’s a
second chance so they’ll try hard, which is what they’re telling you.”42 Moreover,
most agencies probably hire too few wandering officers to notice that, as our data

40.

See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 549 (describing two officers hired by the West
Palm Beach Police Department despite serious, undiscovered problems at their previous police departments); Ian Cohen, Questionable Hires, Low Morale Plague Palm Beach Police, PALM
BEACH DAILY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20190322
/exclusive-questionable-hires-low-morale-plague-palm-beach-police
[https://perma.cc
/MK5P-USD6] (reporting that the Palm Beach Police Department “ignored or missed red
ﬂags in the applications of its officers, some of whom had applied [to] and were rejected with
cause from multiple agencies before being accepted by Palm Beach”).
41. See Final Report, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 29-30 (2015), https://
cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_ﬁnalreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SPA-DQT3]
(quoting National Decertiﬁcation Index—FAQs, INT’L ASS’N DIRECTORS L. ENFORCEMENT
STANDARDS & TRAINING, https://www.iadlest.org/Portals/0/Files/NDI/FAQ/ndi_faq.html
[https://perma.cc/5EAH-QAUQ]).
42. Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (quoting Lieutenant David Hubbard of the Eustis, Florida
Police Department).
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suggest, their actual pattern of behavior seems to cut the other way. In light of
our new evidence, law-enforcement agencies should be cautious about hiring
wandering officers. And agencies that do hire them might invest in enhanced
monitoring and support or, alternatively, adopt recidivist penalties designed to
deter misconduct in this high-risk population.
Third, agencies may know that wandering officers are risky hires but lack
any better alternatives—that is, the wandering officers they hire may be less risky
than the alternative candidates. Consistent with our ﬁnding that wandering ofﬁcers tend to move to agencies with fewer resources, cash-strapped agencies—
and particularly those in undesirable locations—may be unable to offer compensation competitive enough to attract candidates of higher quality than the wandering officers they hire. In that case, and assuming officers must be hired at all,
the solution may be to improve the pool of candidates by raising salaries or reducing barriers to entry. Certainly, if law-enforcement agencies were sophisticated, for-proﬁt entities that internalized the costs of bad hiring decisions, this
story would be compelling. As we discuss in a moment, however, there are reasons to think that agencies do not internalize these costs.
Ideally, to test this third hypothesis, we would compare each wandering ofﬁcer who was hired with the “marginal officer”—the officer the agency would
have hired had it decided not to hire the wanderer. Unfortunately, we are unable
to identify the actual marginal officer with our data. We make progress on this
problem by isolating, for each wandering officer, a plausible candidate cohort—
a group of officers who were hired around the same time by nearby agencies with
similar budgetary resources. We ﬁnd that wandering officers are still riskier than
this narrower comparator group, providing some evidence that this third hypothesis is, at best, a partial explanation.
Fourth, agencies may know that wandering officers are risky but hire them
because of the unique beneﬁts they are perceived to bring. Some agencies, for
example, may actually seek out “cowboy” veteran officers to work the toughest
beats. Given the “band of brothers” ethos that pervades American policing, some
law-enforcement leaders, too, may feel a “warm glow” upon hiring officers who
have been cast out by other agencies.43 This may explain the seemingly cavalier
attitudes police chiefs sometimes express toward hiring officers who have been
ﬁred before. “We believe in redemption,” explained one police chief.44 “This
43.

See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 453, 454 (2004) (describing how, “[i]n the face of outside criticism, cops tend to circle
the wagons, adopting a ‘code of silence,’ protecting each other, and defending each other’s
actions”).
44. Schaefer & Kaufman, supra note 20 (quoting Police Chief Chester Logan of Highland Park,
Michigan).
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stuff is supposed to follow you forever?” another wondered. “For the rest of your
career? Of course I’m going to give somebody a second chance.”45 Relatedly,
agencies might hire wandering officers who are riskier than the alternatives if the
cost is lower. Given that they typically have little if any discretion over salaries,
it is unlikely that police administrators hire wandering officers because they are
willing to accept lower salaries than similarly experienced candidates who have
never been ﬁred.46 But wandering officers may be cheaper than fresh recruits, as
most Florida agencies pay police-academy tuition when they onboard rookie
hires. Compared to rookies, wandering officers are able to hit the streets more
quickly, too.
Finally, agencies may externalize, and thus discount, the costs of hiring wandering officers. Although agencies nearly always indemnify officers against ﬁnancial liability, the officers themselves enjoy qualiﬁed immunity, which, in
practice, protects the agencies as well.47 Direct municipal liability for negligent
hiring, moreover, is rare.48 And even when municipalities do end up paying for
harms wandering officers have caused, whether agencies internalize those costs
depends on the institutional and budgetary niceties of municipal governance.49
If cost externalization contributes to the hiring of wandering officers, and we
suspect it does, the appropriate response is to improve existing mechanisms of
accountability. This is in some sense the central challenge of all civil-rights liability regimes, however; many have tried and failed to accomplish it. Barring
successful accountability reforms, and if future research corroborates our ﬁndings, states could consider following Connecticut and banning local agencies
from hiring wandering officers altogether.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the lawenforcement labor market. Part II reviews the pertinent literature. Part III describes our data in detail. Part IV presents our ﬁndings about the wandering of-

45.
46.
47.
48.

49.

Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (quoting Police Chief Roberto Fulgueira of Sweetwater, Florida).
See infra Section VI.D.
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes,
104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1519-24 (2016).
See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT LAW AND LITIGATION § 4:16 (3d ed. 2016)
(describing just how difficult it is for plaintiffs to make out a claim for municipal liability
based on bad hiring).
In some jurisdictions, for example, payments come from the general treasury and the agency
is never held accountable. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets,
and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1148 (2016).
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ﬁcer. Part V examines whether we can predict which wandering officers are likeliest to fail. Part VI considers potential causal mechanisms for the wanderingofficer phenomenon and corresponding reforms.
i. the law-enforcement labor market
Every year, over ﬁfteen thousand individual law-enforcement agencies,
spread across ﬁfty states, hire thousands of officers.50 Because of this segmentation, it is challenging to offer a comprehensive description of the law-enforcement labor market or the features of the system that inﬂuence whether a local
agency hires a wandering officer. In this Part, however, we sketch out general
patterns in the labor market across the states and offer details on Florida—the
site of the current study—as an illustrative example.
A. Hiring
The vast majority of law-enforcement officers work for county or municipal
agencies; a small number work directly for the state.51 In nearly every state, to
become a law-enforcement officer at any level, an applicant must ﬁrst obtain certiﬁcation—essentially an occupational license—from a state-level licensing entity.52 In most states, this body is called the Peace Officer Standards and Training
(POST) Board.53 Certiﬁcation procedures vary widely from state to state.54
In Florida, the certifying entity is the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (CJSTC), which is part of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE).55 To obtain certiﬁcation in the state, candidates must clear a

50.

BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 2 tbl.1 (2015).

LOCAL POLICE DE-

51.

Id.
See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, POST AGENCY CERTIFICATION PRACTICES, 2015, at 1 (2016) (reporting that Hawaii does not have a POST board and the District of Columbia’s POST board
does not certify officers). On July 10, 2018, Hawaii enacted legislation to create a POST board,
which was scheduled to ﬁnalize its standards and certiﬁcation process by July 1, 2019. See 2018
Haw. Sess. Laws 741.
53. See Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertiﬁcation of Police: An Alternative to Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45, 47-48 (1987).
54. See Roger Goldman, Importance of State Law in Police Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 381
(2016); Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 550-52.
55. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.11, 943.12(3) (2019).
52.
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basic abilities test, graduate the police academy, and then pass a written certiﬁcation examination.56 They must also meet certain minimum qualiﬁcations regarding age, citizenship, and education.57 Once certiﬁed, officers must undergo
continuing training and education to maintain their certiﬁcation.58
State law generally regulates the process by which agencies hire officers. In
Florida, local agencies must conduct a background investigation and gather documentation to prove compliance with the statewide minimum qualiﬁcations.59
State law speciﬁes that background investigations “should include information
setting forth the facts and reasons for any of the applicant’s previous separations
from private or public employment or appointment, as the applicant understands them.”60 Implementing regulations require that local agencies “verify . . . [p]rior criminal justice employments of the applicant and the facts and
reasons for any prior separations of employment”61 by “[o]btain[ing] previous
employment data from prior employers.”62 Local agencies are expected to contact CJSTC to conﬁrm prior employment and discipline.63
As part of the background investigation in Florida, the hiring agency must
conﬁrm that the candidate has “good moral character.”64 Under Florida regulations, moral-character violations can include committing any felony or certain
misdemeanors (regardless of criminal prosecution), using excessive force, misusing an official position to secure a privilege or beneﬁt, participating in sexual
conduct while on duty, engaging in sexual harassment, making false statements
during the job application process, subverting training and testing processes,
and making false statements in a court proceeding.65 Regulations also provide
that CJSTC is available to assist local agencies in examining moral character:

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.

Id. § 943.13(9)-(10); id. § 943.1397 (certiﬁcation examination); id. § 943.14 (police academy);
id. § 943.17 (basic abilities test).
Id. § 943.13.
Id. §§ 943.13(11), 943.135.
Id. § 943.133(1)-(3); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.002(3) (2019) (documentation); id. r.
11B-27.0022 (background investigation).
FLA. STAT. § 943.133(3).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0022(1)(a).
Id. r. 11B-27.0022(2)(a).
See Employment Background Investigative Report, No. CJSTC-77, https://www.fdle
.state.ﬂ.us/CJSTC/Documents/Rules-Forms/WordDoc/CJSTC-077-3-2013-7-2-13TR.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LG7J-V2XE], cited in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.002(3)(a)(2).
See FLA. STAT. § 943.13(7); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0022(1)(d); see also id. r. 11B27.0011(1).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011(4).
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upon request, the CJSTC “shall evaluate the qualiﬁcation of an applicant to determine compliance with ‘good moral character’ pursuant to this rule section.”66
The CJSTC’s assistance focuses on the applicant’s criminal history, especially
out-of-state or federal court records.67
Within the constraints set forth by state law, local agencies have fairly broad
discretion over hiring. Such discretion is not absolute, however, as it is often
subject to civil service requirements and sometimes to provisions of a collectivebargaining agreement with a police officers’ union.68 To facilitate the hiring process, most agencies designate certain hiring prerequisites, such as a minimum
age or education level, and a set of screening exams, such as a physical ﬁtness or
driving test or a polygraph examination.69 Only candidates who satisfy the prerequisites and pass the exams are eligible to be hired. Local agencies may augment, but not diminish, state-law hiring prerequisites.70 The same is true for
continuing education and training.71
B. Discipline
Each local agency also administers its own disciplinary process for officers
who commit crimes or violate agency policy. As with hiring, the agency’s authority over discipline may be circumscribed by civil-service laws or provisions of a
collective-bargaining agreement. Collective-bargaining agreements frequently
provide for arbitration of disciplinary decisions, including termination. Arbitrators commonly order agencies to reinstate terminated officers.72

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. r. 11B-27.0011(3).
Email from Terry Baker, Training & Research Manager, Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf’t, to John Rappaport (Aug. 7, 2018, 7:41 AM CDT) (on ﬁle with John Rappaport).
See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA 115-21, 134 (9th ed. 2017).
See id. at 135-39, 141-42.
FLA. STAT. § 943.137 (2019). Florida law, for example, requires officers to be at least nineteen
years old, id. § 943.13(1), but a local agency is free to raise the minimum age to twenty-one.
Id. § 943.135.
See Mark Iris, Unbinding Binding Arbitration of Police Discipline: The Public Policy Exception, 1
VA. J. CRIM. L. 540 (2013); Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545
(2019); Kimbriell Kelly et al., Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often Forced to Put Officers
Fired for Misconduct Back on the Streets, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-ﬁred-rehired
[https://
perma.cc/4EQZ-82AB].
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In forty-ﬁve states, the government entity responsible for certifying officers
also has the power to decertify upon certain conditions.73 Officers who have been
decertiﬁed are prohibited from working in law enforcement anywhere in the
state. As with certiﬁcation, the criteria for decertiﬁcation vary widely among the
states. All states with decertiﬁcation authority, for example, can decertify for felony convictions, but only 61% can decertify for failure to meet training or qualiﬁcation requirements, 57% for general misconduct, 39% for termination for
cause, and 11% for any misdemeanor conviction.74 Like most of its counterparts,
the CJSTC in Florida has the authority to decertify Florida officers.75 Decertiﬁcation can happen when an officer has committed a felony or a misdemeanor
involving dishonesty (again, regardless of criminal prosecution) or fails to maintain good moral character.76 Note that this standard, detailed above, covers only
fairly egregious types of misconduct.
The CJSTC learns about potentially disqualifying activity through several
channels, but two are particularly important. First, local agencies are required to
notify the CJSTC whenever an officer separates from employment, “setting forth
in detail the facts and reasons for such separation.”77 Second, local agencies must
conduct an internal investigation when they have cause to suspect that an officer
has committed a disqualifying crime or moral character violation.78 If the
agency’s suspicion is substantiated, the agency must notify the CJSTC.79 Florida
is one of the more active states in decertifying officers even though the substantive scope of its decertiﬁcation authority is not the broadest.80

73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 1 (reporting that forty-four states allow decertiﬁcation of ofﬁcers). After Hickman wrote, in October 2016, the responsible agency in New York promulgated regulations permitting it to decertify officers. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 6065.6 (2019). New Jersey does not have an agency that decertiﬁes officers. Certain criminal
convictions, however, can trigger “forfeiture of office” by court order, which can, in some
cases, entail permanent disqualiﬁcation from holding any public office. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:51-2 (West 2019); State v. Hupka, 1 A.3d 640, 645-46 (N.J. 2010).
HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 2. These ﬁgures do not cover New York, which adopted decertiﬁcation regulations after the report was written. See supra note 73.
FLA. STAT. § 943.12(3).
Id. § 943.1395(6)-(7); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011 (2019).
FLA. STAT. § 943.139(2); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.002(5).
FLA. STAT. § 943.1395(5); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.003(1).
FLA. STAT. § 943.1395(5); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.003(2)(b).
While Florida is sometimes identiﬁed as the second-highest state (after Georgia) by number
of decertiﬁcations, see HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 2, that observation misses a few key points.
First, Florida is the third-largest state by population and therefore has more officers than most
other states. Second, most officers decertiﬁed in Florida are corrections officers, not the lawenforcement officers on whom we focus here. In 2011, for example, Florida decertiﬁed 72 law-
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Given all of these regulations, how do wandering officers still manage to ﬁnd
work? For starters, local agencies do not always conduct thorough background
investigations before hiring.81 Even when they do, past employers are not always
forthcoming and sometimes conceal the real reasons for an officer’s separation.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that officers who commit misconduct are often allowed to resign, with a guaranteed positive work reference, in exchange for forgoing legal action.82 Similarly, local agencies do not always notify their state
POST boards about officer misconduct. Even setting aside cases in which local
agencies disregard mandatory disclosure obligations,83 reporting to POST is
wholly voluntary in most states.84 Agencies are reportedly reluctant to disclose
negative employment information—either to other local agencies or state POST
boards—for fear of being sued for defamation.85 Even more important, as men-

81.
82.

83.
84.
85.

enforcement officers at a rate of 1.6 decertiﬁcations per 1,000 officers, which made it the nineteenth-most-frequent decertiﬁer per officer in the country. See Loren T. Atherley & Matthew
J. Hickman, Officer Decertiﬁcation and the National Decertiﬁcation Index, 16 POLICE Q. 420, 43132 tbl.1 (2013). Still, Florida does decertify officers more frequently than other big states such
as California, Texas, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Illinois, and Ohio. For examples of states
with apparently broader decertiﬁcation authority than Florida, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 233-35(3) (2019), which permits decertiﬁcation for officers who “have been discharged from
employment for cause” or “have engaged in conduct unbecoming of a law enforcement ofﬁcer”; and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.85(3)(cm) (West 2019), which authorizes the POST board
to “[d]ecertify law enforcement . . . officers who terminate employment or are terminated.”
See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548; Cohen, supra note 40; Dewan & Oppel, supra
note 1; Williams, supra note 21.
See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 54, at 382; Cara E. Rabe-Hemp & Jeremy Braithwaite, An Exploration of Recidivism and the Officer Shuffle in Police Sexual Violence, 16 POLICE Q. 127, 140
(2012); Williams, supra note 21. In Florida, speciﬁcally, see Anthony Cormier & Matthew
Doig, Police Agencies Undermine System, HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.) (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:04
AM),
http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20111211/special-report-police-agencies
-undermine-system [https://perma.cc/7QFA-8QEC].
See Cormier & Doig, supra note 82.
See HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 5.
See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548; Steven Puro et al., Police Decertiﬁcation:
Changing Patterns Among the States, 1985-1995, 20 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES &
MGMT. 481, 492-94 (1997); see also J. Hoult Verkeke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference
Practices, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 135 (1998) (“Providing such negative information creates a
risk of defamation liability while offering few clear beneﬁts to the referring employer. Indeed,
the available empirical evidence suggests that former employers are less likely to reveal employee misconduct than any other information about the employee.”). Florida law attempts
to ameliorate this and several of the other problems mentioned. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 943.133(3) (2019) (requiring background checks); id. § 943.134(1)(b)-(2)(a) (requiring
prior employers to disclose disciplinary history and reasons for separation); id. § 943.134(5)
(providing immunity for disclosure of employment information to a subsequent hiring
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tioned earlier, many states deﬁne the scope of POST-reportable conduct narrowly—twenty states, for example, require a criminal conviction before an officer
can be decertiﬁed.86 In other words, not all “police misconduct” must be reported even in mandatory-reporting states. In addition, local agencies sometimes learn about prior misconduct and hire the officers anyway.87
Officer mobility across state lines introduces yet another layer of complexity.
A signiﬁcant problem with state-by-state certiﬁcation is that an officer decertiﬁed in one state can move across state lines and obtain certiﬁcation, and then
employment, in another. In an effort to address this problem, the International
Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training constructed a national database called the National Decertiﬁcation Index (NDI).88
State POST boards are encouraged to enter their decertiﬁcation decisions into
the database. When a decertiﬁed officer attempts to ﬁnd employment in another
state, that state’s POST board—or, in some cases, the local hiring agency—can
query the database and review the prior decertiﬁcation record.
Unfortunately, the NDI is far from watertight. As mentioned, ﬁve states plus
the District of Columbia—which collectively employ a signiﬁcant share of all
law-enforcement officers nationwide—have no decertiﬁcation authority.89
Among the majority of states that do decertify officers, reporting to the NDI is
voluntary.90 In 2011, only thirty states contributed to the database; by 2015, that
number rose to thirty-eight.91 On the back end, only 375 local agencies have permission to query the NDI directly when hiring. The rest must rely on their state
POST boards, only twenty-eight of which say they “always” or “frequently”

86.
87.

88.

89.
90.

91.

agency); id. § 943.139(4) (providing immunity for disclosure to CJSTC). It is unclear how
effective these provisions are and, in any event, many states have no analogs.
Fisher, supra note 25; Merchant et al., supra note 25.
See HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 7 (stating that “four POSTs reported that law enforcement
agencies in their state have hired individuals as officers who had been decertiﬁed in another
state”). Consider Tom Coleman as well.
See Raymond A. Franklin et al., 2009 Survey of POST Agencies Regarding Certiﬁcation Practices,
NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 3-4 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij
/227927.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJT7-R6K6].
See Goldman, supra note 54, at 382; sources cited supra note 73.
Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Officers’ Licenses and Federal Criminal
Prosecution: An Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 121, 125
(2003); Merchant et al., supra note 25.
HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 6.
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query the NDI.92 In 2009, Florida reported that it “occasionally” queries the national database.93
The conﬂuence of all these legal and institutional forces is thought to channel
wandering officers toward small, understaffed, and resource-strapped agencies.94 Budget constraints impede thorough background checks. They also make
wandering officers, who may be prepared to settle for modest salaries and more
limited opportunities for professional advancement, more appealing—especially
where agencies must otherwise foot the bill to put rookie hires through the police
academy. And experienced wandering officers who are already trained and certiﬁed can hit the streets immediately.

92.

Id. at 7.
93. Franklin et al., supra note 88, at 41.
94. For versions of this narrative, see, for example, Atherley & Hickman, supra note 80, at 421
(“[D]ismissal isn’t always the ﬁnal word on the matter. Officers may be rehired by another
jurisdiction, in which case the new jurisdiction inherits another jurisdiction’s problem. This
can be a conscious decision by the hiring agency, especially in small jurisdictions where ﬁnancial resources are limited and lateral officers are simply scarce.” (citation omitted)); Bell, supra
note 32, at 2137 (“[T]he prevalence of very small departments in close proximity to each other
increases the likelihood that an officer ﬁred from one jurisdiction for serious reasons could
ﬁnd work as an officer in another. Poor communities are more likely to hire ‘gypsy cops,’
officers with spotty work histories who have been ﬁred elsewhere, because their resource constraints make it more difficult for them to discriminate between good and bad officers.”);
Goldman, supra note 54, at 373, 381, which describes the pressures faced by small departments
that lead them to hire previously terminated officers; Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548
(“Although it might seem unusual for a police department to hire an officer with a past record
of misconduct, the second department is usually located in a poor community that cannot
afford to pay high salaries to its police.”); Shockey-Eckles, supra note 26, at 299 (“These municipalities, although well known for high crime rates and excessive violence, typically offer
low pay and few beneﬁts to their officers. Hence, they are the very communities willing to
hire gypsy cops when other departments with more resources are unwilling to do so.”); Childress, supra note 28, which notes that “some departments still hire [wandering] officers, particularly those that are smaller and strapped for cash”; Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (“Veterans in trouble often ﬁnd second chances by heading down the career ladder, to smaller police
forces in need of experience.”); Dill, supra note 19, which describes efforts to remedy a state
shortage of police officers “while trying to avoid problem officers who bounce from department to department”; Toner & Rutecki, supra note 25, which reports that “poorer communities” in the Chicago suburbs “are also places where officers with troubled histories and records
of multiple shootings are often employed”; Williams, supra note 21 (“[S]maller departments
and those that lack sufficient funding or are understaffed are most likely to hire applicants
with problematic pasts if they have completed state-mandated training, which allows departments to avoid the cost of sending them to the police academy.”); and Yoder, supra note 25
(“Even if a background check turns up past rogue behavior, a small department may go ahead
anyway. Such agencies usually are in poor communities that can’t afford high salaries.”).
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ii. literature review
At least two academic literatures provide helpful background on the wandering-officer phenomenon. First, a number of studies, mostly in criminology, have
examined the correlates of police misconduct. Second, a large literature in labor
economics describes the dynamics of labor markets, largely for professions and
industries other than policing. We summarize each literature in turn.
A. Correlates of Police Misconduct
Empirical research directly examining law-enforcement hiring and separation has been fairly limited. Perhaps the most pertinent study concerns the New
York City Police Department (NYPD), the nation’s largest law-enforcement
agency. Criminologists Robert Kane and Michael White examined all involuntary separations in the NYPD between 1975 and 1996. They identiﬁed 1,543 ofﬁcers who were separated for so-called “career-ending misconduct” during that
period—roughly 2% of the 78,000 individuals the NYPD had employed.95 They
then compared these officers with randomly selected members of their respective
police academy classes.96
Using multivariate analyses, Kane and White identiﬁed differences between
the study and comparison groups that served as both risk and protective factors
for misconduct. In particular, black officers were signiﬁcantly more likely than
white officers to be terminated for misconduct.97 Prior criminal history, documented problems in prior jobs, civilian complaints, and assignment to busy patrols also signiﬁcantly predicted misconduct.98 Officers with associate’s or bachelor’s degrees, in contrast, were less likely to be ﬁred for misconduct, as were
officers who were older when hired or who were married.99 Kane and White
concluded that “police departments should continue to invest heavily in pre-employment screening processes that exclude people who have demonstrated records of criminal involvement and employee disciplinary problems” and embrace

95.

KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 8.
See id. at 3-5.
97. More precisely, black officers were more likely to be ﬁred for two out of three types of misconduct. Initially, the same was also true for Hispanic and Asian officers, but over time, their
separation rates converged with that for white officers. See id. at 99.
98. See id. at 93-94, 104.
99. See id. at 101-02.
96.
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“racial/ethnic diversity and post-secondary educational requirements.”100 Informative as it is, Kane and White’s study was set entirely within a single lawenforcement agency and does not speak to the lateral movement of officers
among agencies, our primary interest in this Article.
Kane and White’s ﬁndings are largely consonant with the broader literature
examining officer-level correlates of police misconduct. Some additional research has also found, for example, that past misconduct predicts future problems.101 Unlike Kane and White’s study, much of the research focuses speciﬁcally
on officer use of force. Studies ﬁnd that younger officers tend to use force more
often.102 So do less experienced officers,103 although that may be precisely because they are younger.104 Research on female officers is mixed. Studies have
found that female officers use less force than male officers in arrest situations105
and are less likely to shoot suspects106 but use similar levels of force in general
citizen encounters.107

100.
101.

102.

103.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 105.
See, e.g., Samuel Carton et al., Identifying Police Officers at Risk of Adverse Events, 2016 PROC.
22ND ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 67, 72
(“[O]fficers who are routinely found to have been engaged in an adverse event are likely to
engage in another such event in the future.”); James P. McElvain & Augustine J. Kposowa,
Police Officer Characteristics and the Likelihood of Using Deadly Force, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
505, 517 (2008) (“[P]revious history of shootings was a very strong predictor of future shootings.”); Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to
Predict Police Misconduct, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 225, 227 (2019) (ﬁnding that past civilian allegations predict future misconduct).
See, e.g., JOEL H. GARNER & CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL, UNDERSTANDING THE PREVALENCE
AND SEVERITY OF FORCE USED BY AND AGAINST THE POLICE (2002); Steven G. Brandl et al.,
Who Are the Complaint-Prone Officers? An Examination of the Relationship Between Police Officers’
Attributes, Arrest Activity, Assignment, and Citizens’ Complaints About Excessive Force, 29 J. CRIM.
JUST. 521, 521 (2001); Christopher Chapman, Use of Force in Minority Communities Is Related
to Police Education, Age, Experience, and Ethnicity, 13 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 421, 433 (2012).
See, e.g., Eugene A. Paoline, III & William Terrill, Police Education, Experience, and the Use of
Force, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 179, 193 (2007); William Terrill & Stephen D. Mastrofski,
Situational and Officer-Based Determinants of Police Coercion, 19 JUST. Q. 215, 242-43 (2002).
See Chapman, supra note 102, at 433 (ﬁnding that, controlling for age, less experienced officers
use less force).
See GARNER & MAXWELL, supra note 102; Amie M. Schuck & Cara Rabe-Hemp, Women Police:
The Use of Force by and Against Female Officers, 16 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 91 (2007).
See McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 101, at 515.
See Eugene A. Paoline, III & William Terrill, Women Police Officers and the Use of Coercion, 15
WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 97, 107-08 (2004) (“[B]oth males and females choose not to invoke
their coercive authority rather similarly (i.e., 44% of the female encounters resulted in no coercion versus 42% for males).”).
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Education, too, has received sustained attention. Studies have found that ofﬁcers with more education use less force108 and are subject to fewer disciplinary
allegations and founded complaints.109 In tension with Kane and White’s recommendation, however, agency-level studies have not found that minimum education requirements reduce misconduct or use of force.110 One possible explanation is that educational requirements shrink the pool of eligible candidates,
excluding otherwise-promising individuals.111
Empirical scholars have also closely examined the relationship between certain hiring requirements and police misconduct. Perhaps the largest body of research examines the capacity of psychological exams to predict officer performance and, in particular, to identify candidates likely to have disciplinary
problems. Many studies ﬁnd that personality proﬁles predict performance,112

108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

See, e.g., McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 101, at 518; Jason Rydberg & William Terrill, The
Effect of Higher Education on Police Behavior, 13 POLICE Q. 92, 110 (2010); Terrill & Mastrofski,
supra note 103, at 242, 244. But see Brandl et al., supra note 102, at 527 (“None of the analyses
conducted here would lead one to believe that officers’ race or level of education played a role
in the receipt of excessive use of force complaints.”).
See, e.g., Victor E. Kappeler et al., Police Officer Higher Education, Citizen Complaints and Departmental Rule Violations, 11 AM. J. POLICE 37, 50 (1992) (“Although officers with college degrees had fewer citizen-initiated complaints and fewer founded complaints for rudeness, they
did not have signiﬁcantly fewer department-generated complaints for violations of agency
rules and procedures.”); Kim Michelle Lersch & Linda L. Kunzman, Misconduct Allegations
and Higher Education in a Southern Sheriff’s Department, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 161, 166 (2001).
But see Donald M. Truxillo et al., College Education and Police Job Performance: A Ten-Year Study,
27 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 269, 269 (1998) (reporting that police officers’ education levels
had “an inconsistent relationship with measures of disciplinary action”).
See, e.g., David Eitle et al., The Effect of Organizational and Environmental Factors on Police Misconduct, 17 POLICE Q. 103, 118 (2014) (ﬁnding that “neither ﬁeld training nor educational
standards had a statistically discernible association with” police misconduct); Dale W. Willits
& Jeffrey S. Nowacki, Police Organisation and Deadly Force: An Examination of Variation Across
Large and Small Cities, 24 POLICING & SOC’Y 63, 72 (2014) (reporting that college requirements
and training hours do not have a statistically signiﬁcant relationship to deadly force incidents).
See, e.g., Lisa Kay Decker & Robert G. Huckabee, Raising the Age and Education Requirements
for Police Officers: Will Too Many Women and Minority Candidates Be Excluded?, 25 POLICING:
INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 789, 799 (2002) (“Not surprisingly, raising the educational requirements for sworn police applicants to require a four-year college degree would
eliminate a large number of the traditionally successful police applicants.”).
See, e.g., Ryan M. Roberts et al., Predicting Postprobationary Job Performance of Police Officers
Using CPI and MMPI-2-RF Test Data Obtained During Preemployment Psychological Screening,
J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 544 (2019) (ﬁnding correlations between prehire psychological
test results in California and Minnesota and supervisor ratings for police officers); Anthony
M. Tarescavage et al., Criterion Validity and Practical Utility of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2–Restructured Form (MMPI–2–RF) in Assessments of Police Officer Candidates,
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though a fair number reach the contrary conclusion.113 Numerous studies have
also identiﬁed particular psychological proﬁles that predict whether someone
will be a “problem officer.”114 As with educational requirements, however, there
is little evidence that psychological exams improve agency-level outcomes such
as civilian complaints or deaths.115
The empirical evidence on the effects of training is particularly conﬂicted.
Various studies have found that training is negatively,116 positively,117 or simply
not118 associated with adverse outcomes such as the use of force, civilian deaths,
civilian complaints, and general misconduct. One plausible explanation is that
the quality of training may matter more than the quantity. Researchers in one

113.

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.

97 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 382, 382 (2015) (ﬁnding correlations between prehire psychological test results in Minnesota and supervisor ratings for police officers).
See, e.g., Suzanne Daniels & Emily King, The Predictive Validity of MMPI-2 Content Scales for
Small-Town Police Officer Performance, 17 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 54, 58 (2002); Beth A.
Sanders, Using Personality Traits to Predict Police Officer Performance, 31 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 129, 141 (2008). These studies often measure officer performance
using ratings given by supervisors, an imperfect outcome measure. See Steven Falkenberg et
al., An Examination of the Constructs Underlying Police Performance Appraisals, 19 J. CRIM. JUST.
351, 356 (1991). Additional studies using more objective outcomes—such as internal investigations, involuntary termination, turnover, and disciplinary complaints—are similarly mixed.
Compare, e.g., Martin Sellbom et al., Identifying MMPI-2 Predictors of Police Officer Integrity and
Misconduct, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 985, 999 (2007), with, e.g., Jose M. Cortina et al., The
“Big Five” Personality Factors in the IPI and MMPI: Predictors of Police Performance, 45 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 119, 138 (1992).
See, e.g., Michael J. Cuttler & Paul M. Muchinsky, Prediction of Law Enforcement Training Performance and Dysfunctional Job Performance with General Mental Ability, Personality, and Life History Variables, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3, 19 (2006); Charles D. Sarchione et al., Prediction of
Dysfunctional Job Behaviors Among Law Enforcement Officers, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 904, 909
(1998).
See, e.g., Liqun Cao et al., A Test of Lundman’s Organizational Product Thesis with Data on Citizen
Complaints, 23 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 356, 367 (2000); Brad W.
Smith, Structural and Organizational Predictors of Homicide by Police, 27 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 539, 551 (2014).
See, e.g., EMILY G. OWENS ET AL., PROMOTING OFFICER INTEGRITY THROUGH EARLY ENGAGEMENTS AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016); Cao et al., supra note 115, at 367.
See, e.g., William C. Bailey, Less-Than-Lethal Weapons and Police-Citizen Killings in U.S. Urban
Areas, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 535, 543 (1996); Hoon Lee et al., An Examination of Police Use of
Force Utilizing Police Training and Neighborhood Contextual Factors: A Multilevel Analysis, 33 POLICING: INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 681 (2010).
See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 117; Willits & Nowacki, supra note 110.
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study, for example, found that roughly a quarter of the variation in officers’ complaint rates was attributable to the identity of their ﬁeld training officers, suggesting that qualitatively bad training may hurt more than it helps.119
B. Labor Economics
Although it does not focus on policing, speciﬁcally, a large body of research
in economics examines the dynamics of labor markets. A number of papers, for
example, study the costs to employers of employee turnover or “churn.” These
costs include the expense of temporarily covering the departing employee’s duties, such as through overtime for other workers; replacement costs, such as
screening new applicants; training costs, including on-the-job training and uniforms; lost productivity for the departing employee, who may spend his last days
writing exit memos or laboring with reduced morale; damaged morale for other
workers; and lost institutional knowledge.120 The costs of churn appear to vary
by region and industry121 and may, in some settings, be partially or wholly offset
by the beneﬁts of hiring new workers.122 Nevertheless, one recent literature review concludes that, on average, the cost of replacing an employee is roughly
one-ﬁfth of the employee’s salary (excluding the very highest-paid jobs).123
High turnover costs may, therefore, discourage law-enforcement agencies from
hiring and ﬁring wandering officers.
A related literature explores the employee-side costs of job separation and
unemployment. One consistent ﬁnding concerns the “unemployment scar”: displaced and nonemployed workers suffer long-term earnings losses.124 Such
119.
120.

121.
122.

123.
124.

See Ryan M. Getty et al., How Far from the Tree Does the Apple Fall? Field Training Officers, Their
Trainees, and Allegations of Misconduct, 62 CRIME & DELINQ. 821, 834 (2016).
See Heather Boushey & Sarah Jane Glynn, There Are Signiﬁcant Business Costs to Replacing Employees, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (Nov. 16, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org
/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/16084443/CostofTurnover0815.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR22
-YRCK].
See id. at 4-5.
See Zeynep Ton & Robert S. Huckman, Managing the Impact of Employee Turnover on Performance: The Role of Process Conformance, 19 ORG. SCI. 56, 57 (2008) (mentioning “improvement
of matches between employees and ﬁrms over time” and increased effort by replacement employees).
Boushey & Glynn, supra note 120, at 1.
See, e.g., Louis S. Jacobson et al., Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 685,
687 (1993) (ﬁnding that high-tenure workers who separate from distressed ﬁrms suffer
longer-term earnings losses averaging 25% per year). See generally William J. Carrington &
Bruce Fallick, Why Do Earnings Fall with Job Displacement?, 56 INDUS. REL. 688 (2017) (reviewing the literature).
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workers, for example, may leave the work force or move to ﬁrms that pay lower
wages.125 Unsurprisingly, earnings losses are greater for workers whom ﬁrms
exercise discretion to ﬁre than for workers displaced by, say, a plant closing—the
former reveals important information about worker quality.126 Fired workers
also experience longer unemployment spells.127 Based on these ﬁndings from the
labor economics literature, we expect that wandering officers will take longer to
land new jobs than other officers and that they will tend to move to less desirable
agencies.
The concept of “wandering workers” is not itself novel. Journalists have, for
example, penned numerous stories about clergy or teachers who, following misconduct, leave one parish or school and ﬁnd work in another.128 As far as we can
tell, however, the labor-economics literature has not focused on most of the core
questions that concern us here: which ﬁrms hire displaced workers and how do
those workers fare upon reemployment? The closest study of which we are aware
examines the market for ﬁnancial advisers.129 The authors ﬁnd that seven percent of working ﬁnancial advisers have misconduct records, and roughly onethird of these are repeat offenders.130 Approximately half of these advisers lose
their jobs after misconduct, yet forty-four percent of them are rehired by other
ﬁrms within a year—they are, in our terminology, “wandering ﬁnancial advisers.”131 This is true even though advisers with prior misconduct are ﬁve times as
likely as the average adviser to commit misconduct in the future.132 Still, advisers

125.

126.
127.
128.

129.
130.
131.
132.

See, e.g., Fatih Guvenen et al., Heterogeneous Scarring Effects of Full-Year Nonemployment, 170
AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 369, 370 (2017) (ﬁnding heterogeneous scarring effects from one year’s nonemployment, resulting primarily from a higher incidence of future
nonemployment rather than lower earnings conditional on working); Kristiina Huttunen et
al., How Destructive Is Creative Destruction? Effects of Job Loss on Job Mobility, Withdrawal and
Income, 9 J. EURO. ECON. ASS’N 840, 842 (2011) (ﬁnding that displacement increases the probability of leaving the labor force by 31% and, for workers who remain, moderately depresses
earnings due to movement between ﬁrms).
See Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz, Layoffs and Lemons, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 351, 375 (1991).
Id.
See, e.g., Tara Isabella Burton, Scathing Report Reveals 300 Pennsylvania Catholic Priests Sexually
Abused over 1,000 Children, VOX (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17689994
/catholic-sex-abuse-priest-crisis-pennsylvania-report
[https://perma.cc/G6EW-HZ2G];
Martha Irvine & Robert Tanner, Sexual Misconduct Plagues US Schools, WASH. POST
(Oct. 21, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/21
/AR2007102100144.html [https://perma.cc/MH5D-527P].
Mark Egan et al., The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct, 127 J. POL. ECON. 233 (2019).
Id. at 248, 251.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 254.
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who commit misconduct do experience an elevated likelihood of industry exit,
longer gaps between employment stints, and, for those who ﬁnd new jobs, lower
compensation at smaller, less desirable ﬁrms.133 Observing that some ﬁrms employ substantially more wandering advisers than others and that misconduct is
more common in wealthy, elderly, and less educated counties, the authors hypothesize that “misconduct may be targeted at customers who are potentially less
ﬁnancially sophisticated.”134
To our knowledge, there is no prior quantitative empirical work on wandering police officers. In the following parts, we report the results of the ﬁrst systematic exploration of this phenomenon. Where possible, we examine how the
correlates of misconduct described above interact with wandering-officer status
and other outcomes of interest.
iii. data
Our primary source of data is the Automated Training Management System
(ATMS), a database constructed and maintained by the FDLE. We supplement
ATMS with a range of other data sources, including an annual survey of Florida
law-enforcement agencies, the United States Census, the Uniform Crime Reports, and others.
A. Automated Training Management System (ATMS)
ATMS compiles information on employment, termination, complaints, discipline, and demographics for every law-enforcement and corrections officer
hired in the State of Florida. Our ATMS extract runs up through June 2017.
We rely on three ATMS data sets in particular. First, the “employment” data
set is structured at the officer-employment level. This means that the same ofﬁcer can appear in multiple rows, one for each job he has held. The raw employment data set has 543,874 observations. We drop a substantial number of them.
First, given our focus on wandering law-enforcement officers, we drop all employment positions categorized by ATMS as “corrections,” “corrections probation,” “concurrent” (both law enforcement and corrections), “civilian,” “instructor,” and “auxiliary.”135 Doing so removes approximately 351,000 rows from the
data. Second, we drop all rows for part-time officers, focusing only on full-time

133.

Id. at 267-72. The ﬁnding concerning the gap between employment stints is driven by advisers
who are not rehired; conditional on being rehired, advisers recently disciplined for misconduct ﬁnd work marginally faster than other advisers. See id. at 269-70.
134. Id. at 238; see id. at 275-81.
135. When we include concurrent officers, the core results of the Article do not change.
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employment. Third, we drop all employment associated with a very small number of officers whose full-time employment dates across two or more positions
overlap by more than 30 days. Fourth, we drop all employment stints beginning
after 2016 because we have only six months of data for 2017. Fifth, we exclude all
employment stints that ended before 1988 due to concerns about whether ATMS
is comprehensive in earlier years.136 Sixth, we drop all stints that end with officers “transferring within agency” to other full-time law-enforcement positions
because these are not true separations for our purposes.137 Before dropping these
stints, however, we assign their start dates to the subsequent employment stints
(to which the officers transferred) to account for the full length of employment.
After applying each of these sample restrictions, the employment data set
contains the 128,616 full-time law-enforcement job stints that spanned at least
one day between 1988 and 2016; they correspond to 98,169 unique officers. Most
of our analyses, however, focus on the 100,768 of those stints that began in or
after 1988 and that correspond to 76,279 unique officers in 490 unique agencies.
Among those agencies, 321 are police departments, 67 are sheriffs’ offices, and
102 are other agencies, which include state-level, university, school, port, and
other kinds of law-enforcement agencies. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics
at the agency-year level. The bottom row indicates that, on average, agencies
were closed for operation in roughly ﬁfteen percent of agency-years; we thus
drop those agency-years from the rest of the descriptive statistics reported in the
table.138 On average, agencies in the data set employed a mean of 98 and a median of 27 full-time officers on at least one day in each year. They hired a mean
of 8.4 and a median of 4 full-time officers per year, and experienced a mean of 5
separations and a median of 2.

136.

Our coverage concerns stem from a substantial increase in the volume of hirings in the years
before 1988, which suggests that the database may not have been capturing all employment
stints during that period. To be clear, although we exclude stints that ended before 1988 from
our analytic data set, we still use those stints to determine officers’ ﬁring histories. To illustrate, suppose a law-enforcement officer was ﬁred from a job in 1987 and then found work
again in 1988. For purposes of our analysis, this officer would have only one row in our data
set—for the employment stint beginning in 1988—which would indicate that the officer had
been previously ﬁred.
137. In contrast, when an officer transfers within agency from a full-time law-enforcement position to a part-time or non-law-enforcement position, we keep the employment stint and treat
it as a voluntary separation because the subsequent stint does not meet the eligibility criteria
for our sample. In some cases, multiple full-time law-enforcement officers “transfer within
agency” on the same day to full-time law-enforcement positions in a different agency, likely
because the initial agency was absorbed by another agency. We assume that these are not true
separations. We therefore assign the start date and other relevant information from the ﬁrst
stint to the second and drop the initial stint from the data.
138. We assume an agency is closed in a given year if it has no full-time law-enforcement officers
employed on any day in that year.
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TABLE 1.

agency-year-level descriptive statistics, 1988-2016

Mean

Median

SD

Min.

Max.

Officers Employed

98.0

27

241.7

1

3,272

Hirings

8.4

4

16.30

0

353

Separations

5.0

2

8.90

0

237

Voluntary Separations

4.2

2

7.20

0

125

Firings

0.78

0

1.65

0

28

Firings for Misconduct

0.54

0

1.18

0

20

Complaints

0.61

0

1.94

0

85

Agency Closed

0.15

0

0.36

0

1

The employment database provides a range of information on each job, including agency name, start and end date, and cause of separation. That last variable is our principal variable of interest. A separation can be either voluntary or
involuntary; it is simply the end of an employment stint, regardless of the reason. We refer to involuntary separations as “terminations,” “involuntary terminations,” or, more colloquially, “ﬁrings.” In total, the variable measuring cause
of separation has thirty-seven different code values. Unfortunately, some of
those values have not been used consistently over time. In consultation with the
FDLE, we have grouped the codes to produce two cause-of-separation measures
that correspond to salient separation categories—voluntary and involuntary separations, or quitting and getting ﬁred—and minimize inconsistencies in data collection over time.139
To reﬁne the broad category of involuntary separations, we develop two
measures of ﬁring. Our ﬁrst, and narrower, measure captures terminations for
“moral character violations” or violations of a local agency’s policy. For convenience, we refer to these terminations as ﬁrings for “misconduct.”140 Agency policy violations may include things like insubordination or failing to follow orders.

139.

For the frequency distributions of these codes among law-enforcement positions beginning
between 1988 and 2016 and their inclusion in our cause-of-separation measures, see infra Table A1.
140. There is no legal authority or academic consensus on the deﬁnition of “police misconduct.”
See KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 20-28.
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Theoretically, they can also include more minor offenses, such as not having
one’s uniform pressed—agency policy manuals are hefty tomes. Generally speaking, however, the types of agency policy violations that warrant termination are
serious or represent the culmination of a pattern of misconduct. It is, after all,
notoriously difficult to ﬁre a police officer.141 The agencies we studied experienced an average of 0.54 ﬁrings for misconduct per year, accounting for roughly
10.8% of all separations.
A second, and broader, measure captures all instances in which officers are
ﬁred for cause. This measure includes ﬁrings for misconduct, but it also includes
terminations for training and performance problems. It does not, however,
count involuntary separations due to downsizing or the dissolution of an agency,
which together account for no more than 1.8% of all separations in the data. As
Table 1 shows, the agencies in our data set saw an average of almost 0.78 ﬁrings
for cause per year during the study period, accounting for roughly 15.6% of all
separations. We deﬁne the remaining 84.4% of the separations as voluntary separations.
One signiﬁcant methodological problem in any study of police employment
and misconduct is that officers who are under investigation are frequently allowed to resign before being terminated involuntarily.142 Fortunately, at least after 1998, ATMS tracks officers who resign “in lieu of separation” or “while being
investigated” for misconduct.143 We include these separations in our ﬁring
measures.
The vast majority of employment stints are easy to deﬁne: they are cleanly
marked by a start and an end date. But there are some edge cases that complicate
that seemingly simple line. Perhaps most important, as mentioned earlier, in

141.

See, e.g., Kelly et al., supra note 72; Tess Owen, Why It’s Hard to Fire Cops, VICE NEWS (Oct.
16, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjy8xw/why-is-it-so-hard-for-cops-to-get
-ﬁred [https://perma.cc/3YD9-RPSL]; Mike Riggs, Why Firing a Bad Cop Is Damn Near Impossible, REASON (Oct. 19, 2012), https://reason.com/2012/10/19/how-special-rights-for-law
-enforcement-m [https://perma.cc/SKQ5-R8WC].
142. See, e.g., Jeremy Gorner, 2 Chicago Cops Resign After Facing Firing for Off-Duty Traffic Dispute
That Led to Gunﬁre, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/breaking/ct-met-chicago-cop-traffic-dispute-police-board-20180330-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9VC3-W27U]; see also Cara E. Trombadore, Police Officer Sexual Misconduct: An Urgent Call to Action in a Context Disproportionately Threatening Women of Color, 32
HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 153, 167 (2016) (“Thus, an officer accused of sexual misconduct can resign before an investigation is completed, and then be hired by another department
where he may continue the behavior.”).
143. We suspect that FDLE was already counting these cases under another, more generic ﬁring
code before 1998 because we do not observe any bump in the total number of ﬁrings and
misconduct-related terminations in that year.
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some cases a labor arbitrator will reverse a ﬁring decision, forcing the agency to
reinstate the ﬁred officer—often months or years later. Unfortunately, there is no
code in the ATMS database that indicates when a ﬁred officer is reinstated after
arbitration. Nevertheless, in a small number of cases—roughly 8% of all ﬁrings
of full-time law-enforcement officers from 1988 to 2016—we do observe ﬁred
officers beginning their next employment stint in the same agency that ﬁred
them. Based on communications with FDLE staff, we suspect that many of these
cases represent arbitral reversals.144
Arbitral reversals pose not only a data challenge but also a conceptual one.
For reinstated officers, is the initial term of employment—or what we call the
“preﬁring stint”—and the period after reinstatement—the “postﬁring stint”—
one employment with a pause in the middle? Or is it two separate employments?
Should the initial ﬁring count as a ﬁring when the department is ultimately
forced to reinstate the officer? The answers likely vary depending on the research
question we seek to answer. Accordingly, for each of our analyses, we indicate
how we handle officers who are ﬁred and then rehired by the same agency.
We use our ﬁring measures to construct professional-history variables,
which indicate whether an officer was ﬁred from his last job or from an earlier
job. In constructing these variables, we include ﬁrings not only from law-enforcement positions but also from employment stints in corrections positions.
That is, although our subject is law-enforcement officers, speciﬁcally—and we
have dropped corrections officers from the employment data set—we use the
corrections-related data to check whether the law-enforcement officers we study
previously worked in corrections positions from which they separated involuntarily.
In addition to the employment data set, we use an ATMS data set containing
state-level “moral character” complaints against officers. Most of these complaints were initiated and investigated by the local agencies that employed the
officers named. Under Florida law, if an agency has cause to believe that an ofﬁcer has committed a moral character violation, it must investigate. If the agency
sustains the allegation, it must submit its ﬁndings to the FDLE, which will then
initiate a state-level complaint. The consistency with which local agencies investigate and report complaints to FDLE likely varies.145 The FDLE also has the
power to initiate complaints on its own, which are included in the data set. We
use the ATMS complaint data to compute the number of complaints ﬁled against
officers during each of their employment stints. We do this using the date on
144.
145.

See Email from Terry Baker, supra note 67.
See Anthony Cormier & Matthew Doig, Special Report: How Florida’s Problem Officers
Remain on the Job, HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.) (Dec. 4, 2011, 12:01 AM), https://
www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20111204/News/605219990/SH
[https://perma.cc
/AW38-TJK6].
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which complaints were initiated, which will typically succeed the date on which
the alleged misconduct occurred. That said, based on communications with the
FDLE, we suspect that, in most cases, these two dates are close in time. These
moral-character complaints are rare—agencies experienced an average of
roughly 0.61 complaints per year. Each complaint in the data set is also tagged
with “offense codes” that indicate the substantive nature of the misconduct alleged, and some complaints are associated with multiple offense codes. We use
these codes to identify the subset of complaints that include any allegation of
violent or sexual misconduct or misconduct that implicates the officer’s integrity.
Finally, ATMS contains an officer-level database that provides demographic
information including race, gender, age, and education. Officer race is designated as white, black, Hispanic, Asian, or other, and we use these terms throughout. We merge these demographic data with the employment data.
B. Supplemental Data Sources
We supplement the ATMS database with several other data sources to leverage additional information on the agencies that employ wandering officers. To
collect information on agency hiring and training requirements, we obtained
from the FDLE all data from the Criminal Justice Agency Proﬁle (CJAP), an annual survey of all law-enforcement agencies in Florida that has run from 1997 to
2016.146 We extract from CJAP information on hiring and training requirements
for all municipal police agencies and sheriffs’ offices in the state. We do not capture data for these variables for other law-enforcement agencies, such as those
in schools, universities, or ports. In total, 358 unique police departments and
sheriffs’ offices appear in at least one year of the survey. Some agencies are not
present every year, either because they formed after 1997 or dissolved before
2016, or because they did not respond to the survey. We create an agency-year
panel data set in which every agency that appears at least once has a row for each
of the twenty years of our study—7,160 rows in total.
With respect to hiring prerequisites, CJAP gathers information on minimum
age, minimum education, prior criminal-justice experience, and tobacco use.
CJAP also collects information on whether each agency requires a driving history, an in-person interview, a physical ﬁtness test, a polygraph examination, a
psychological examination, a written exam, a swimming test, a vision test, or a
voice-stress analysis. It also records the length of any probationary employment

146.

We are grateful to Guangya Liu for her heroic efforts to extract and process the relevant variables from CJAP.
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period.147 To compute a rough estimate of each agency’s overall hiring stringency in a given year, we create a composite measure combining these requirements.148 On average, agencies have a hiring-stringency score of 4.6 on our scale.
The average score increased from 1997 to 2016, from 4.3 to 5.2.
CJAP also collects information on ongoing training requirements. These include training on chemical agents, defensive tactics, driving, ﬁrearms, and ﬁrst
aid. In addition, CJAP records the length of the training period required of new
officers under a ﬁeld training officer (FTO).149 As with hiring, we combine the
training requirements to create a composite measure of the stringency of an
agency’s training regimen.150 On average, agencies have a hiring-stringency
score of 2.9. Agencies’ average composite-training score increased from 1997 to
2016, from 2.6 to 3.3.
We also supplement the data with additional sources of information, which
we describe in greater detail below. First, using Google Maps, we geocoded the
longitude and latitude coordinates of law-enforcement agencies to measure the
distance that wandering officers travel from one job to the next. Second, we obtained agency-level annual crime data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.
Third, we gathered county- and city-level information on the racial and ethnic
composition of resident populations and unemployment rates from the United
States Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, we obtained information
on county- and city-level law-enforcement expenditures from the Florida Department of Financial Services.
C. Limitations
Although our data is rich and reasonably comprehensive, there are important
limitations worth noting. One substantive limitation is that the separation codes
147.

Descriptive statistics for these variables are available in Table A2.
148. We construct our composite score by giving an agency one point for every hiring requirement.
To maximize the length of our observation period, we do not include hiring variables that
were excluded from one or more years of the survey. This leads us to drop driving history,
voice-stress analysis, and the swimming test. Three variables—age, education, and probationary period—are not binary. We therefore specify a threshold at which to assign an agency a
point for these requirements. Based on the statistics reported in Table A2, we assign agencies
a point for requiring officers to be older than nineteen, to have an associate’s degree or college
credit, and to undergo more than twelve months of probationary employment.
149. Descriptive statistics for these variables are available in Table A3.
150. To construct the composite-training score, we give agencies one point for requiring training
in chemical agents, defensive tactics, driving, ﬁrearms, or ﬁrst aid every six months or year.
We give them an additional point for requiring more than twelve months of training under
an FTO.
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we use to construct our cause-of-separation measures (listed in Table A1) reveal
only the general reason for each separation, such as a failure to complete training
requirements, budgetary constraints, misconduct, or a voluntary departure.
Within the all-important category of ﬁrings for misconduct, we are not able to
identify the speciﬁc nature of the misconduct, such as excessive force, embezzlement, substance abuse, and so on. That said, even if we had more speciﬁc information on the official reason for termination, it would remain difficult in many
cases to determine reliably the actual, underlying conduct at issue. As just one
example, NYPD officer Martin Tisdale shot and killed a woman during a struggle over his ﬁrearm, ﬂed the scene, and then disposed of the ﬁrearm. The official
reason for his termination was recorded as “failure to safeguard a weapon.”151
Other limitations relate to the geographic scope of our data, all of which are
drawn from the State of Florida. We cannot, for example, observe officers who
were ﬁred out of state and then obtained law-enforcement work in Florida. That
our data is limited to one state also raises questions about the external validity of
our results—that is, the extent to which our conclusions generalize to other locations. It is certainly possible that law-enforcement labor markets vary from
state to state in ways that implicate our research questions. Indeed, we note below some reasons to believe that wandering officers may be relatively more prevalent in some other states,152 except for Connecticut, which bans their hiring altogether.153 At the same time, we are unaware of any reason to think that Florida
is idiosyncratic in pertinent respects.
A national study, it bears noting, would not be practicable at this time. Although we have not conducted an exhaustive survey, we are unaware of any other
state that collects and makes available the type of data contained in Florida’s
ATMS. There are, moreover, methodological advantages to working within a
single state. For one thing, any state-level covariates, such as state law or other
state characteristics, are held constant, simplifying statistical analysis and reducing the risk of omitted variable bias. In addition, that a single entity (a state
agency) collects all of the critical data signiﬁcantly mitigates concerns about data
consistency.
iv. describing the wandering officer
Thousands of law-enforcement officers begin and end jobs in Florida each
year. Some are hired for the ﬁrst time; some for the third or fourth. Some sepa-

151.

KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 1-3.
152. See infra Section IV.B.1.
153. See infra Section VI.E.
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rate voluntarily to retire or change careers; others are ﬁred for grievous misconduct. Section IV.A presents an overview of the law-enforcement labor market in
Florida, describing hiring patterns and then separations. Section IV.B details the
prevalence, characteristics, movement patterns, and behavior of wandering ofﬁcers.
A. The Law-Enforcement Labor Market in Florida
1. Hirings
The law-enforcement labor market in Florida is large. As the black line in
Figure 1 reveals, Florida agencies hired between 2,000 and 4,000 full-time officers in most years between 1988 and 2016.154 In general, trends in hiring appear
to track conditions in the wider American economy. The number of officers hired
each year dropped dramatically during the economic recession in 1990 and 1991.
It then began rising again until it peaked in the late 2000s and fell during the
Great Recession, from 2007 to 2009. Since then, the number has been steadily
rising.

154.
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To give a complete picture of the ATMS database over time, all of the data we report in this
subsection include both the pre- and postﬁring terms for officers who were ﬁred and then
rehired by the same agency for their next job. As noted, the postﬁring term likely represents
an employment stint resulting from an arbitrator’s decision to reinstate the officer. See supra
Section III.A.

the wandering officer

FIGURE 1.

total number of law-enforcement officers hired and separated, 1988-2016

Men held the vast majority of full-time law-enforcement jobs in Florida from
1988 to 2016—roughly 85%. Most jobs also went to white officers—73%—with
11% to black officers and 15% to Hispanic officers. Educational information is
available for about 60% of the jobs in the employment database. Of those, 18%
were held by officers with only a high school education. Another 24% were held
by officers with an associate’s degree and 50% by officers with a bachelor’s degree. Just 8% were held by officers with a master’s degree.155
2. Separations
Turning to separations, Figure 1 shows that, in most years from 1988 to 2016,
about 2,000 to 3,500 officers separated from their jobs, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily. Unsurprisingly, the number of separations tracks the number of
hires, rising in most years except during recessions, when fewer jobs are available.
155.

Although our data identify Asian officers and officers with doctoral degrees, we do not report
them here because they are too scarce. We also decline to report ﬁgures where officer characteristics are unknown or where officer race is coded as “Other.”
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In Figure 2, we disaggregate separations by cause.156 From 1988 to 2016, an
average of 13% of separations were involuntary—meaning that the officer was
ﬁred—while the remaining 87% were voluntary. The proportion of involuntary
separations fell in the 1990s, from roughly 19% to 12%, but has remained relatively stable since then. The same basic pattern characterizes ﬁrings for misconduct, speciﬁcally.
FIGURE 2.

proportion of separations by cause of separation, 1988-2016

Table 2 breaks down by demographic characteristics the proportions of separations that were ﬁrings and ﬁrings for misconduct, respectively. The most
striking observation is that black officers were most likely to be ﬁred, both in
general and for misconduct: 22% of all separations involving black officers were
ﬁrings and 15% were ﬁrings for misconduct. Those rates were substantially
higher than the rates for Hispanic officers—who were ﬁred 18% of the time and
ﬁred for misconduct 11% of the time—and white officers—who were ﬁred 12%
of the time and ﬁred for misconduct 9% of the time. To be clear, these ﬁgures do

156.
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To give a complete picture of separations in the ATMS database, throughout this subsection
we count all involuntary separations, including those in the pre- and postﬁring terms for ofﬁcers who were ﬁred and then rehired by the same agency for their next job.
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not necessarily imply any problem with the relative performance of black officers. Black officers, for example, may be ﬁred more often due to discrimination in
the disciplinary process157 or because they are disproportionately assigned duties
that present elevated opportunities for misconduct.158
Educational background is also correlated with involuntary termination, at
least within the 60% of employment stints for which education data are available. Officers with only a high school education are most likely to be ﬁred, and
the rate of ﬁring generally decreases with higher educational attainment. Officers
without a four-year college degree are also most likely to be ﬁred for misconduct.
TABLE 2.

cause of separation by demographic groups, 1988-2016

n

Fired

Fired for
Misconduct

White

69,103

11.7%

8.6%

Black

8,228

21.6%

14.8%

Hispanic

8,323

17.8%

11.7%

Male

75,946

13.3%

9.7%

Female

11,155

13.4%

7.6%

High School

4,028

16.9%

8.8%

Associate’s

12,728

12.1%

8.5%

Bachelor’s

22,503

9.5%

6.3%

Master’s

3,637

7.2%

4.7%

87,116

13.3%

9.5%

Demographics

Race

Gender

Education

Overall

157.

See, e.g., KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 34, 99-101 (discussing possible heightened scrutiny
of black officers due to “tokenism”); Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839,
878-80 (2019).
158. See KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 34; see also James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165, 196 (1988) (“Disparities in on-duty shooting rates were
attributable largely to racial differences in rank and assignment.”); William A. Geller & Kevin
J. Karales, Shootings of and by Chicago Police: Uncommon Crisis—Part I: Shootings by Chicago
Police, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1813, 1859 (1981) (similar).
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B. The Wandering Officer
Despite the salience of wandering officers, we have remarkably little systematic data about them. In this Section, we attempt to answer four basic questions
that frequently arise in public discourse about police misconduct. First, how
common are wandering officers? Second, how easy is it for them to land new
jobs? Third, where do they go? And fourth, are they really a problem, in the sense
that they cause more harms than other officers to the communities they police?
We take each of these questions in turn.
Before we begin, a brief deﬁnitional note. There is no legal or even informal
consensus deﬁnition to tell us who, exactly, counts as a wandering officer. We
therefore adopt an expansive deﬁnition: a wandering officer is someone who was
ﬁred from at least one full-time law-enforcement or corrections position in the
State of Florida and later lands another full-time law-enforcement job in the
state. At times, we also break wandering officers into two smaller groups—those
who were ﬁred from their last job and those who were ﬁred from a job earlier in
their employment history—because the results for these groups differ in important respects.
1. How Common Are Wandering Officers?
In absolute numbers, wandering officers are fairly common. From 1988 to
2016, an average of roughly 1,100 full-time law-enforcement officers who had
previously been ﬁred, and just under 800 officers who had been ﬁred for misconduct, were employed by new agencies in any given year.159 Figure 3 depicts
the number of wandering officers employed over time. As the dark and light gray
lines show, the number of wandering officers employed throughout the state in
any given year has been relatively stable over time, with a slight decrease in recent years. The black line also shows that the number of all officers—divided by
ten to depict all three lines on the same axis—has been increasing steadily over
time. In 2016, just under 1,000 full-time officers had been previously ﬁred and
just over 600 had been ﬁred for misconduct. To be clear, these counts include
only wandering officers, not all officers who worked in law enforcement after having been ﬁred. If we include officers who were rehired by the same agency that
ﬁred them, the counts are even higher: from 1988 to 2016, on average, roughly
1,500 and 900 officers were employed who had previously been ﬁred or ﬁred for
misconduct, respectively.
159.

In this Section we exclude from our officer counts the post-ﬁring stints of officers who were
ﬁred and then rehired by the same agency (before being hired at any other agency). While
these officers have previously been ﬁred, they are not wandering officers because they have
not, as of yet, moved to another agency.
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FIGURE 3.

number of employed officers by professional history, 1988-2016

When viewed in relative terms, the prevalence of wandering officers seems
more limited. Almost 3% of all officers employed in any given year were wandering officers previously ﬁred and just 2% were wandering officers previously ﬁred
for misconduct. As Figure 4 shows, the relative proportion of wandering officers
has fallen gradually over time. This is partly because—as we observed Figure 3—
the total number of officers employed has increased. By 2016, just over 2% of all
officers employed were wandering officers who had ever been ﬁred and 1.4%
were wandering officers who had been ﬁred for misconduct.
FIGURE 4.

percent of all employed officers who are wandering officers, 1988-2016
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Whether there are many wandering officers or few, therefore, may be in the
eye of the beholder. In absolute terms, Florida law-enforcement agencies employ
many wanderers: in recent years, roughly 1,100 wandering officers who had previously been ﬁred and about 800 who had been ﬁred for misconduct. In total,
these officers likely interact with hundreds of thousands of civilians each year.160
Yet when viewed in relative terms, we see that the proportion of wandering ofﬁcers is small and decreasing gradually over time.
Still, we suspect that our ﬁgures underestimate the actual number of wandering officers for at least three reasons. First, because our data is limited to Florida agencies, we are unable to identify wandering officers who were previously
ﬁred from law-enforcement agencies in other states. Second, a small number of
officers may successfully obscure their employment history, even within the
Florida market. Some who have been ﬁred may simply lie and get away with it.
Others may have negotiated an apparently “voluntary” separation in exchange
for separating without a legal ﬁght.161 Third, other states may have more wandering officers than Florida does. Florida has a robust statewide data system
tracking officer employment and requires hiring agencies to investigate applicants’ employment history. Although it may be possible for an applicant to conceal a prior ﬁring, it is probably not easy. Florida also decertiﬁes more officers
than many other states, and a decertiﬁed officer cannot subsequently gain employment with any Florida agency. Because our estimate of the volume of wandering officers is likely a lowball—both for Florida, speciﬁcally, and for other
states—it is hard to conclude that wandering officers are a negligible phenomenon.
2. How Easily Do Wandering Officers Find New Work?
A second core question is how much difficulty officers have ﬁnding work after being ﬁred.162 In this Section, we probe this question along several dimensions, including how often ﬁred officers land a new job, how long it takes them
to do so (assuming they are looking for work), how far they have to travel, and
how many different jobs they tend to hold. We count as reemployment only full-

160.

Drawing upon official Florida data and prior academic research, Jordan Blair Woods recently
estimated that law-enforcement officers in Florida have conducted between 4.6 million and
13.8 million traffic stops annually during the past decade. See Jordan Blair Woods, Policing,
Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 MICH. L. REV. 635, 676 (2019). If wandering
officers conducted a proportional number of these stops—three percent—they would have
conducted between 138,000 and 414,000 stops each year.
161. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Shockey-Eckles, supra note 26, at 300 (asserting that ﬁred officers who resign rather
than face license revocation ﬁnd work “with relative ease”).
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time law-enforcement jobs in public agencies in Florida. We exclude jobs that
end with a ﬁring followed immediately by reemployment with the same agency,
a pattern that, as mentioned earlier, likely reﬂects reinstatement by an arbitrator
rather than the officer’s efforts and success on the job market.
a. Reemployment Rates
First, do officers who have been ﬁred obtain law-enforcement work less often
than officers who have not been? Interestingly, the answer depends on when
during their careers they were ﬁred. To explore this issue, we exclude all employment stints ending after 2013 to allow all officers in the data at least three years
to obtain a new position.
As the bottom row of Panel A in Table 3 reports, from 1988 to 2013, 39% of
officers who separated and had never been ﬁred obtained a new full-time lawenforcement position in Florida. In contrast, just 17% of officers who were ﬁred
from their last job secured a new position, which represents a statistically significant difference.163 Yet officers who were ﬁred further back in their employment
history obtained a new job at a rate similar to officers who had never been
ﬁred.164 The rest of Table 3 shows that the same basic results hold across officer
characteristics and when, in Panel B, we group officers by their history of ﬁrings
for misconduct, speciﬁcally.165

163.

p < 0.001. All of the statistical tests in Section IV.B.2 are two-sided t-tests clustered at the
person and agency level.
164. While the difference is substantively small, it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Ideally,
we would also calculate rehiring rates while excluding officers who have decided to retire, to
concentrate on the subset of separated officers who were most plausibly looking for law-enforcement work. We do not have data on retirements for ﬁred officers, however. As an imperfect alternative, we exclude officers who were over ﬁfty years of age at the time of separation;
in a separate analysis, we exclude officers with at least twenty-ﬁve years of full-time service at
the time of separation. The basic pattern of results for both analyses is substantively similar
to the results we report in the text.
166. Sample sizes are shown in parentheses.
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TABLE 3.

rehiring rates by demographic groups and professional history, 1988-2013166
Panel B: Fired for Misconduct

Never
Fired

Fired,
Last Job

Fired,
Earlier
Job

Never
Fired

Fired,
Last Job

Fired,
Earlier
Job

White

37%
(51,538)

18%
(6,702)

41%
(2,498)

37%
(53,908)

15%
(5,177)

42%
(1,653)

Black

40%
(5,073)

14%
(1,451)

48%
(414)

40%
(5,626)

12%
(1,074)

44%
(238)

Hispanic

49%
(5,164)

19%
(1,123)

51%
(304)

47%
(5,607)

17%
(795)

52%
(189)

Male

39%
(54,841)

17%
(8,283)

44%
(2,928)

39%
(57,692)

15%
(6,431)

45%
(1,929)

Female

35%
(7,926)

16%
(1,151)

32%
(311)

34%
(8,506)

13%
(717)

27%
(165)

High
School

56%
(1,664)

19%
(284)

60%
(60)

54%
(1,813)

19%
(160)

60%
(35)

Associate’s

36%
(9,359)

20%
(1,249)

40%
(453)

36%
(9,816)

17%
(940)

42%
(305)

Bachelor’s

41%
(16,996)

21%
(1,657)

45%
(596)

41%
(17,732)

18%
(1,174)

45%
(343)

Master’s

52%
(2,739)

31%
(187)

55%
(126)

52%
(2,849)

24%
(136)

58%
(67)

39%
(62,780)

17%
(9,436)

43%
(3,239)

38%
(66,212)

15%
(7,149)

44%
(2,094)

All

Education

Gender

Race

Panel A: Fired

166.

Sample sizes are shown in parentheses.
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We next examine reemployment rates over time. Figure 5 shows the proportion of officers who obtained a new job within three years, conditional on their
professional history of ﬁrings.167 We limit our rehiring measure to three years to
address a potential censoring problem: officers who separated in the last few
years had less time to secure a new job. If we did not limit the rehiring measure
in this way, censoring might severely deﬂate the rehiring rate in the last few years
relative to years prior.
As Figure 5 shows, the lower reemployment rates we observe for ﬁred officers
date back at least to the late 1980s. Moreover, the reemployment rate for officers
ﬁred from their last job fell in the early 1990s, from 25% to roughly 15%. That
number fell again around 2009, probably because—as we showed above—lawenforcement hiring generally fell throughout the state during the Great Recession. Since then, the reemployment rate for ﬁred officers appears to have increased slightly and may continue to do so if the 2009 drop was driven primarily
by the economic downturn.
FIGURE 5.

proportion of separations in which officer obtains subsequent employment
within three years, by professional history of firing, 1988-2013

167.

See Figure A1 for similar results on ﬁrings for misconduct, speciﬁcally.
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We cannot be sure why reemployment rates are so different for officers who
were ﬁred from their most recent job versus officers who were ﬁred from a job
further back in their employment history. One possible explanation is that the
subset of officers who landed an intervening job were initially ﬁred for conduct
that, on average, was less egregious than the officers who were ﬁred from their
last job. Another possibility is that wandering officers who voluntarily separated
from their last job seek employment in law enforcement at higher rates than
those who were ﬁred from their last job. A third potential explanation is that
law-enforcement agencies believe at least some previously ﬁred officers are “redeemed” if they have held at least one other job in the intervening period without
having been ﬁred. We interrogate this “redemption” story in further detail below.
b. Time to Reemployment
To assess how much ﬁred officers may struggle to obtain new employment,
we also consider how long it takes them to secure their next job. Folk wisdom
says not long. Our data, however, show something different.
As the bottom row of Table 4 reports, officers who were ﬁred or ﬁred for
misconduct from their most recent job who later obtain another job take substantially longer to do so, on average, than officers who have never been ﬁred or
ﬁred for misconduct—more than 300 days longer.168 In Table A4, we report the
median time to reemployment rather than the mean. The same basic pattern is
present, but the difference is even starker.169 These ﬁndings are driven, at least
partially, by the fact that officers who separate voluntarily often do not leave until
they have another job lined up.170 Once again, as the rest of Table 4 shows, ﬁrings further back in time are substantially less important and there is relatively
little variation in these patterns across demographic groups.

168.

p < 0.001.
169. The median time for officers ﬁred (350 days) or ﬁred for misconduct (450 days) from their
previous job is over 20 times longer than for officers who have never been ﬁred (17 days) or
ﬁred for misconduct (18 days).
170. We can see, for example, that many officers who separate voluntarily begin a new employment
stint the day after ﬁnishing the last one.
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TABLE 4.

mean time to new employment by demographic groups and professional
history, 1988-2013171

All

Education

Gender

Race

Panel A: Fired

171.

Panel B: Fired for Misconduct

Never
Fired

Fired,
Last Job

Fired,
Earlier
Job

Never
Fired

Fired,
Last Job

Fired,
Earlier
Job

White

400
(19,280)

685
(1,175)

443
(1,024)

402
(19,977)

782
(800)

454
(702)

Black

317
(2,049)

703
(210)

209
(198)

325
(2,224)

729
(129)

213
(104)

Hispanic

316
(2,519)

787
(212)

402
(154)

322
(2,649)

910
(137)

473
(99)

Male

378
(21,451)

694
(1,441)

407
(1,288)

380
(22,327)

785
(986)

428
(867)

Female

430
(2,750)

767
(180)

355
(98)

435
(2,892)

886
(92)

402
(44)

High
School

416
(937)

859
(55)

665
(36)

423
(977)

1,038
(30)

789
(21)

Associate’s

370
(3,401)

674
(247)

483
(179)

372
(3,538)

785
(162)

535
(127)

Bachelor’s

375
(6,982)

686
(347)

295
(270)

378
(7,236)

760
(210)

286
(153)

Master’s

440
(1,436)

774
(58)

586
(69)

439
(1,491)

897
(33)

854
(39)

384
(24,205)

703
(1,621)

403
(1,386)

386
(25,223)

794
(1,078)

426
(911)

Sample sizes are shown in parentheses.
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c. Distance Traveled for Reemployment
We also probe how much wandering officers may struggle to ﬁnd new work
by examining how far they travel to obtain their next job. The conventional wisdom is that wandering officers obtain jobs at agencies that are relatively far away
and so have less (often informal) information about their past conduct. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd little evidence of such differential movement.172
Among officers who have never been ﬁred, those who separate and ﬁnd new
employment move to an agency that is, on average, forty-two miles away from
their last job. Similarly, officers who were ﬁred from their last job or some job
further back in their employment history move to agencies that are, on average,
forty-four and forty-ﬁve miles away, respectively. The difference in median distances was just slightly larger.173 We also ﬁnd little difference in the movement
patterns of officers who were ﬁred for misconduct, speciﬁcally, either from their
most recent job or earlier.
d. Number of Subsequent Jobs
Finally, we examine how many full-time jobs wandering officers hold over
the course of their careers and, perhaps more important, after their ﬁrst ﬁring.
As a baseline for comparison, Figure 6 shows the proportion of officers who,
over the course of an entire career, worked a particular number of full-time
jobs.174 One thing is clear: most officers move around very little. The vast majority hold no more than one full-time job, and virtually all of them—roughly
94%—hold no more than two.

172.

To obtain geographic coordinates, we geocoded the names of each agency using an R package
called “ggmaps” that automatically runs queries on Google Maps. In total, we were able to
obtain geographic coordinates for 89% of the agencies in our sample. Most of the agencies we
could not geocode are state-level agencies with ambiguous (and potentially multiple) geographic locations. In total, we are missing geographic distance information for 17% of all employment stints from which an officer separated and later obtained another job.
173. Officers who have never been ﬁred move a median of fourteen miles. Officers who were ﬁred
from their last job move a median of twenty miles, while officers ﬁred further back in their
employment history move a median of seventeen miles.
174. We do not count the postﬁring stint for officers who were ﬁred and then rehired by the same
agency.
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Of course, not all officers who work more than one job are wandering officers; many were never ﬁred at all. The top panel of Figure 7 shows the proportion
of officers who, after having been ﬁred, worked a particular number of subsequent
full-time jobs; the bottom panel presents the same information for officers who
were ﬁred for misconduct. Both are consistent with what we already know: the
vast majority of ﬁred officers—around 81%—never secure another job. Moreover, very few—fewer than 6%—obtain more than one additional full-time job.
Virtually none obtain more than three. Wandering officers “jump[ing] from
agency to agency” who “may have 10 agencies under their belt within a 5 year
period” therefore appear to be exceedingly rare, if not apocryphal, at least as far
as our data can detect.175
FIGURE 6.

number of full-time positions held by unique officers, 1988-2016

175.

Dill, supra note 19.
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FIGURE 7.

number of full-time positions held by unique officers after being fired for
the first time, 1988-2016

Taken together, our data suggest that officers who were ﬁred from their most
recent job may face signiﬁcant challenges in securing new law-enforcement work
in Florida. They are half as likely as other officers to obtain a new position and
it takes them twice as long to do so. Moreover, the vast majority of officers who
were ﬁred hold a very small number of full-time positions throughout their career—virtually all of them have fewer than three. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrings from earlier in an officer’s career appear to pose a much smaller
obstacle to ﬁnding a new job.
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3. Where Do Wandering Officers Go?
If ﬁred officers struggle to ﬁnd work, they might seek employment at smaller
agencies, which may have fewer resources, or at agencies that serve socioeconomically disadvantaged communities of color with higher crime. Various accounts advance these hypotheses.176 To test them empirically, we compare, for
each wandering officer, characteristics of the previous agency in the year of separation to characteristics of the hiring agency in the year of hiring. We exclude all
years prior to 1996 because, for most of our agency-level variables, we lack data
before then. As in the previous Section, we also exclude jobs that end with a
ﬁring followed by reemployment with the same agency, which likely reﬂects reinstatement by an arbitrator rather than the discretionary decisions of officers
and agencies on the market.
Our data bear out some, but not all, of the hypotheses about the movement
patterns of wandering officers. In particular, we ﬁnd that wandering officers tend
to migrate to agencies with fewer resources in communities with slightly higher
proportions of residents of color. Officers who were just ﬁred tend to move to
smaller agencies as well. We ﬁnd no evidence, however, that wandering officers
move to areas with more unemployment or crime.
a. Agency Size
Officers who were ﬁred from their last job move to smaller agencies on average. We calculate agency size using the ATMS employment data set by counting
the number of unique full-time law-enforcement officers employed in each
agency each year. From 1996 to 2013, officers who had never been ﬁred and who
landed a new job moved, on average, from agencies with roughly 368 officers to
agencies with roughly 384 officers—representing a relative increase of nearly 4%.
In contrast, officers who were ﬁred or ﬁred for misconduct from their previous
job and who obtained a new position moved from agencies with 343 and 331 ofﬁcers to agencies with 194 and 136 officers, respectively—relative decreases of
43% and 59%. These differences between the increase experienced by officers
who had never been ﬁred, on the one hand, and the decreases experienced by
wandering officers, on the other, are both large and statistically signiﬁcant.177
Officers who were ﬁred at some point before their most recent separation
actually move in the opposite direction. These officers went from agencies with,

176.
177.

See sources cited supra note 94.
p < 0.001. All of the statistical tests in Section IV.B.3 are two-sided t-tests clustered at the
person and agency level.
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on average, 213 officers to agencies with 285 officers—a relative increase of
roughly 34%. This increase is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change
in agency size experienced by officers who had never been ﬁred.178 Note, however, that officers who were ﬁred at some point continue to work at smaller agencies, on average, than officers who had never been ﬁred.
b. Agency Resources
Wandering officers appear to migrate toward agencies with fewer resources.
To examine this issue, we collected data on law-enforcement expenditures by
every county and municipality in Florida from the Florida Department of Financial Services from 1996 to 2016. The data set, therefore, contains information
only on municipal police departments and sheriffs’ offices and not state-level,
university, school, or port agencies.179 Our expenditure ﬁgures include “personal
services” and “operating costs”—which cover salaries and beneﬁts—but exclude
“capital outlays.”180
Officers who had never been ﬁred and landed a new job moved, on average,
from agencies with operating budgets of $46.2 million to agencies with budgets
of $55.8 million—a relative increase of 21%. In contrast, officers who were ﬁred
from their last job moved, on average, from agencies with $43.6 million budgets
to agencies with $23.2 million budgets—which represents a 47% decline that is
statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers who
had never been ﬁred.181 Similarly, officers who were ﬁred for misconduct from
their last job moved, on average, from agencies with $38.2 million budgets to
agencies with $15.7 million budgets—a 58.9% decline that is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers who had never been

178.

p < 0.05. When we do the same comparison for ﬁrings for misconduct, however, the results
are not statistically signiﬁcantly different.
179. We are missing expenditure data for roughly 30% of all employment stints, but nearly all of
those missing observations—almost 90%—involve an officer moving to or from a law-enforcement agency that is neither a sheriff’s office nor a police department. Another limitation
of our data is that they are reported by municipalities and counties, not by the law-enforcement agencies themselves. Some municipalities contract with other municipalities or counties
for policing services. Our estimates of agency budgets may exclude funds provided to an
agency by another municipality.
180. We exclude capital outlays because they are spiky over time and because, while they potentially support an agency for many years, we observe only the year in which the money was
spent and not the years in which the beneﬁts of the purchase actually accrued.
181. p < 0.001.
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ﬁred for misconduct.182 As before, the experience of officers who were ﬁred further back in their employment history more closely resembles that of officers
who had never been ﬁred. Officers who were ﬁred further back in their career
moved, on average, from agencies with $26.9 million-dollar budgets to agencies
with $40.9 million-dollar budgets—a relative increase of 52% that is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers who had
never been ﬁred.
The same basic patterns emerge when we examine agencies’ budgetary dollars per officer, though the differences are smaller in magnitude.183 Officers who
had never been ﬁred and obtained a new job moved, on average, from agencies
with $90,000 per officer to agencies with $96,000 per officer—a relative increase
of 7%. In contrast, officers ﬁred from their last job moved, on average, from
agencies with $87,000 per officer to agencies with $78,000 per officer—a relative
decline of 10%, which is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers who had never been ﬁred.184 Similarly, officers ﬁred for
misconduct from their most recent job moved, on average, from agencies with
$82,000 per officer to agencies with $73,000 per officer—a relative decline of 11%
that is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers
who had never been ﬁred.185 Yet again, the behavior of officers who were ﬁred
further back in their employment history more closely resembles the behavior of
officers who had never been ﬁred. Officers who were ﬁred at some point further
back in their employment history moved, on average, from agencies with
$75,000 per officer to agencies with $85,000 per officer, which is not statistically
signiﬁcantly different from the increase experienced by officers who had never
been ﬁred.
c. Racial Composition
Our data suggest that wandering officers tend to move to areas with slightly
higher proportions of residents of color. We use municipal measures of race and
ethnicity from the Census for municipal agencies, and county-level measures for

182.

p < 0.001.
For this measure, we divide the agency’s budget by the total number of officers employed in
that same year. Because some law-enforcement agencies also employ correctional officers, we
include these officers in this estimate of agency size. We also ﬁnd the same basic patterns when
we examine budgetary dollars per resident rather than per officer.
184. p < 0.001.
185. p < 0.001.
183.
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all other agencies.186 Although county-level estimates are available annually, municipal estimates are not. We therefore use decennial measures from 1990, 2000,
and 2010. We apply the data from each of those Census years to all subsequent
years until the next decennial census.187
From 1996 to 2013, officers who had never been ﬁred and found new work
moved, on average, from agencies in areas with black populations averaging
17.2% to agencies in areas with black populations averaging 15.4%—a relative decrease of 10%. By contrast, officers who were ﬁred from their last job and found
new work moved, on average, from agencies in areas with black populations of
16.8% to agencies in areas with black populations of 18.8%—a relative increase
of 12%, which is a statistically signiﬁcant difference from the change experienced
by officers who had never been ﬁred.188 Similarly, officers who were ﬁred for
misconduct moved from agencies in areas with black populations of 17.6% to
agencies in areas with black populations of 19.2%—a relative increase of 9%,
which is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers who had never been ﬁred for misconduct.189 There is no statistically signiﬁcant difference between the movement patterns of officers who were ﬁred further
back in their career—whether or not for misconduct—and officers who had never
been ﬁred. The same basic patterns emerge if we examine population data for
Hispanic residents.190
As we have shown so far, our data support certain aspects of the conventional
wisdom about wandering officers—many move to smaller agencies, with fewer
resources, in communities with slightly more residents of color. But not every
186.

187.
188.
189.
190.

Our race data is missing for roughly 25% of all employment stints because it is mostly limited
to municipal police departments and sheriffs’ offices. Indeed, roughly 93% of all the missing
observations come from employment stints in which an officer moves from or to an agency
that is neither a municipal police department nor a sheriff’s office.
In other words, we assign 1990 data to all years between 1997 and 1999; we assign 2000 data
to all years between 2000 and 2009; and we assign 2010 data to all years after 2010.
p < 0.001.
p < 0.05.
Officers who had never been ﬁred moved, on average, from agencies in areas with 14% Hispanic populations to agencies in areas with 13.5% Hispanic populations—a relative decrease
of 4%. Officers who were ﬁred from their last job moved in the other direction, from agencies
in areas with 13.6% Hispanic populations to agencies in areas with 15.2% Hispanic populations—a relative increase of 12%, which is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change
experienced by officers who had never been ﬁred (p < 0.05). Similarly, officers ﬁred for misconduct for their last job moved from agencies in areas with 14.5% Hispanic populations to
agencies in areas with 16.1% Hispanic populations—a relative increase of 11%, which is not
statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers who had never been
ﬁred for misconduct. And once again, officers who were ﬁred further back in their employment history behaved similarly to officers who had never been ﬁred.
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element of the conventional wisdom is borne out by the data. We turn to those
other elements next.
d. Unemployment
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we ﬁnd little evidence that wandering
officers move to agencies in communities with higher unemployment, which we
use as a rough proxy for socioeconomic well-being.191 This result might appear
at odds with our earlier ﬁnding that wandering officers move to agencies in areas
with larger communities of color, but the magnitude of the change in racial composition was quite small.
We use two measures of unemployment rates, which produce similar
(though not identical) results. Our ﬁrst measure is annual county-level unemployment rates from 1996 to 2013, which are available from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics Current Population Survey.192 During that period, officers who had
never been ﬁred and secured a new position moved, on average, from agencies
in counties with an unemployment rate of 5.6% to agencies in counties with a
rate of 5.7%. Officers who were ﬁred from their most recent job and secured subsequent employment moved from agencies in counties with an unemployment
rate of 5.4%, on average, to agencies in counties with a rate of 5.7%—a change
that is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers
who had never been ﬁred.193 Officers who were ﬁred for misconduct experienced
a similar increase, moving from agencies in counties with an unemployment rate
of 5.4%, on average, to agencies in counties with an average rate of nearly 5.8%—
a change that is also statistically signiﬁcantly different from that of officers who
had never been ﬁred.194 While these changes are statistically signiﬁcant, they are

191.

See, e.g., John P. Crank, The Inﬂuence of Environmental and Organizational Factors on Police Style
in Urban and Rural Environments, 27 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 166, 170 (1990) (using unemployment rate as one of two measures of community economic conditions in examining their
relationship with policing style); Vickie L. Shavers, Measurement of Socioeconomic Status in
Health Disparities Research, 99 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 1013, 1016-17 (2007) (listing unemployment rate as a “commonly used” measure of community socioeconomic status in public-health
research); see also Bell, supra note 32, at 2137 (asserting that “[p]oor communities are more
likely to hire ‘gypsy cops’”).
192. Our unemployment data is missing for roughly 20% of all employment stints because it is
limited to municipal police departments and sheriffs’ offices. Indeed, roughly 97% of all the
missing cases come from employment stints in which an officer moves from or to an agency
that is neither a municipal police department nor a sheriff’s office.
193. p < 0.05.
194. p < 0.05.
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substantively very small.195 When we look at the data for ﬁrings further back in
an officer’s career, once again we ﬁnd little difference between officers who have
and have not been ﬁred. If anything, officers who were ﬁred earlier in their career
appear to go to agencies in counties with slightly lower unemployment.
Our county-level estimates of unemployment, however, may mask variation
within counties, especially as municipal agencies, which serve municipalities,
make up the majority of all agencies in our data set. To address this problem, we
construct a second measure of unemployment that assigns municipal-level unemployment data to municipal agencies. Unfortunately, municipal-level data is
available only back to 2009. We therefore assign all agencies the relevant countylevel or municipal-level unemployment rate from 2009 for all years.196 This approach is not ideal, as it requires the strong assumption that any changes in the
unemployment rate over time are constant across all localities. In other words,
in unmasking spatial variation in unemployment rates within counties, we are
forced to mask temporal variation. Still, we think the analysis useful as a check
on our results above.
Based on this second measure, officers who had never been ﬁred and landed
another job moved, on average, from agencies in localities with an unemployment rate of 8.6% to agencies in localities with an unemployment rate of 8.9%.
Officers who were ﬁred from their last job moved, on average, from agencies in
localities with an unemployment rate of 8.5% to agencies in localities with a rate
of 8.6%, while officers who were ﬁred for misconduct from their last job moved
from agencies in localities with a rate of 8.6% to those with a rate of 8.7%. Neither of these latter changes is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change
experienced by officers who had never been ﬁred. Finally, officers who were ﬁred
or ﬁred for misconduct further back in their career moved from agencies in localities with roughly 9.3% unemployment to agencies in localities with the same
rate.
Thus, our ﬁrst and second measures of unemployment point to similar answers. The ﬁrst measure suggests that wandering officers migrate toward agencies in communities with very slightly more unemployment than other officers—
from about 5.3% to 5.6%—while our second measure ﬁnds no evidence at all of
any difference in migration patterns for wandering officers.

195.

Indeed, a 0.3% or 0.4% change in the county-level unemployment rate is well within the ordinary range of annual ﬂuctuations for the counties in our data set.
196. Our measure of unemployment data is missing for 24% of all employment stints from 1996
to 2013. Roughly 96% of the missing cases come from employment stints in which an officer
moves from or to an agency that is neither a municipal police department nor a sheriff’s office.
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e. Crime
We also ﬁnd little evidence that wandering officers are more likely than other
officers to migrate toward areas with more crime. We measure crime using data
from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports that capture “offenses known to the police” from 1997 to 2013.197 As it turns out, both wandering and non-wandering
officers tended to move to agencies with less crime, and, if anything, wandering
officers tended to experience larger decreases in crime from one job to the next—
although the difference in the size of these drops was not statistically signiﬁcant.
From 1997 to 2013, officers who had never been ﬁred and landed a new job
moved, on average, from an agency with 2,210 violent crimes per 100,000 residents annually to an agency with 1,970 such crimes—a relative decrease of 11%.
Officers who were ﬁred from their last job moved, on average, from an agency
with 2,410 violent crimes per 100,000 residents to an agency with 2,050 such
crimes—a relative decrease of 15%, which is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from the decrease experienced by officers who had never been ﬁred. Officers
who were ﬁred for misconduct from their last job experienced an even greater
decrease, moving from agencies with 2,460 violent crimes per 100,000 residents
to agencies with 2,030 such crimes—a relative decrease of 17%, which is also not
statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced by officers who
had never been ﬁred for misconduct.198 Once again, officers who were ﬁred from
a job earlier in their employment history behaved similarly to officers who had
never been ﬁred.199 Taken together, these results suggest that wandering officers
do not move to agencies in communities with more crime.

197.

Our crime data begin in 1997 because a large number of agencies did not report crime data in
1996. Even between 1997 and 2013, we are missing crime data for roughly 34% of our employment stints. But nearly all of those missing observations—84%—involve an officer moving to
or from a law-enforcement agency that is neither a sheriff’s office nor a police department.
Both the crime and population data are at the agency level.
198. We observe a similar pattern using property crime. Officers who had never been ﬁred and
found a new job moved from an agency with 1,870 property crimes per 100,000, on average,
to an agency with 1,640 such crimes, a relative decrease of 12%. Officers who were ﬁred from
their most recent job moved from agencies with 1,990 property crimes per 100,000 to agencies with 1,720 such crimes—a relative decrease of 14%. Similarly, officers who were ﬁred for
misconduct from their last job and found new work moved from agencies with an average of
2,150 property crimes per 100,000 to agencies with 1,680—a relative decrease of 22%.
199. Officers who were ﬁred further back in their career moved, on average, from an agency with
2,260 violent crimes per 100,000 to an agency with 1,980 such crimes—a relative decrease of
12%, which is similar to the decrease experienced by officers who had never been ﬁred. And
officers who were ﬁred for misconduct at some point before their most recent job moved from
agencies with an average of 2,310 violent crimes per 100,000 to agencies with 1,990—a relative
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4. Do Wandering Officers Engage in More Misconduct?
Many worry that when wandering officers move, they “tak[e] trouble with
them.”200 In the absence of systematic data, however, analysts have not known
whether this fear is justiﬁed. In this Section, we examine employment and disciplinary data to assess whether wandering officers seem to pose heightened risks
to the communities they are hired to serve. We ﬁnd that they do. We then consider potential explanations for these ﬁndings.
Because one goal of our analysis is to enable critical evaluation of the choice
to hire wandering officers, we focus on employment stints in which agencies actually exercise their discretion to bring an officer onto the force. Throughout this
Section, therefore, we drop the post-ﬁring employment stint for officers who are
ﬁred and then rehired by the same agency. As noted, many of these stints likely
represent cases in which an arbitrator forced the agency to reinstate the officer
against its will.
a. Firing
We consider ﬁrst whether wandering officers are ﬁred more often than other
officers. We begin by examining ﬁring rates across groups of officers with different professional histories.201 As Panel A in Table 5 shows, from 1988 to 2013,202
officers who had never been ﬁred and who secured a new position were subsequently ﬁred 8.7% of the time and ﬁred for misconduct 6.6% of the time.203 In
contrast, officers who were ﬁred from their most recent position and landed a
new job were ﬁred and ﬁred for misconduct, respectively, 18.4% and 13.8% of the
time. This is more than twice as often, and the difference is statistically signiﬁcant.204 Officers who voluntarily separated from their last position but who had
been ﬁred at some point earlier in their career were subsequently ﬁred and ﬁred
for misconduct 14.7% and 11.1% of the time, respectively. This is roughly 50%
more often than officers who had never been ﬁred, and the difference is again
decrease of 14%, which is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from the change experienced
by officers who had never been ﬁred for misconduct.
200. Abshire, supra note 26, at 11B.
201. We do not break out these ﬁring rates by demographic categories due to small sample sizes.
202. We exclude stints that began after 2013 to ensure we have at least three years of follow-up for
every observation. The results are substantively similar if we start our analysis in 1996 rather
than 1988, as we did in the previous Section due to data limitations. See Table A5.
203. The denominator includes both employment stints that have ended and those that have not
yet ended.
204. p < 0.001.
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statistically signiﬁcant.205 Because wandering and non-wandering officers may
remain in their jobs for different lengths of time, we also report ﬁring rates
within three-year windows (as well as one- and ﬁve-year windows in Table A6),
and the results are substantively similar. The same basic pattern holds in Panel
B when we examine officers’ history of ﬁrings for misconduct, speciﬁcally.206
TABLE 5.

subsequent firing by professional history, 1988-2013207

Fired

Panel A:
Firings

Panel B:
Firings for
Misconduct
Panel C:
Rookie

Fired for
Misconduct

n

Ever

3
Years

Ever

3
Years

Never

29,888

8.7%

4.5%

6.6%

3.0%

Fired, last job

1,969

18.4%

11.2%

13.8%

7.9%

Fired, earlier job

1,631

14.7%

7.5%

11.1%

5.6%

Never

31,182

9.0%

4.7%

6.7%

3.1%

Fired, last job

1,297

20.0%

12.2%

15.3%

9.0%

Fired, earlier job

1,009

15.0%

8.1%

11.2%

6.2%

54,476

10.5%

5.8%

7.2%

3.2%

205.

p < 0.001.
206. Officers who had never been ﬁred for misconduct and who secured a new position were subsequently ﬁred 9% of the time and ﬁred for misconduct just 6.7% of the time. In contrast,
officers who were ﬁred for misconduct from their most recent position were ﬁred 20% of the
time and ﬁred for misconduct 15.3% of the time—more than twice as often as officers who had
never been ﬁred (p < 0.001). Officers who voluntarily separated from their last position but
had been ﬁred for misconduct at some point earlier in their career were subsequently ﬁred
15% of the time and ﬁred for misconduct 11.2% of the time—roughly 50% more often than
never-ﬁred officers (p < 0.001). Once again, the same pattern emerges when we examine ﬁrings within three-year windows (and one- and ﬁve-year windows in Table A6).
207. As noted earlier, although our focus is on law-enforcement officers, our variables measuring
whether an officer was previously ﬁred include any past ﬁrings from a position in corrections
as well. A very small number of law-enforcement rookies—officers who are working for the
ﬁrst time in a law-enforcement position—were previously ﬁred from corrections positions.
We count these officers as rookies when we estimate ﬁring rates in Table 5, but excluding them
has very little effect on the result.
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Earlier, we found that officers who have been ﬁred are far more likely to secure a new job if they voluntarily separate from at least one intervening position.
We hypothesized that hiring agencies might view these officers as rehabilitated.
The results just reported, however, imply a story of only partial redemption: ofﬁcers who were ﬁred from a job further back in their career are less likely to be
ﬁred than officers who were ﬁred from their most recent position. Perhaps this
is unsurprising, as these officers have been double-screened: two different agencies have made the decision to hire them since they were ﬁred. Still, these officers
are substantially more likely to be ﬁred than officers who have never been ﬁred
before.
Of course, when hiring, law-enforcement agencies do not simply choose
among veteran officers. They might also decide to hire a rookie who has never
had a full-time job in law enforcement before. Officers hired as rookies therefore
offer another potentially helpful performance benchmark. As Table 5 reports in
Panel C, rookies are ﬁred 10.5% of the time and ﬁred for misconduct 7.2% of the
time. This makes them substantially less risky than wandering officers—both
those who were ﬁred from their most recent job and those who were ﬁred from
an earlier one.208 Officers hired as rookies tend to be slightly riskier than veterans
who have never been ﬁred, but the differences are not consistently statistically
signiﬁcant across our speciﬁcations.
So far, we have compared the ﬁring rates of wandering officers to those of all
veterans who have never been ﬁred and all officers hired as rookies. Yet
employment markets may vary across both space and time. To account for such
potential local variations, we next narrow our analysis both geographically and
temporally. The idea is to capture, as best we can, the subset of officers who may
have applied for each job, or at least to approximate the type and quality of
officers who were likely to have been in the candidate pool.
Our approach is to match each wandering officer with all nonwandering
officers who were hired within 50 miles and up to 90 days after the wandering
officer’s hiring date.209 The results are similar when we change the time window
to 180 days or 1 year and the geographic limit to 20 or 100 miles. We exclude all

208.

All but one of the differences between officers hired as rookies and wandering officers are
statistically signiﬁcant. The sole exception is when we compare ﬁrings within one year for
officers hired as rookies and officers who had been ﬁred prior to their most recent job.
209. We do not allow officers from the same agency to serve as comparators for each other. Each
wandering officer is matched, on average, to roughly one hundred comparators. Because some
wandering officers are matched with more comparator officers than others, we weight each
comparator officer by the inverse of the number of comparator officers assigned to the same
wandering officer. In other words, for a wandering officer with twenty-ﬁve comparators, we
weight each of the comparators 1/25.
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observations for the 51 law-enforcement agencies for which we were unable to
obtain geographic coordinates.210 As a result, the data set we use for this analysis
differs somewhat from the data set used previously.
In Table 6, Panel A presents ﬁring rates based on professional history. As a
basis for comparison, the ﬁrst row reports ﬁring rates for all officers who had
never previously been ﬁred. Overall, these officers were ﬁred 10% of the time.
The next row reports ﬁring rates for wandering officers who had been ﬁred from
their immediately preceding job. Similar to our results in Table 5, these officers
ended up being ﬁred 18.6% of the time—almost 90% more often. More
important, the following row reports the ﬁring rate for the never-ﬁred officers
who were chosen as matched comparators based on location and timing. These
officers were ﬁred 10.8% of the time—slightly more than all officers who had
never been ﬁred, but still far less than the wandering officers.211 Matching
comparator officers to wandering officers based on geography and timing thus
appears to have slightly increased the ﬁring rate of the comparison group, but
the comparator officers are still ﬁred at rates much lower than the wandering
officers are.
The remaining rows in Panel A conduct the same analysis for wandering
officers who were ﬁred from a job further back in their employment history. The
results are substantively similar.212 In the remaining columns of Panel A, the
same basic pattern also appears for ﬁrings within a three-year window and
subsequent ﬁrings for misconduct. Panel B shows similar results when we deﬁne
wandering officers as officers who had been ﬁred for misconduct, speciﬁcally.

210.

The vast majority of these agencies are state-level agencies for which assigning a speciﬁc location is not straightforward.
211. The statistical signiﬁcance tests we report here are two-sided t-tests based on cluster-robust
standard errors clustered at the person level. The difference in ﬁring rate between these wandering officers and matched comparators is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level.
212. The difference in ﬁring rate between these wandering officers and matched comparators is
again statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level.
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TABLE 6.

subsequent firing by professional history for matched comparators based
on timing and geography, 1988-2013

Fired
Ever

3 Years

Ever

3 Years

10.0%

5.4%

7.1%

3.3%

Wanderer

18.6%

11.1%

14.0%

8.0%

Comparator

10.8%

6.0%

7.9%

3.8%

Wanderer

14.6%

7.4%

11.1%

5.7%

Comparator

10.2%

5.6%

7.1%

3.3%

10.1%

5.5%

7.2%

3.3%

Wanderer

20.2%

12.1%

15.7%

9.2%

Comparator

10.9%

6.0%

8.1%

3.9%

Wanderer

15.3%

8.3%

11.5%

6.5%

Comparator

10.5%

5.7%

7.4%

3.5%

Panel A:
Firings

Never
Fired,
last job
Fired,
earlier job

Panel B:
Firings for
Misconduct

Never
Fired,
last job
Fired,
earlier job

Fired for Misconduct

We can narrow our comparator pool even further if we assume that
applicants similarly evaluate the desirability of working at speciﬁc agencies and
that agencies similarly evaluate the desirability of job applicants. If so, at least
within local labor markets, more desirable candidates are likely to be hired by
more desirable agencies.213 Under this logic, we can further narrow our analysis
to the pool of candidates who were likely vying for the same job by matching
wandering officers not only based on timing and geography but also based on
whether they were hired by a similarly desirable agency.
Designing an objective measure of agency desirability poses two challenges.
The ﬁrst is that we need to know what agency characteristics officers value.
Unfortunately, there is little relevant empirical evidence in the policing literature.
Moreover, different officers may value agency characteristics differently. As just
one example, some officers may prefer to work at agencies with high levels of
213.

See David Card et al., Workplace Heterogeneity and the Rise of West German Wage Inequality, 128
Q.J. ECON. 967, 980-83 (2013) (ﬁnding that more educated workers in Germany tend to be
hired by higher-paying employers and that this correlation increased over time from the 1980s
to the late 2000s).
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crime—to be close to the action—while others may prefer agencies in safer areas.
The second challenge is that we need observable measures of agency
characteristics—measures that ideally vary over time, given the longitudinal
nature of our study.
Given these constraints, we proxy for agency desirability using annual
expenditures per officer. The assumption is that job candidates prefer to work at
agencies with more money to spend on each officer—for salaries, beneﬁts, perks,
and other organizational resources.214 Because the expenditure data start in
1996, we drop all employment stints that began before that year. We then use
agency expenditure data to compute, within each year,215 the percentile rank of
each agency in terms of expenditures per officer. We group the agencies into
quintiles—with the bottom twenty percent in the ﬁrst quintile, the next twenty
percent in the second quintile, and so on, until the ﬁfth quintile, which includes
the top twenty percent in each year. We then use these quintile scores to select
comparator officers who were hired within ninety days and ﬁfty miles of the
wandering officer by an agency within the same desirability quintile.216 As we
show in Table A7, our basic results do not change when we match on agency
desirability.
This geographic, temporal, and agency-desirability matching process helps
us get closer to capturing a picture of the “marginal officer”—the officer the
agency would have hired had it not hired the wandering officer. Ideally, we
would compare wandering officers and marginal officers more directly. Without
data on job applicants,217 however, it is impossible to identify the actual marginal
officers, and we cannot probe this question any more closely.
The foregoing analysis has revealed consistent evidence that wandering
officers are ﬁred at signiﬁcantly higher rates than both veterans who have never

214.

To obtain a comprehensive measure of the number of officers employed by an agency, we
count both law-enforcement officers and correctional officers.
215. Because some agencies’ expenditures vary substantially from year to year, we also calculated,
for each agency, average expenditures per officer over the entire period, 1996 to 2013. We then
reran our analysis using this time-invariant measure of agency desirability. The results are
similar.
216. Because matching on desirability quintiles substantially reduces the pool of potential comparator officers, 326 out of the 2,186 wandering officers who were hired from 1996 to 2013 who
had previously been ﬁred were not matched with any comparators. Also, 193 of the 1,355 ofﬁcers hired during this period who had previously been ﬁred for misconduct did not receive
a match. We drop these unmatched wandering officers from this analysis. The remaining
wandering officers were matched with an average of about twenty-one comparators.
217. We did not try to collect applicant data because it would require obtaining sensitive personnel
records from each of the hundreds of law-enforcement agencies in Florida, likely an impossible task.
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been ﬁred and rookies. One lingering question is whether this relationship—
between wandering-officer status and ﬁring rates—is mediated by other
observable officer characteristics. Might it be, for example, that wandering
officers tend to be young and that youth predicts a higher ﬁring rate? If so, what
appears to be a “wandering-officer effect” might really be a “youth effect.”
To explore this possibility, Table 7 reports a series of linear probability
models, at the employment-stint level, on our variable measuring ﬁrings within
three years.218 Model 1 essentially replicates the results in Table 5 because it
contains only the professional-history variables: whether an officer was ﬁred
from his last job, was ﬁred from a job further back in his employment history,
or was hired as a rookie. Veterans who have never been ﬁred are the comparison
group. The model conﬁrms that officers who were ﬁred from their last job and
officers ﬁred further back in their employment history are subsequently ﬁred 6.7
and 2.9 percentage points more often, respectively, than officers who have never
been ﬁred.
In Model 2, we add some officer-level demographic variables: age and
gender.219 The addition of these variables has little effect on the coefficients for
either type of wandering officer, meaning that the predictive power of being a
wandering officer is not merely driven by these demographic characteristics.
Model 3 adds educational attainment to the model, but this step is,
unfortunately, more complicated because the variable is frequently missing. The
coefficient for officers who were ﬁred from their last job falls slightly, while the
coefficient for officers who were ﬁred from an earlier job falls dramatically, by
roughly two-thirds. It is possible, however, that dropped observations due to
missing data, rather than the predictive power of educational attainment, are
driving these differences. To test this possibility, in Model 4 we replicate Model
2 but drop all observations for which we lack education data. The results are
similar to Model 3. This shows that the change in coefficients we observed in
Model 3 is likely due to the loss of observations from missing data rather than to
the effect of the education variables.220 In the end, therefore, we ﬁnd little
evidence that observable officer-level variables mediate the heightened ﬁring rate
that wandering officers experience.
218.

We report the results of linear probability models (or linear regressions) because the magnitudes of their coefficients are easy to interpret. The results are substantively similar, however,
when we use logistic regression, which better ﬁts the binary structure of the dependent variable. The results are also substantively similar when we ﬁt the model on our variable measuring ﬁrings for misconduct within three years.
219. We divide age by ten so that the coefficients are not rounded to zero.
220. The fact that the results change dramatically thus suggests that the education variable is not
missing randomly.
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TABLE 7.

regression models on firing within three years, 1988-2013221

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept

0.045**
[0.002]

0.053**
[0.006]

0.044**
[0.007]

0.025**
[0.005]

Fired from
Last Job

0.067**
[0.007]

0.067**
[0.007]

0.063**
[0.010]

0.064**
[0.010]

Fired from
Earlier Job

0.029**
[0.007]

0.030**
[0.007]

0.011
[0.009]

0.011
[0.009]

Rookie

0.012**
[0.002]

0.011**
[0.002]

0.010**
[0.002]

0.011**
[0.002]

Age

-0.002
[0.001]

0.004**
[0.001]

0.004**
[0.001]

Male

-0.002
[0.003]

-0.007*
[0.003]

-0.005
[0.003]

Education

Associate’s

-0.009*
[0.005]

Bachelor’s

-0.024**
[0.004]

Master’s

-0.034**
[0.005]

n

87,964

87,948

46,974

46,974

b. Complaints
As an alternative measure of officer performance, we also consider complaints ﬁled with the state licensing board—the CJSTC—alleging “moral character violations” as deﬁned by Florida law. As detailed above,222 these complaints
typically begin as civilian or internal affairs allegations investigated by a local

221.

An asterisk (*) denotes an estimate that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; two asterisks (**) denote an estimate that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. While our threshold of statistical signiﬁcance throughout the paper is 0.05, we also note estimates that are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level with a dagger (†). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the person- and agency-level are reported in brackets.
222. See supra Section III.A.
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agency. If the local agency sustains the allegation and the offense implicates the
officer’s “moral character,” the agency must submit its ﬁndings to the FDLE,
which opens a “complaint” and begins an independent disciplinary process. The
FDLE also has the power to initiate complaints on its own, which are included
in the data set. Once again, our results suggest that wandering officers may pose
signiﬁcant risks.
Table 8 shows the rate at which officers received complaints conditional on
their professional history. Because the FDLE appears to have begun consistently
recording complaints in 1993, our analyses of complaints include only employment stints beginning between 1993 and 2013. As in our analysis of ﬁrings, we
exclude job stints in which an officer is employed by an agency that had ﬁred the
officer in his immediately preceding job. Panel A shows that officers who had
never been ﬁred and who secured a new position received an average of 0.07
complaints during their next job. In contrast, officers who were ﬁred from their
last job received an average of 0.13 complaints, almost ninety percent more, a
difference that is statistically signiﬁcant.223 Officers who voluntarily separated
from their previous job but had been ﬁred at some point earlier in their career
received an average of 0.12 complaints, which is also statistically signiﬁcantly
more than officers who had never been ﬁred.224

223.
224.

p < 0.001.
p < 0.001.
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TABLE 8.

number of complaints by professional history and type, 1993-2013

Panel C:
Rookie

Panel B:
Firings for
Misconduct

Panel A:
Firings

All

Violent/
Sexual

Integrity

n

Ever

3
Years

Ever

3
Years

Ever

3
Years

Never

24,711

0.07

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.01

Fired,
last job

1,394

0.13

0.07

0.04

0.02

0.06

0.03

Fired,
earlier jobs

1,295

0.12

0.05

0.03

0.01

0.05

0.02

Never

25,686

0.07

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.01

Fired,
last job

934

0.16

0.08

0.04

0.03

0.07

0.03

Fired,
earlier jobs

780

0.14

0.05

0.03

0.01

0.06

0.02

44,584

0.08

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

One question is whether the additional complaints that wandering officers
receive concern the types of misconduct the public ﬁnds most troubling. While
we are constrained by the relatively small number of complaints in the data, we
are able to break complaints into broad categories based on the character of the
misconduct alleged. Almost a quarter of the complaints are for violent or sexual
conduct (including implied violence), the most common allegations of which are
“excess force,” “assault,” “battery – domestic violence,” and “sex offense.”225 Another third are integrity-related complaints, the most common allegations of
which are “false statements,” “perjury,” “misuse of public position,” and

225.

In our primary speciﬁcation, we exclude from this category complaints concerning prostitution, sex on duty, intimidation, harassing communication, sexual harassment, resisting an ofﬁcer, unprofessional relationships, and the manufacture, possession, or transportation of obscene materials. The results, however, are substantively similar when we include these
complaints. Details of the coding scheme are available from the authors upon request.
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“fraud.”226 We also create a category for drug-related allegations, which account
for just 10% of the complaints. This is too few to support any reliable results,
but also indicates that our general results, reported above, are not driven by
drug-related offenses.
As Table 8 shows, officers who had never been ﬁred and who secured a new
position received an average of 0.02 complaints for violent or sexual conduct
during their next job. In contrast, officers who were ﬁred from their last job received an average of 0.04, roughly twice as many, a difference that is statistically
signiﬁcant.227 Officers who voluntarily separated from their previous job but had
been ﬁred at some point earlier in their career received an average of 0.03 complaints for violent or sexual conduct, which is statistically signiﬁcantly different
from officers who had never been ﬁred.228 We ﬁnd a similar pattern of results for
integrity-related complaints.
Because employment stints vary in length, Table 8 also reports the average
number of complaints against officers within a three-year window, and the results are similar (as are the results within one- and ﬁve-year windows, reported
in Table A8).229 Furthermore, as Panel B of Table 8 shows, all of these same patterns hold if we examine officers who have been ﬁred for misconduct instead.
Here, too, officers hired as rookies provide another useful performance
benchmark for wandering officers. As shown in Panel C of Table 8, officers hired
as rookies receive a roughly similar number of complaints as veterans who have
never been ﬁred230—and fewer than wandering officers.231
As before, we next match each wandering officer with the nonwandering
officers who were hired within 50 miles and fewer than 90 days after the
226.
227.
228.
229.

230.

231.

We exclude traditional theft offenses and offenses involving stolen property, which do not
necessarily implicate truthfulness or the abuse of an official position.
p < 0.001.
p < 0.05.
The one exception is that, for violent and sexual complaints, the difference between officers
who have never been ﬁred and officers who voluntarily separated from their last job but who
were ﬁred earlier in their career is not statistically signiﬁcant within a one-, three-, or ﬁveyear window.
When we count all complaints, all violent or sexual complaints, or all integrity-related complaints incurred during the employment stint, officers hired as rookies receive statistically signiﬁcantly more complaints than veterans who have never been ﬁred, at a threshold of p < 0.05,
though the differences are substantively small. In the time-limited comparisons, most of the
differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The differences are always statistically signiﬁcantly different for officers who were ﬁred from
their last job (p < 0.05). They are also statistically signiﬁcant for officers who were ﬁred further back in their employment history when we count all complaints and integrity-related
complaints (p < 0.05), but not when we count only violent or sexual complaints.
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wandering officer’s hiring date.232 The results, reported in Table 9, follow the
now-familiar pattern: wandering officers receive, on average, 0.14 complaints—
about 75% more than all officers with no prior history of ﬁring (0.08 complaints)
and the comparator officers (0.08 complaints).233 The same pattern of results
holds for wandering officers who were ﬁred from a job earlier in their
employment history, for complaints received within a three-year window, and
for wandering officers who were ﬁred for misconduct, speciﬁcally. The same
patterns also hold when we count only violent or sexual complaints or integrityrelated complaints.234 And, as reported in Table A9, the same basic pattern holds
when we match comparator officers not only on timing and geography but also
on agency desirability.
TABLE 9.

number of complaints by professional history for matched comparators
based on timing and geography, 1993-2013

All

Panel A:
Firings
Panel B: Firings
for Misconduct

Fired,
earlier job

3
Years

Ever

3
Years

Ever

3
Years

0.08

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Wanderer

0.14

0.07

0.04

0.02

0.06

0.03

Comparator

0.08

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Wanderer

0.12

0.05

0.03

0.01

0.06

0.02

Comparator

0.07

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

0.08

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Wanderer

0.16

0.08

0.05

0.03

0.07

0.03

Comparator

0.08

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Wanderer

0.14

0.06

0.03

0.01

0.07

0.02

Comparator

0.07

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Never
Fired,
last job
Fired,
earlier job

Integrity

Ever
Never
Fired,
last job

Violent/Sexual

232.

The results are similar when we expand the time window to 180 days or one year and when
we expand the geographic limit to 50 or 100 miles.
233. The statistical signiﬁcance tests we report here are two-sided t-tests based on cluster-robust
standard errors clustered at the person level. The difference in complaints received by these
wandering officers and their matched comparators is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level.
234. The differences are not always statistically signiﬁcant, however, for violent and sexual complaints within a three-year window.
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Finally, as with our ﬁring measures, we consider whether the higher number
of complaints against wandering officers is mediated by other observable officer
characteristics. Table 10 reports a series of linear-regression models that mirror
those described in Table 7.235 The basic results are the same: we ﬁnd no evidence
that adding officer age, gender, or education to the models decreases the size of
the coefficient on the professional-history variables. Differences in coefficients
among the models appear to be due to the loss of observations from missing data
rather than to the effect of the independent variables. We therefore ﬁnd no
evidence that observable officer-level characteristics mediate the heightened risk
associated with hiring wandering officers.
TABLE 10.

regression models on number of complaints within three years, 1993-2013236

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept

0.024**
[0.001]

0.033**
[0.003]

0.025**
[0.004]

0.019**
[0.004]

Fired from
Last Job

0.044**
[0.008]

0.043**
[0.008]

0.038**
[0.010]

0.039**
[0.010]

Fired from
Earlier Job

0.023**
[0.007]

0.024**
[0.006]

0.01
[0.009]

0.01
[0.009]

Rookie

0.002
[0.001]

-0.001
[0.002]

0
[0.002]

0.001
[0.002]

Age

-0.005**
[0.001]

-0.001
[0.001]

-0.001†
[0.001]

Male

0.007**
[0.002]

0.004†
[0.002]

0.005*
[0.002]

235.

We report the results of linear models because the magnitudes of their coefficients are easy to
interpret. The results are substantively similar, however, when we use negative binomial regression.
236. An asterisk (*) denotes an estimate that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; two asterisks (**) denote an estimate that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. While our threshold of statistical signiﬁcance throughout the paper is 0.05, we also note estimates here that are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level with a dagger (†). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the person- and agency-level are reported in brackets.
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Education

Associate’s

-0.001
[0.003]

Bachelor’s

-0.008**
[0.002]

Master’s

-0.011**
[0.003]

n

71,984

71,971

40,436

40,436

c. Explanations
Taken together, our results suggest that wandering officers are signiﬁcantly
more likely than comparable officers—either officers hired as rookies or veterans
who have never been ﬁred from a Florida law-enforcement agency—to be ﬁred
and to incur complaints of serious misconduct. What explains these ﬁndings? At
least four hypotheses strike us as plausible.
First, agencies may scrutinize wandering officers more rigorously than other
officers by monitoring them more closely or applying a lower threshold for initiating the disciplinary process. To put the point most forcefully, agencies might
even hire wandering officers on a de facto “probationary” basis, intending simply
to ﬁre them if problems arise. Although this is possible, it strikes us as unlikely
that it could fully explain the sizable gaps in the rates at which officers are ﬁred
and incur complaints.
As an initial matter, employee turnover, or “churn,” is typically expensive: a
recent review of the labor economics literature found that the median cost of
replacing a worker is roughly one-ﬁfth of the worker’s salary.237 This makes less
plausible the notion that agencies would hire wandering officers on a probationary rationale, particularly as the agencies that hire wandering officers tend to be
more poorly resourced. At the same time, the literature emphasizes that the costs
of turnover vary by industry, region, and other factors, and they may be lower
for Florida law enforcement than this general evidence suggests.238
237.

See Boushey & Glynn, supra note 120, at 1. We have not found any research on the cost of
turnover in law enforcement speciﬁcally. For potential analogs, see GARY BARNES ET AL., THE
COST OF TEACHER TURNOVER IN FIVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS: A PILOT STUDY 4-5 (2007) (estimating the cost of teacher turnover in ﬁve school districts in 2007 at $4,366 to $17,872); and
Michelle I. Graef & Erick L. Hill, Costing Child Protective Services Staff Turnover, 79 CHILD
WELFARE 517, 528 (2000) (estimating the cost of turnover for a child protective services
worker in a midwestern state in 1995 at $10,000).
238. Where labor requires “knowledge exploitation” (i.e., implementation, execution) rather than
“knowledge exploration” (i.e., discovery, innovation), however—as seems generally true of
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To probe this ﬁrst hypothesis more closely, we consider a series of additional
empirical checks. None of these checks is conclusive on its own but, collectively,
they suggest that heightened scrutiny cannot fully explain our results. To begin
with, we found earlier that wandering officers receive not only more complaints
in general, but also more complaints speciﬁcally about violent or sexual misconduct. While certainly possible, it seems less likely that heightened scrutiny could
drive those results, as agencies presumably take violent and sexual conduct more
seriously than other misconduct regardless of which officers are accused.
Our complaint data offer another way to test the heightened-scrutiny hypothesis. The FDLE, a statewide entity independent from the local agencies that
employ law-enforcement officers, itself initiates roughly one-third of the complaints in our data set. These include complaints opened in response to an ofﬁcer’s arrest, a news report, a veriﬁed citizen complaint tendered to the FDLE
directly, or a problem FDLE staff discovered while auditing local-agency records.239 If heightened scrutiny by employing agencies explained why wandering
officers receive more complaints, we would expect the gap in complaint rates to
disappear in this subset of the data (because, again, the employing agencies do
not trigger these complaints). The data does not bear this out. We reran our
analysis of complaints on the FDLE-initiated subset. As Table A11 shows, the
results are substantively similar to when we use all complaints: across each of the
speciﬁcations, wandering officers were roughly twice as likely as officers who had
never been ﬁred to receive a complaint initiated by the FDLE.240
Next, we examine ﬁring and complaint rates across agencies of varying size.
What little has been written on the topic suggests that smaller agencies are less

policing—the average net effects of turnover are expected to be negative. See Ton & Huckman,
supra note 122, at 57-58, 65.
239. The ATMS database contains seven codes that deﬁne the source of a complaint: affidavit of
separation, arrest hit notiﬁcation, FDLE staff documentation, internal investigation, newspaper, other, and veriﬁable complaint. Based on conversations with the FDLE, we deﬁne a complaint as initiated by the FDLE (and not the officer’s agency) if its code is anything other than
affidavit of separation or internal investigation. As noted, see supra Section III.A, we have data
only on the date a complaint was opened and not the date on which the alleged misconduct
occurred. It is possible that, in some cases, there is a nontrivial gap between the date a complaint was opened and the date of the alleged misconduct.
240. The difference between never-ﬁred officers and officers who were ﬁred from their last job is
statistically signiﬁcant across all comparisons at p < 0.01. The difference between never-ﬁred
officers and officers who were ﬁred further back in their employment history is signiﬁcant
across all comparisons at p < 0.05.
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likely than their larger counterparts to have the resources and organizational apparatus to closely monitor and remediate particular officers.241 Thus, if wandering officers are ﬁred more frequently or receive more complaints than other ofﬁcers because they face heightened scrutiny, we would expect these gaps to
narrow or disappear in smaller agencies.242 We therefore reran our analyses of
ﬁring and complaints after breaking the data into two groups of agencies, by
size: agencies that employed fewer than sixty-two officers—the smallest quartile
of employment stints—and agencies that employed sixty-two officers or more.
We then reran the analysis again using even smaller thresholds: thirty-one officers and ﬁfteen officers. Across all of these comparisons, our results were substantively similar.243 In both large and small agencies, officers who were ﬁred from
their last job were roughly twice as likely to be ﬁred,244 be ﬁred for misconduct,245 or receive a complaint246 than officers who had never been ﬁred before.

241.

242.
243.

244.
245.
246.

See, e.g., STEVEN G. BRANDL, POLICE IN AMERICA 41 (2017) (“[L]arger police departments tend
to have more rules and policies than smaller ones.”); PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 41, at 28-29 (reporting that “small forces often lack the resources
for training and equipment accessible to larger departments” and encouraging consolidation);
David N. Falcone et al., The Small-Town Police Department, 25 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 371, 374 (2002) (“Given the low number of [full-time employees] for smalltown police departments, and the near absence of organizational differentiation, all officers,
regardless of rank, must carry out general patrol functions.”); Kevin Johnson, Lack of Training,
Standards Mean Big Problems for Small Police Departments, USA TODAY (June 23, 2015, 4:39
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/23/small-police-departments
-standards-training/28823849 [https://perma.cc/8YFL-LEJG] (“[Q]uestions about leadership, training and basic competence track an array of unmet public safety needs that threaten
small-town policing operations in communities across the country.”); cf. Casey Toner & Jared
Rutecki, 113 Suburban Cop Shootings, Zero Discipline, WBEZ (Jan. 8, 2018), https://interactive.wbez.org/taking-cover/zero-discipline [https://perma.cc/C5V9-WLTT] (“The investigation found little evidence that suburban police agencies do any self-reﬂection or post-mortem reviews aimed at retraining officers involved in deadly shootings, a practice often
employed at larger departments.”).
Alternatively, it is possible that police chiefs in smaller agencies are better able to monitor
wandering officers closely. Our results run contrary to this prediction, too.
See infra Table A12. To reduce the size of the table, we present only the results for agencies that
are bigger and smaller than ﬁfteen officers at the time the officer was hired and for ﬁrings (but
not ﬁrings for misconduct). The results are substantively similar when we break up agencies
based on the thirty-one-officer and sixty-two-officer thresholds and when we examine ﬁrings
for misconduct.
p < 0.001.
p < 0.001.
p < 0.05.
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While officers who were ﬁred further back in their employment history also experienced heightened rates of ﬁring and complaints—both in small and large
agencies—the differences were only sometimes statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, we probe the heightened-scrutiny hypothesis by examining the timing of ﬁrings and complaints. If wandering officers are, like probationary employees, scrutinized more closely than others, this heightened monitoring is
probably not indeﬁnite. Indeed, monitoring can be costly and its expected returns may diminish with time. It seems likely, then, that wandering officers
blend in with the rest of the workforce at some point. We therefore calculate the
average rate at which officers are ﬁred and receive complaints during their fourth
through seventh years of employment.247 As Table A13 shows, wandering officers continue to experience higher rates of ﬁrings248 and complaints249 even during those later years, though the gap between wandering and nonwandering ofﬁcers is somewhat smaller during this period than during years one through
three.
A second potential explanation for the elevated rates of ﬁring and complaints
that wandering officers receive is that, even if wandering officers are not treated
differently within agencies, they may, on average, take jobs at agencies that are
better at detecting misconduct or more likely to initiate the disciplinary process.
We are doubtful this hypothesis is correct. If anything, agencies that are better
at detecting misconduct or more likely to initiate the disciplinary process are,
because of their high quality, probably less likely to hire wandering officers in the
ﬁrst place. While we cannot directly observe the stringency of an agency’s disciplinary process, our composite measures of agencies’ hiring and training requirements provide useful proxies. In our data, officers who were ﬁred from
their last job and land a new position tend to move to agencies with less stringent

247.

We also examine the data in one-year increments. The basic results are substantively similar
but noisy due to the limited number of ﬁrings and complaints within each period. In calculating the ﬁring and complaint rates in years four through seven, we count in the denominator
all officers who had left the agency in years one through three. If instead we drop these officers
from the analysis, the difference in ﬁring rates between wandering and nonwandering officers
is even larger.
248. The ﬁring rate for officers ﬁred from their last job is statistically signiﬁcantly different from
that of officers who were never ﬁred at a threshold of 0.01. For officers ﬁred earlier in their
employment history, the difference is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level for all comparisons except when we measure both professional history and subsequent ﬁrings using ﬁrings
for misconduct.
249. The number of complaints for officers ﬁred from their last job is only marginally statistically
signiﬁcantly different from the number of complaints for officers who have never been ﬁred,
at the 0.10 level. For officers ﬁred further back in their employment history, the difference is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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hiring and training requirements than officers who have never been ﬁred.250 This
suggests that, as we expected, wandering officers are not moving to agencies
with more stringent disciplinary processes than other agencies.
Third, wandering officers may take jobs at agencies where, due to differences
in culture, leadership, or beat assignment, they are exposed to conditions conducive to further misconduct. Although we did not ﬁnd any evidence that wandering officers move to agencies in higher-crime jurisdictions, many move to
smaller agencies with relatively fewer resources. For this reason, we think this
third hypothesis warrants further investigation.
We test the hypothesis in two ways.251 First, we assess whether observable
agency-level variables reduce the predictive power of officers’ professional-history variables. Table 11 presents a series of linear probability models where the
dependent variable is whether an officer was ﬁred within three years.252 Because
some of our agency-level variables begin in 1997, we restrict our analysis to employment stints that began between 1997 and 2013. Model 1 contains only the
professional-history variables and shows that, during that period, officers who
were ﬁred from their last job and officers ﬁred further back in their employment
history were subsequently ﬁred 6.6 and 2.9 percentage points more often, respectively, than veterans who had never been ﬁred, the comparison group.
In Model 2, we add a number of agency-level variables (as of the date the
officer’s employment began): total number of officers employed by the agency,
agency expenditures per full-time officer, violent crimes per 100,000 residents,

250.

Our hiring and training scores begin in 1997. We are also missing a substantial number of
observations within our sample. As a result, we lack hiring-requirement and training-requirement data for 33% and 40% of observations from 1997 to 2013, respectively. Most of these
missing cases—82% and 68% of the missing hiring and training observations—concern moves
from or to agencies that are neither municipal police departments nor sheriffs’ offices. Officers
who have never been ﬁred, who separated from their previous job voluntarily, and who land
a new job move from agencies that, on average, have hiring and training scores of 5.2 and 3.2
to agencies with scores of 5.3 and 3.4—almost no change at all. Similarly, officers who were
ﬁred earlier in their employment history but voluntarily separated from their last job and
found new work moved from agencies with hiring and training scores of 4.4 and 2.9 to agencies with scores of 4.6 and 3.1. In contrast, officers who were ﬁred from their last job and
obtain new work tend to move to agencies with lower hiring and training scores; indeed, they
move from agencies with average scores of 5.2 and 3.3 to agencies with scores of 4.6 and 2.9
(p < 0.001).
251. As in the rest of our analyses of professional history and ﬁrings, we exclude job stints in which
an officer is employed by an agency that had ﬁred him in his immediately preceding job.
252. As before, we report the results of linear probability models (or linear regressions) because
the magnitudes of their coefficients are easy to interpret. The results are substantively similar,
however, when we use logistic regression, which better ﬁts the binary structure of the dependent variable.
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property crimes per 100,000 residents, unemployment, proportion of the population that is black, and proportion of the population that is Hispanic. Adding
these variables decreases the coefficient both for officers who were ﬁred from
their last job and for officers who were ﬁred further back in their employment
history by 10% to 15%. Because we are missing data for at least one of the agencylevel variables in roughly 17% of employment stints from 1997 to 2013, it is once
again possible that missing data—rather than the introduction of the agencylevel variables—explain the change in results from Model 1 to Model 2. We assess
this possibility in Model 3 by replicating Model 1 while dropping any observations for which we are missing some agency-level data. The coefficients both for
officers ﬁred from their last job and for officers ﬁred from an earlier job are
roughly similar to those in Model 1, suggesting that the addition of the agencylevel variables is responsible for much of the modest decrease in the coefficient
from Model 1 to 2. Taken together, these models suggest that the agency-level
variables may reduce the predictive power of the professional-history variables
but only very slightly.
Second, we test whether unobservable agency-level characteristics reduce the
predictive power of the professional-history variables. More speciﬁcally, we introduce agency ﬁxed effects to assess whether the heightened rates at which wandering officers are ﬁred stem from their moving to agencies with higher rates of
ﬁring and complaints in general. As Model 4 in Table 11 shows, adding these
ﬁxed effects has little impact on the size of the coefficients for either type of wandering officer. This provides further evidence that this third hypothesis has limited explanatory power.

1752

the wandering officer

TABLE 11.

regression models on firing within three years with agency characteristics,
1997-2013253

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept

0.039**
[0.002]

0.052**
[0.006]

0.041**
[0.002]

Fired from Last Job

0.066**
[0.009]

0.055**
[0.009]

0.060**
[0.009]

0.056**
[0.009]

Fired from Earlier Job

0.029**
[0.008]

0.026**
[0.009]

0.029**
[0.009]

0.024**
[0.009]

Rookie

0.015**
[0.003]

0.018**
[0.002]

0.015**
[0.003]

0.016**
[0.002]

Number of Officers
(In Hundreds)

-0.002**
[0.000]

0.002
[0.002]

Expenditure Per Officer
(In Thousands)

0
[0.000]

0
[0.000]

Violent-Crime Rate
(Per 100 Residents)

0.005**
[0.001]

0.002
[0.003]

Property-Crime Rate
(Per 100 Residents)

-0.003†
[0.002]

0
[0.002]

County-Level
Unemployment Rate

0.024
[0.059]

-0.063
[0.058]

Proportion Black

-0.008
[0.014]

-0.053
[0.061]

Proportion Hispanic

-0.015
[0.010]

-0.042
[0.060]

Agency Fixed Effects
n

No

No

No

Yes

59,861

49,687

49,687

49,687

The fourth and ﬁnal hypothesis is the most straightforward: holding all else
constant, wandering officers may simply behave worse than officers who have

253.

Asterisks (*) denote estimates that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; two asterisks
(**) denote estimates statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. While our statistical signiﬁcance threshold is 0.05, we note estimates statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level with daggers
(†). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the person- and agency-level are in brackets.
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never been ﬁred. On top of that, they tend to be hired by smaller agencies with
fewer resources, which may be unable to provide them with the policies, training, and supervision that could help them stay in line. Because the other hypotheses largely fail, and because this explanation is consistent with anecdotal accounts, we suspect that this is, in the end, the most plausible explanation of the
higher rates of ﬁring and complaints against wandering officers.
v. predicting which wandering officers get fired again
Before we turn to potential legal reforms for the problems just identiﬁed, we
examine one ﬁnal empirical question: whether certain agencies, or certain wandering officers, pose greater or lesser risks than others. More speciﬁcally, should
certain agencies be especially wary of hiring wandering officers? Do agencies’
hiring or training requirements affect the risk that wandering officers pose? Are
there observable characteristics that mark some wandering officers as more or
less risky than others?
To examine these questions, we ﬁt a series of linear probability models on a
data set containing an observation for every time, from 1988 to 2013, an agency
hired a wandering officer.254 The dependent variable indicates whether the ofﬁcer was ﬁred within three years. We include a range of independent variables
measuring characteristics of the officer, as well as the law-enforcement agencies
he moved from and to, in order to estimate whether any of these characteristics
is associated with a lower probability that the officer’s separation was involuntary. As in the earlier analyses of ﬁrings, we exclude job stints in which an officer
is employed by an agency that had ﬁred the officer in his immediately preceding
job.
Table 12 presents the results.255 Model 1 includes one independent variable:
whether the officer was ﬁred from his most recent job. It shows that such officers
are 3.7 percentage points more likely to be ﬁred than other wandering officers.
Model 2 adds various officer-level independent variables, including the number
of jobs worked, gender, age (at start of employment), and a dummy for prior
complaints. The only statistically signiﬁcant variable is whether the officer was
ﬁred from his most recent job.

254.

We report the results of linear probability models (or linear regressions) because the magnitudes of their coefficients are easy to interpret. The results are substantively similar, however,
when we use logistic regression, which better ﬁts the binary structure of the dependent variable.
255. We report cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the agency and officer level.
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In Model 3, we add a variable reﬂecting the officer’s educational attainment
to see whether education is associated with the likelihood that a wandering ofﬁcer is ﬁred. Because education data is missing for many officers, we lose a signiﬁcant proportion of our observations. We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant evidence that officer education makes a difference here, but we caution that our
estimates are noisy, at least partially due to the decreased sample size.
Finally, in Model 4, we examine whether any agency characteristics are correlated with whether a wandering officer will be ﬁred again. We add several characteristics of the hiring agency for the year the officer was hired, including the
proportion of the agency’s jurisdiction that is black, the proportion that is Hispanic, the violent and property crime rates per 100,000 residents, county-level
unemployment rates, and agency expenditures per officer. We also test whether
the agency’s hiring or training requirements are correlated with whether the
agency will ﬁre a wandering officer it hires by adding two composite scores, described in Section III.B, that measure the stringency of the hiring agency’s requirements. The idea is that stricter hiring requirements might direct agencies
toward the least risky wandering officers and that rigorous training requirements might keep wandering officers on the right path. Finally, the model also
contains two variables capturing the number of full-time officers employed by
the agencies the officer moved to and from divided by 100 (to ease interpretation
of the results). Because some of these agency-level variables are available only
starting in 1997, we exclude all employment stints that began before that year.
We also lose some additional observations due to missingness on some of the
agency-level variables.
In this model, the variable indicating whether an officer was ﬁred from his
most recent job (rather than a job further back in his employment history) decreases in size and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. More important, the only
agency-level variables that are statistically signiﬁcant relate to agency size; they
show that officers who move from and to agencies that are smaller tend to be
ﬁred less frequently. Otherwise, we ﬁnd little evidence of any statistical association between the agency variables and ﬁring. When we examine ﬁring rates
based on wandering officers’ history of ﬁrings for misconduct, speciﬁcally, we
ﬁnd a similar pattern of results.256 Because Model 4 is restricted to hirings from
1997 to 2013, however, the number of observations is substantially reduced,
which may partly explain the null results.

256.

See Table A10.
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TABLE 12.

predicting whether wandering officers are fired again, 1988–2013257

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept

0.074**
[0.007]

0.103**
[0.023]

0.075†
[0.042]

0.194**
[0.049]

Fired from
Last Job

0.037**
[0.010]

0.035**
[0.013]

0.043*
[0.020]

0.025
[0.020]

2

0.009
[0.017]

-0.002
[0.030]

-0.008
[0.029]

3

0.005
[0.017]

-0.016
[0.029]

-0.003
[0.030]

4+

0.015
[0.019]

-0.002
[0.032]

-0.024
[0.030]

Age
(At Start)

-0.001
[0.001]

0
[0.001]

0
[0.001]

Male

-0.028
[0.018]

-0.031
[0.025]

-0.091**
[0.031]

Any Past
Complaints

0.006
[0.014]

-0.007
[0.019]

-0.011
[0.018]

Job Number

Education

257.

Associate’s

0.005
[0.028]

Bachelor’s

0.014
[0.027]

Master’s/
Doctorate

-0.011
[0.032]

An asterisk (*) denotes an estimate that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; two asterisks (**) denote an estimate that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. While our threshold of statistical signiﬁcance throughout the paper is 0.05, we also note estimates that are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level with a dagger (†). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the person-level are reported in brackets.
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Hiring
Agency

Separating
Agency
n

Proportion Black

-0.025
[0.050]

Proportion
Hispanic

-0.062
[0.041]

Violent-Crime
Rate
(Per 100,000)

0
[0.000]

Property-Crime
Rate
(Per 100,000)

0
[0.000]

County-Level
Unemployment
Rate

0.031
[0.313]

Expenditures Per
Officer (2008)

0
[0.000]

Hiring Requirement Score

0.003
[0.005]

Training Requirement Score

-0.007
[0.006]

No. of Officers

-0.003*
[0.001]

No. of Officers

-0.003**
[0.001]
3,533

3,533

1,390

1,451

Taken together, what should we make of these results? Assuming a law-enforcement agency will hire a wandering officer, are there ways to reduce the
risks? Our models provide little optimism on this front. Most of the models suggest that, among wandering officers who are hired again, those who have separated voluntarily from at least one job since their last ﬁring are less likely to be
ﬁred again. The models also suggest that officers coming from or going to
smaller agencies may be slightly less likely to be ﬁred. Beyond that, however, the
regression models provide little consistent evidence about how to predict which
wandering officers will be ﬁred again.
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vi. mechanisms and reforms
We have found that an average of over one thousand wandering officers were
working in full-time Florida law-enforcement jobs in any given year between
1988 and 2016. Many of these officers found work by migrating to smaller, less
desirable agencies—measured by resources per officer—than the agencies that
ﬁred them. They were then ﬁred and subjected to complaints alleging “moral
character violations” at higher rates than officers who had never been ﬁred before, even when we restrict the latter group to officers who were hired around
the same time and place by similarly desirable agencies. Although we cannot be
sure why wandering officers experienced these adverse outcomes, after a review
of several hypotheses, we think the most straightforward explanation is also the
most plausible one: wandering officers simply behave worse than officers who
have never been ﬁred. These results appear generally consistent with the pertinent labor economics literature and, in particular, with the closest study on
point, which concerns the labor mobility and behavior of ﬁnancial advisers who
commit misconduct.258
If wandering officers are so risky, one might reasonably ask, why do police
chiefs keep hiring them? Our data do not permit us to isolate a single mechanism, and we doubt that there is only one cause in any event. In this ﬁnal Part,
we consider ﬁve plausible explanations along with the policy implications of
each. In Section A, we examine the possibility that agencies may not know they
are hiring wandering officers. In Section B, we consider whether agencies may
not appreciate the risks that wandering officers pose. In Section C, drawing upon
our empirical analysis in Section IV.B.4, we discuss whether wandering officers
are simply the best available candidates—that is, if they are hired when no
stronger candidate is available. In Section D, we explore the beneﬁts that might
make wandering officers attractive notwithstanding their risks. Finally, in Section E, we discuss the possibility that agencies are not concerned about the risks
of hiring wandering officers because, generally speaking, they do not bear the
costs of any resulting harms.
A. Poor Information
In some instances, an agency may hire a wandering officer simply because it
does not know about the officer’s past. Indeed, agencies do not always complete
adequate background checks, possibly due to unprofessional organizational culture or resource constraints. The Cleveland Police Department, for instance,
“never reviewed [the] personnel ﬁle” for Tim Loehmann, who shot and killed

258.

See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
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Tamir Rice.259 In addition, some candidates may deliberately conceal their professional history. Much of the small academic literature on wandering officers
emphasizes this explanation for the ability of wandering officers to ﬁnd work.260
The favored solution here is to build a robust national decertiﬁcation database. Such a database would record state agency decisions to decertify officers
and make them available for local agencies in other states to see. A small group
of academics has been pushing this idea for decades and, in 2015, the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing lent its imprimatur.261 To be sure, a national
database does already exist—the NDI described in Part I. But its coverage is poor.
Some states “have decided it’s a drain on resources to contribute to the index
[and] the state-by-state discrepancies signiﬁcantly limit the database’s effectiveness.”262 As one reference point, Georgia decertiﬁed 562 officers in 2015 but submitted nothing to the database.263
Our data and ﬁndings highlight both the importance and limits of a national
decertiﬁcation database as a tool to stop wandering officers. On the one hand,
our ﬁnding that wandering officers are more likely than other officers to be ﬁred,
including for misconduct, and more likely to be subject to serious misconduct
complaints, underscores the importance of some kind of national—and mandatory—tracking system. Such a tool could help agencies avoid hiring wandering
officers who saunter in from other states.
On the other hand, as the Loehmann example demonstrates—along with all
of our own ﬁndings—the focus on interstate movement seems to skip a step.
Wandering officers frequently move around within a single state. Even before
we get to any national database, background checks should be standardized and

259.

Dewan & Oppel, supra note 1; see CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE FOR THE N. DIST. OF OHIO, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE
(2014) (detailing systemic and structural deﬁciencies in the department). On the importance
of organizational culture more generally, see Armacost, supra note 43.
260. See, e.g., Atherley & Hickman, supra note 80, at 435-36 (describing impediments to the ﬂow
of information necessary to vet candidates thoroughly); Bell, supra note 32, at 2137 (explaining
that “resource constraints make it more difficult” for agencies “to discriminate between good
and bad officers”); Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548 (“[T]he second department may
be unaware of the previous misconduct, either because the ﬁrst department would not disclose the officer’s previous misconduct, or because the second department does not conduct a
thorough background check.”).
261. See, e.g., Atherley & Hickman, supra note 80, at 435-36; Goldman & Puro, supra note 53, at 7678; Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 575-78; see also PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 41, at 29.
262. Fisher, supra note 25.
263. Id.
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mandatory (as they are in some states, including Florida). There is some suggestion, mentioned earlier, that background checks are taxing on very small or
resource-strapped departments. If so, states or the federal government should
consider subsidizing or otherwise assisting local agencies in conducting the necessary investigation of officer candidates.
In addition, even if the database includes every decertiﬁcation decision nationwide, it is useful only if states regularly decertify problem officers. But they
do not.264 Recall that ﬁve states plus the District of Columbia, employing a signiﬁcant share of all law-enforcement officers nationally, have no decertiﬁcation
option at all. Another twenty states require a criminal conviction before an officer
can be decertiﬁed. And according to one study, in 2015, over half of all police
decertiﬁcations reported to the NDI came from Florida and Georgia, while Louisiana, Mississippi, and Wyoming did not decertify a single officer265—in fact,
Louisiana has not decertiﬁed anyone in at least a decade.266 Even in states that
do decertify a relatively high number of officers, moreover, decertiﬁcation is still
rare. Only a small subset of misconduct will render an officer eligible for decertiﬁcation.267 It is worth pointing out that, to our knowledge, none of the employment stints in our study—including those of wandering officers—was held by an
officer who had been decertiﬁed in Florida before the stint began.268
The federal government—through an exercise of Congress’s spending
power—could encourage the states to decertify officers under speciﬁed conditions. Short of that, the most productive reform might be to expand the substantive coverage of the national database. Rather than merely cover officer decertiﬁcations, the database ought to record at least all misconduct-related terminations,
and probably all involuntary terminations or all separations of any kind. This
would resemble the National Practitioner Databank (NPDB) that tracks medical

264.

See, e.g., Puro et al., supra note 85, at 494 (“The decertiﬁcation authority is available [in most
states] but may not be implemented in many states owing to factors such as a lack of political
will by the state legislature, insufficient staffing at the POST, or lack of participation by local
police chiefs or sheriffs.”).
265. Fisher, supra note 25.
266. Kelly et al., supra note 23.
267. See Fisher, supra note 25 (“I think some people are under the misimpression that if a cop gets
ﬁred for anything really bad, they’re going to get decertiﬁed, and that is not the case. . . . It’s
a very narrow range of behavior that will cause them to lose their certiﬁcation.” (quoting Sue
Rahr, former police chief and member of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing)).
268. It is possible that some had been decertiﬁed and later recertiﬁed. It is also possible that some
had been decertiﬁed in another state before moving to Florida.
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malpractice and fraud.269 In fact, the NPDB goes further, requiring reporting of
not only employment separations but also malpractice payments and certain disciplinary actions.270 In the 1990s, Congress actually considered two bills that
sought to establish a federal clearinghouse of law-enforcement “employment
termination data.”271 Both died in committee.272 Some states have recently taken
steps in this direction for their in-state databases. A 2016 Illinois law, for example, requires local agencies to notify the state POST board of any “ﬁnal determination of willful violation of department or agency policy, official misconduct,
or violation of law” in connection with an officer’s termination or resignation.273
If other states enact similar reforms, an effective national database will be that
much closer to reality.
B. Unawareness of Risk
Some agencies may know they are hiring wandering officers but may not
know that wandering officers are, in general, risky hires.274 After all, plenty of
wandering officers do not reoffend,275 and plenty of officers who have not been
ﬁred before commit misconduct. In fact, police administrators sometimes make
the plausible argument that wandering officers should be more conscientious
than others because they have been reprimanded before—they know, in other

269.

270.
271.

272.
273.

274.

275.

National Practitioner Data Bank, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/GCA9-7W7M]; see Goldman &
Puro, supra note 26, at 575.
See Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice
Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2006).
Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment Registration Act of 1996, H.R.
3263, 104th Cong. § 2(5) (1996); Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment
Registration Act of 1995, S. 484, 104th Cong. § 2(5) (1995).
Fisher, supra note 25.
Illinois Police Training Act, 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705 / 6.2(a) (2019). But see Toner & Rutecki,
supra note 25 (reporting in 2018 that only twenty-six officers’ names had been submitted and
that ten of the twenty-six had gone on to ﬁnd additional police work).
See, e.g., Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (describing a city manager who knowingly hired ofﬁcers who had been ﬁred for perjury, excessive force, and making false statements—but not
decertiﬁed—reasoning that, “[i]f the [certifying] commission says they’re good to go, they’re
good to go”); cf. Egan et al., supra note 129, at 237 (hypothesizing that ﬁnancial advisers with
records of misconduct may ﬁnd work because unsophisticated customers do not know “how
to interpret” their records).
See, e.g., Shockey-Eckles, supra note 26, at 304-05 (relating the story of a wandering officer
who “salvaged his career,” was named officer of the year, and was promoted to lieutenant in
his new agency).
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words, that they are not invincible.276 Very few agencies, we suspect, hire enough
wandering officers to notice that, in the aggregate, the pattern of their behavior
actually seems to cut the other way.
Police administrators are now on notice. Even when well intentioned—as a
second chance for a hard-working cop—hiring a wandering officer is risky business. Wandering officers, we have shown, are ﬁred and subjected to moral-character complaints more often than other officers. Notably, they are riskier, by our
measures, than even officers hired as rookies. Our ﬁndings are consistent with
prior studies, using different data and methods, that examined police misconduct without focusing on wandering officers speciﬁcally. White and Kane, for
example, found that New York City officers with “red ﬂags” early in their careers
were at greatest risk of dismissal later on.277 Machine-learning researchers who
developed an early intervention system to predict adverse events for CharlotteMecklenburg officers found that “[t]he most predictive features of the model
were those relevant to the prior [internal affairs] history of the officer.”278 And
Kyle Rozema and Max Schanzenbach found that Chicago officers who receive
more civilian complaints are more likely to be sued later for civil-rights violations.279
In light of this evidence, law-enforcement agencies should be wary of knowingly hiring wandering officers and, when they do make such hires, should be
realistic about the risk they assume. Agencies should consider enhanced monitoring and support of wandering officers as a potential way to manage this risk.
They might also promulgate recidivist penalties for officers—common in the
substantive criminal law—designed to deter misconduct by this high-risk population. (Some may have already.) And if given the choice between two wandering-officer candidates, one of whom was just ﬁred and one of whom was ﬁred
earlier in his career, our evidence suggests that agencies ought to opt for the latter, all else equal.
C. Inadequate Alternatives
Many have assumed that hiring a wandering officer is an obvious management blunder. It certainly appears so after the fact, when the public learns that

276.

See Cormier & Doig, supra note 25.
277. Michael D. White & Robert J. Kane, Pathways to Career-Ending Police Misconduct: An Examination of Patterns, Timing, and Organizational Responses to Officer Malfeasance in the NYPD, 40
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1301, 1316 (2013).
278. Carton et al., supra note 101, at 72.
279. Rozema & Schanzenbach, supra note 101, at 251-55.
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an officer who hurt someone had previously been ﬁred by another agency. But
these cases alone, tragic as they are, actually tell us little about the wisdom of the
decision from an ex ante perspective. Even if agencies suspect that, on average,
wandering officers carry certain risks, they might still be making optimal hiring
decisions under the circumstances. The wandering officers who are hired might
be less risky than the available alternative candidates.280 That wandering officers
tend to migrate to agencies with fewer resources is evidence consistent with this
account. Certainly, if law-enforcement agencies were epistemically sophisticated, proﬁt-driven private entities that internalized the costs of bad hiring decisions, this story would be compelling. As we discuss in Section E below, however, there are reasons to think most agencies are not like this.
Fortunately, we were able to do more than speculate in this way. We were
able, as detailed in Part IV above, to identify, for each wandering officer, a plausible candidate cohort—a group of officers who were hired around the same time
by nearby, and similarly desirable, agencies. This group roughly approximates
the type of officers who may have been candidates for the job the wandering
officer ultimately obtained. As we showed, although this cohort is riskier than
the general population of officers who have never been ﬁred, the wandering ofﬁcers are riskier still. It would be preferable, of course, to compare the wandering
officers to the actual officers who competed for the same jobs, but that information is unavailable. In its absence, our cohort analysis provides some evidence
that agencies are not always making the optimal hiring decision.
Nevertheless, it remains possible that a shallow applicant pool does explain
some wandering-officer hiring. If so, and assuming additional hires are actually
necessary, the solution may be to improve the pool of candidates by raising compensation or improving outreach and recruitment.281 This, of course, is likely far
easier said than done. Still, to the extent that officials allocating budgets have not

280.

See, e.g., Atherley & Hickman, supra note 80, at 421 (explaining that small agencies sometimes
consciously hire wandering officers when “ﬁnancial resources are limited and lateral officers
are simply scarce”); Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548 (“Although it might seem unusual
for a police department to hire an officer with a past record of misconduct, the second department is usually located in a poor community that cannot afford to pay high salaries to its
police.”); Cohen, supra note 40 (“[I]f it’s not an attractive department, you’d have . . . very
few applicants, and it’s a matter of getting the best of the worst.” (quoting Vincent del Castillo)); Kyle Hopkins, The Village Where Every Cop Has Been Convicted of Domestic Violence,
PROPUBLICA (July 18, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/stebbins-alaska
-cops-criminal-records-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/TC68-2YFY] (describing small
Alaskan communities in which all applicants for law-enforcement jobs have criminal records).
281. Cf., e.g., Johnson, supra note 241 (“L[i]ke the mayor, the chief is concerned about the town’s
ability to draw candidates to small-town policing ‘when you can make more at McDonalds.’”
(quoting Roger Dowell, Police Chief, Damascus, Va.)).
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perceived a problem, our ﬁndings might encourage them to reconsider. Localities that are forced to hire wandering officers might appeal to intergovernmental
sources of funding, such as the state, for assistance in subsidizing salary enhancements.
Another way to improve the candidate pool may be to reduce barriers to entry into the profession. This could include minimizing ﬁnancial barriers, such as
the cost of the requisite training or education. Another possibility—although not
one without risks—is to relax the stringency of hiring requirements. Because research ﬁnds that more educated officers, for example, tend to commit less misconduct, many assume that agencies should raise their education requirements.282 But higher education requirements may screen out some otherwiseexcellent candidates—candidates who might be a superior choice to a better-educated wandering officer. More research is warranted on the effects of hiring requirements on the makeup and performance of the police forces they yield.
D. Countervailing Beneﬁts
Some agencies may understand that wandering officers are risky—riskier,
even, than alternative candidates—but hire them because of the beneﬁts, both
cultural and ﬁnancial, they’re perceived to bring. The chief, for example, may be
looking for a “cowboy” officer to work the toughest beat—someone who’s savvy
and unafraid to do what’s necessary to “clean up the streets.”283 Some agency
leaders may even believe they are doing a service to the profession by helping a
cast-out comrade ﬁnd his way. Unlike a new recruit, a wandering officer has
earned his spot in policing’s “band of brothers”;284 that he has been ﬁred may
signal only that he was unfairly maligned or fell victim to “politics.”285 The
chance to right this perceived wrong may generate for some chiefs a “warm

282.

See, e.g., KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 105.
See, e.g., Toner & Rutecki, supra note 25 (“Certain officers are more active than other officers. . . . You have officers that are out there simply looking for the bad elements. They are
looking for the criminals. They are looking for the drugs. They are looking for the guns out
there, which is what they should be doing.” (quoting Robert Collins Jr., Police Chief, Dolton,
Ill.)).
284. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V act 4, sc. 3 (MIT ed. 1993) (“We few, we happy
few, we band of brothers; / For he to-day that sheds his blood with me / Shall be my
brother . . . .”).
285. Kelly et al., supra note 23 (“Former New Orleans police superintendent Ronal Serpas said that
sheriffs and other chiefs often justify rehiring officers by dismissing their problems as ‘political.’”).
283.
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glow” that actually makes a wandering officer more, not less, attractive than a
nonwandering alternative.286
Alternatively, agencies might hire wandering officers who are riskier than the
marginal hires if the costs of doing so are lower. Because collective-bargaining
agreements in many law-enforcement agencies across the country, and in Florida
speciﬁcally, establish scheduled pay raises based primarily on years of service,
police administrators typically have little discretion over salaries.287 It is therefore unlikely that an administrator would hire a wandering officer simply because that officer is willing to accept a lower salary than a similarly experienced
marginal candidate who has never been ﬁred. But wandering officers might be
cheaper than rookies. In many jurisdictions, hiring agencies must pay to send
new recruits to the police academy and fund their salaries during training as

286.

See, e.g., Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (“‘This stuff is supposed to follow you forever? . . .
Of course I’m going to give somebody a second chance.’” (quoting Roberto Fulgueira, Police
Chief of the Sweetwater Police Department)); Schaefer & Kaufman, supra note 20 (describing
police chief who considers his agency “a place where cops can earn a second chance”); cf. Maya
Lau & Matt Stiles, L.A. County Sheriff Alex Villanueva Reinstates Four More Fired Deputies,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-sheriff-more
-reinstatements-20190405-story.html [https://perma.cc/4L8C-4MNV] (describing a sheriff
who “argued that previous sheriffs were too harsh in punishing deputies and he wants to be
fairer” and who campaigned “on a promise to correct the wrongs of the past, including . . .
addressing the cases of deputies who’d been unfairly disciplined through a ‘truth and reconciliation’ panel”). On the concept of “warm glow,” see James Andreoni, Giving with Impure
Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1447 (1989).
287. See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205
(2014) (describing the New York Police Department’s wage schedule, in which “pay depend[s] on the length of employment, not officer performance”); Agreement Between the City
of Boca Raton and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #35, CITY OF BOCA RATON 81 (2017), http://
bocaraton.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.php?ﬁle=bocaraton_459d440a463643240879
eb6b939e5406.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRH6-QDBP]; Agreement Between the City of St. Petersburg and Sun Coast Police Benevolent Association for Police Officers and Technicians, CITY OF ST.
PETERSBURG 35, 42 (2016), https://www.stpete.org/city_departments/human_resources
/docs/PBA%20Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NCN-6P8G]; City of Orlando Collective Bargaining Agreement with Fraternal Order of Police, Orlando Lodge #25, CITY OF ORLANDO
85-87 (2016), https://orlando.novusagenda.com/AgendaPublic/AttachmentViewer.ashx
?AttachmentID=69269&ItemID=41183 [https://perma.cc/S3P2-KW9X].
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well.288 Training also creates delay; wandering officers join the agency ready to
deploy.289
While not easy, it may be possible to diminish the inﬂuence of these perceived beneﬁts on agencies’ hiring decisions. With respect to the cultural factors,
scholars and even some police leaders are increasingly challenging the notion
that high crime—even violent crime—demands a militaristic response.290 The
idea is that Guardian Officers, not Warrior Cops, may best accomplish the aspirational aim of law enforcement: “protecting civilians from unnecessary indignity and harm.”291 “[R]ethinking the professional self-image of policing and
changing some of the core values that inform officers’ actions and decisions” will
not be easy,292 but instructive examples do exist.293 By foregrounding the service

288.

See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548 (explaining that, when they hire wandering
officers, “[d]epartments need not pay for the costs of a training academy or the salary of the
trainee while he is in training”); Williams, supra note 21 (“[S]maller departments and those
that lack sufficient funding or are understaffed are most likely to hire applicants with problematic pasts if they have completed state-mandated training, which allows departments to
avoid the cost of sending them to the police academy.”). In Florida, for example, local agencies
are authorized, though not legally required, to pay police-academy tuition. See FLA. STAT.
§ 943.16 (2019). Most do: according to CJAP data, in both 2008 and 2016, 70% of the responding police departments and sheriffs’ offices reimbursed tuition costs. As a point of reference, tuition at one program in 2019 ran roughly $3,400 for Florida residents and $10,000
for out-of-state residents. Law Enforcement Officer, GA. STONE TECH. COLL., https://
gstc-ecsd-ﬂ.schoolloop.com/pf4/cms2/view_page?d=x&group_id=1356612364276&vdid
=i31g1yerxd3mb [https://perma.cc/VT2Z-HWT8]. Given that so many agencies pay these
costs, it may be extremely difficult for agencies that do not to hire new recruits.
289. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 21 (explaining that wandering officers “can start work almost
immediately”); Yoder, supra note 25 (“Given the opportunity to hire a licensed officer who can
start immediately and for whom the hiring agency doesn’t need to pay training costs, [a small
department] may decide to ignore their history.”).
290. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 41, at 11; Seth W.
Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
611, 626-27 (2016); Kate Mather, LAPD Urges Officers to Be Community Guardians, Not Warriors on Crime, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/crime
/la-me-warrior-guardians-20150821-story.html [https://perma.cc/A8BW-F94Z]; Nick
Morgan, From Warriors to Guardians, MAIL TRIB. (Medford, Or.) (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.mailtribune.com/article/20160304/NEWS/160309853
[https://perma.cc
/ZN3F-4Z36].
291. Stoughton, supra note 290, at 614.
292. Id. at 612.
293. See, e.g., Sue Rahr & Stephen K. Rice, From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American
Police Culture to Democratic Ideals, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING BULL., Apr. 2015, at 7-11,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248654.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX5L-4NV5] (describing training curriculum reforms in Washington designed to cultivate a guardian mentality by
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aspects of the job, these same reforms might help temper the “band of brothers”
mentality that may lead chiefs to pity, or at least identify with, wandering officers. Litigation targeting legal rules that reinforce a self-protective, insular mindset might, over time, gradually erode that mentality as well.294
The perceived ﬁnancial beneﬁts—that wandering officers are cheaper to hire
than new recruits—may be more straightforward to neutralize. If agencies are
hiring officers with troubled histories to avoid the startup costs of educating and
training new recruits, then they should not be asked to pay these costs. If the
locality itself cannot allot more money to the police department’s budget, state
and federal authorities may need to intervene. The idea is not a fanciful one—
the federal government, for example, already supports local policing with tens
of billions of dollars. Rachel Harmon has argued that much of this money goes
to programs that are ineffective or that may do more harm than good.295 If that
is right, the suggestion here is simply to repurpose some of these funds to pay
for training rather than tanks.296 To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that
agencies are correct to think that a wandering officer is cheaper than a rookie in
the long run. Even if a wandering officer is less costly upfront, what he gives
with one hand he may take away with the other, later, in the form of attrition
and potential civil liability. All told, the best approach may be to ensure that
agencies are internalizing these countervailing costs, a point to which we now
turn.
E. Cost Externalization
Finally, agencies may hire wandering officers because they externalize, and
therefore discount, the costs of doing so—in other words, they know it’s risky
but they don’t care.297 Agencies’ principal ﬁnancial exposure comes from lawsuits against officers for the harms their misconduct inﬂicts. Although these actions technically run against the defendant officers as individuals, officers are

emphasizing the nobility of policing, procedural justice, crisis intervention, tactical social interaction, and respect).
294. See Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213.
295. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870,
876, 883-84 (2015).
296. See id. at 918-29 (describing federal grant programs that ﬁnance the acquisition of militaristic
equipment).
297. See, e.g., Dill, supra note 19 (“You have some agencies that take the approach, we need warm
bodies, so they will hire that [wandering] individual . . . .” (quoting Union County, South
Carolina Sheriff David Taylor)).
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virtually always indemniﬁed by the employing locality.298 Yet, even setting aside
the fact that many civilians wronged by the police will never sue, the locality
itself bears relatively limited exposure due to robust qualiﬁed immunity protections that immunize “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.”299
Moreover, even when the locality does incur liability on behalf of an officer,
there are additional impediments to the generation of effective behavioral incentives for those who run the agency. Roughly half of the agencies covered by one
recent study contribute nothing to the satisfaction of lawsuits brought against
them; central government funds are used to pay the bills.300 Not all of the agencies that do contribute, moreover, actually experience ﬁnancial pressures; some,
for example, pay from funds that were earmarked for litigation costs alone.301
All told, because of these complexities in the way localities ﬁnance liability costs,
the majority of agencies suffer no ﬁnancial consequences when liability costs increase—they do not “feel the burn,” so to speak.302 And though political pressures may increase with liability, most agencies do not track or analyze information about police litigation in a way that could facilitate learning and
improvement.303
Municipalities are also exposed to direct liability for faulty hiring decisions.304 But the opening for plaintiffs is narrow, limited to situations in which
an officer’s misconduct was a “plainly obvious consequence of the decision to
hire” the officer.305 That said, courts have upheld claims “where there is a close
connection between information a municipality did or should have learned about
an employee in the hiring process and the constitutional violation that ultimately
occurred.”306 In one recent case, an officer who had previously been ﬁred from
298.

See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemniﬁcation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014).
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see, e.g., Carbado, supra note 47, at 1519-24. But cf.
Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualiﬁed Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9-10 (2017) (ﬁnding that
qualiﬁed immunity rarely ends civil rights cases, although allowing that it may discourage
people from ever ﬁling suit).
300. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 1148.
301. Id. at 1149.
302. See id. at 1203.
303. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010) (ﬁnding that officials do not
typically learn from civil-rights lawsuits to make informed decisions about how to modify
agency policy).
304. Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
305. Id. at 411.
306. AVERY ET AL., supra note 48, at 606; see id. at 607 n.15 (collecting cases).
299.
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four separate law-enforcement agencies shot and killed the former mayor of a
small town in South Carolina. Shortly after the incident, the town’s police chief
noted that, despite the officer’s rocky past, he had “proven himself” at his current
job: “He’s done a good job, so I guess he got a second chance.”307 The decedent’s
family sued, alleging, among other theories, negligent hiring by the town. A jury
awarded the family almost one hundred million dollars, including sixty million
in punitive damages against the town.308
Given our evidence about the risks wandering officers pose, the jury in a case
like this—or a court deciding a dispositive motion—is justiﬁed in deeming an
agency’s decision to hire a wandering officer (or failure to conduct an adequate
background investigation) to be probative of fault. The more serious the officer’s
past misconduct, the more probative the evidence is. Nevertheless, wanderingofficer status remains but one risk factor among many and rarely should be dispositive.309
Increased judicial willingness to entertain negligent-hiring suits concerning
wandering officers might, on the margins, affect the frequency with which wandering officers are hired. Yet the impediments just discussed—to translating ﬁnancial liability into constructive behavioral incentives—are every bit as powerful here as in the case of individual officer liability. To the extent these
impediments contribute to the hiring of wandering officers, the appropriate response would be to improve the system’s mechanisms of accountability so that
agencies internalize the costs of their hiring decisions. But this is hardly a novel
suggestion; indeed, it is clear by now there is no straightforward solution. Police-liability insurers might pitch in by converting the “large but improbable potential liabilities” of negligent hiring into more salient premium dollars.310 By
raising premiums for agencies that hire wandering officers, for example, insurers
would force local governments to pay for the incremental increase in risk that
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Harve Jacobs, Cop Accused of Shooting Ex-Mayor Had Previous Encounter, Chief Says, WCSC
(June 24, 2011, 3:15 AM), http://www.live5news.com/story/14655413/sled-investigate-officer
-involved-shooting-in-cottageville [https://perma.cc/UYD8-VLHL].
308. See Heath Hamacher, A Matter of Force: $97.5M Jury Award Trains a Spotlight on the Issue of Law
Enforcement Hiring, S.C. LAW. WKLY. (Oct. 27, 2014), https://sclawyersweekly.com/news
/2014/10/27/a-matter-of-force-97-5m-jury-award-trains-a-spotlight-on-the-issue-of-law
-enforcement-hiring [https://perma.cc/3RZG-3U69]. The parties later settled for $10 million. South Carolina Mayor’s Death Settlement Reduced to $10M, INS. J. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/03/16/360555.htm
[https://perma.cc
/9QVN-5MD3].
309. See supra Part II (reviewing research on other officer-level correlates of misconduct).
310. John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1607
(2017).
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wandering officers present regardless whether that risk ultimately materialized.311 Here, too, however, according special treatment to wandering-officer
status may make most sense if other officer-level risk factors are also considered.
Of course, many costs of wrongful policing are nonpecuniary in nature. Police misconduct humiliates and degrades its subjects, creates racial disparities in
criminal-justice outcomes, causes negative health consequences, and breeds cynicism toward the police—which, in turn, can “stymie or hinder public safety efforts and, instead, keep crime rates higher in the same communities where fair
and just policing practices are most needed.”312 Agencies externalize many of
these nonpecuniary costs as well.313 Improving transparency ought to allow the
public to monitor the police more effectively and thus to exert pressure on political actors to account for these neglected costs of policing.314 In the meantime,
federal pattern-or-practice lawsuits might help to achieve organizational change
where ﬁnancial penalties do not. The federal government could consider the hiring of wandering officers, for example, when determining whether and how to
target particular agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 14141.315
Barring successful general-accountability reforms, and if future research corroborates our ﬁndings, states could consider the “nuclear option” that Connecticut invoked in 2015. Connecticut law now prohibits any local agency from hiring

311.

312.

313.

314.

315.

See id.; see also id. at 1555 (describing “feature rating” of insurance policies, the practice of
“charging more to riskier customers . . . based on the presence of traits correlated with riskiness”).
Marie Ouellet et al., Network Exposure and Excessive Use of Force: Investigating the Social Transmission of Police Misconduct, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 675 (2019); see Harmon, supra note
295, at 901-05. As Harmon points out, lawful policing can impose many of these costs as well.
Harmon, supra note 295, at 904.
See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 295, at 939 (explaining that, “[f]or local governments to function as a check on the nonbudgetary costs of policing, the public must be able to monitor and
attribute responsibility for the harm the police do, and political actors must be able to inﬂuence police conduct,” and highlighting ways that federal policing programs “undermine these
preconditions for local accountability”).
See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827,
1838 (2015) (“The people must be able to see what their agents are doing so they can evaluate
those actions and exercise control as necessary.”).
Some of the important sources on § 14141 include Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009); Debra Livingston, Police Reform
and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815 (1999);
Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189 (2014); and
Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department Pattern
or Practice Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3 (2003). For more information, see
also CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND
PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT (2017).
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an officer who was previously employed by another Connecticut agency and who
“(1) was dismissed for malfeasance or other serious misconduct calling into
question such person’s ﬁtness to serve as a police officer; or (2) resigned or retired from such officer’s position while under investigation for such malfeasance
or other serious misconduct.”316 We are not prepared, on the basis of our evidence alone, to offer a full-throated defense of the nuclear option, but it is certainly a plausible backstop, and it could be useful to study Connecticut’s experience to develop a better sense of the costs and beneﬁts of going down this road.
conclusion
Not all those who wander are lost, but in policing, many are. In any given
year over the last three decades, an average of roughly 1,100 full-time law-enforcement officers in Florida walk the streets having been ﬁred in the past, and
almost 800 having been ﬁred for misconduct, not counting the many who were
ﬁred and reinstated in arbitration. These officers, we have shown, are subsequently ﬁred and subjected to “moral character” complaints at elevated rates relative to both officers hired as rookies and veterans with clean professional histories. And we likely underestimate the prevalence of the phenomenon nationwide.
We have, moreover, only a partial understanding of the extent of the problem
wandering officers pose. Beyond their own misbehavior, wandering officers may
undermine efforts to improve police culture, as they carry their baggage to new
locales. Worse yet, wandering officers may “infect” other officers upon arrival,317
causing misconduct to metastasize to the farthest reaches of the law-enforcement
community. Future research should investigate these possibilities.

316.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-291c(a) (2019).
317. Cf. Ouellet et al., supra note 312 (suggesting that peers inﬂuence whether an individual officer
will engage in misconduct); Edika G. Quispe-Torreblanca & Neil Stewart, Causal Peer Effects
in Police Misconduct, 3 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 797 (2019) (estimating peer effects in police misconduct); Daria Roithmayr, The Dynamics of Excessive Force, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 407 (arguing that use of excessive force should be thought of as contagious); Thibaut Horel et
al., The Contagiousness of Police Violence (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law
.uchicago.edu/ﬁles/2018-11/chicago_contagiousness_of_violence.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/FX67-9XJ6] (studying whether police shootings are “contagious”).
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appendix
FIGURE A1.

proportion of separations in which officer obtains subsequent employment
within three years, by professional history of firing for misconduct, 19882013
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TABLE A1.

Frequency

Proportion

Fired

Fired for
Misconduct

frequency distribution of raw separation codes, 1988-2016

Administrative - Unfavorable
(Historical Use Only)

928

0.009

Yes

Yes

Misconduct
(Historical Use Only)

584

0.006

Yes

Yes

No Cause for Decertification
(Historical Use Only)

90

0.001

Yes

Yes

Resigned - Would Not Rehire
(Historical Use Only)

7

0

Yes

Yes

Resigned/Retired in Lieu of Separation for
Violating Agency/Training Center Policy

270

0.003

Yes

Yes

Resigned/Retired in Lieu of Separation for
Violating Moral Character Standards

216

0.002

Yes

Yes

Resigned/Retired While Being Investigated
for Violating Moral Character Standards

1,027

0.01

Yes

Yes

Resigned/Retired While Being Investigated
for Violating Agency Policy

1,039

0.01

Yes

Yes

Terminated for Violating Agency Policy
(No Moral Character Violation)

1,143

0.011

Yes

Yes

Terminated for Violating Ch. 943.13(4),
FS or Moral Character Standards

1,048

0.01

Yes

Yes

Under Investigation
(Historical Use Only)

304

0.003

Yes

Yes

Failure to Complete Basic
Recruit Training

476

0.005

Yes

Failure to Complete Elder
Abuse Training

114

0.001

Yes

Failure to Meet Mandatory
Retraining Requirement

438

0.004

Yes

Failure to Pass State
Certification Examination

70

0.001

Yes

Failure to Perform Assigned
Tasks Satisfactorily

283

0.003

Yes

Failure to Qualify with Firearm

225

0.002

Yes

Separation Code
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Failure to Satisfactorily Complete Agency
Field-Training Program

1,083

0.011

Yes

2

0

Yes

Other - Excessive Absence, Fail Report for
Duty, Sleep on Duty, Etc.

141

0.001

Yes

Staff Termination
(Historical Use Only)

106

0.001

Yes

1,087

0.011

Budgetary Constraints

86

0.001

Deceased

707

0.007

Extended Leave of Absence

17

0

Extended Leave of Absence or Suspension
(Historical Use Only)

135

0.001

Leave of Absence
(Historical Use Only)

10

0

Military Leave of Absence

138

0.001

39,344

0.39

Processed Fingerprints Not Received
Within One Year

364

0.004

Resigned/Retired
(Historical Use Only)

19

0

7,845

0.078

Special Elected or Appointed Position

28

0

Suspension

13

0

Temporary Employment Authorization
(Period Exceeded)

48

0

Transfer Within Agency
(No Break in Service)

5,658

0.056

Voluntary Separation
(Not Involving Misconduct)

35,675

0.354

Involuntary Separation
(Historical Use Only)

Administrative Separation
(Not Involving Misconduct)

Not Separated

Retired
(Not Involving Misconduct)
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TABLE A2.

descriptive statistics of cjap hiring requirements, 1997-2016
Mean

SD

Min

Max

n

18

0.01

0.12

0

1

6,539

19

0.64

0.48

0

1

6,539

20

0.02

0.13

0

1

6,539

21

0.33

0.47

0

1

6,539

0

0.07

0

1

6,539

High School/
GED

0.9

0.3

0

1

6,581

Associate’s/
Some College

0.09

0.29

0

1

6,581

Bachelor’s

0.01

0.08

0

1

6,581

Criminal-Justice
Experience

0.07

0.26

0

1

6,575

Tobacco
Requirement

0.26

0.44

0

1

6,575

Driving Test

0.79

0.41

0

1

5,252

Interview

0.92

0.27

0

1

6,585

Physical-Ability
Test

0.49

0.5

0

1

6,570

Polygraph Test

0.5

0.5

0

1

6,564

Psychological
Test

0.75

0.43

0

1

6,562

Selection Exam

0.54

0.5

0

1

6,575

Swimming Test

0.09

0.29

0

1

6,254

Vision Test

0.61

0.49

0

1

6,570

Voice Test

0.23

0.42

0

1

5,906

Probation Period
(In Months)

11.5

2.72

0

24

5,811

Composite
Requirement Score

4.61

1.96

0

9

6,469

Age

22

Education
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TABLE A3.

descriptive statistics of cjap training variables, 1997-2016
Mean

SD

Min

Max

n

Not Required

0.43

0.49

0

1

6,207

Every 24-48 Months

0.21

0.41

0

1

6,207

Every 6-12 Months

0.36

0.48

0

1

6,207

Not Required

0.39

0.49

0

1

6,530

Every 24-48 Months

0.17

0.38

0

1

6,530

Every 6-12 Months

0.44

0.50

0

1

6,530

Not Required

0.59

0.49

0

1

6,521

Every 24-48 Months

0.20

0.40

0

1

6,521

Every 6-12 Months

0.20

0.40

0

1

6,521

Not Required

0.01

0.09

0

1

6,550

Every 12-48 Months

0.89

0.31

0

1

6,550

Every 6 Months

0.10

0.30

0

1

6,550

Not Required

0.85

0.36

0

1

5,192

Every 24-48 Months

0.02

0.14

0

1

5,192

Every 6-12 Months

0.13

0.34

0

1

5,192

Not Required

0.31

0.46

0

1

6,527

Every 24-48 Months

0.49

0.50

0

1

6,527

Every 6-12 Months

0.21

0.40

0

1

6,527

FTO

11.96

5.91

0

52

6,486

Continued

0.68

0.47

0

1

5,887

Composite
Training Score

2.91

1.44

0

6

6,094

Chemical
Agents

SelfDefense

Driving

Firearm

In-Service

Medical
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TABLE A4.

median time to new employment by demographic groups and professional
history, 1988-2013
Panel A: Fired
Panel B: Fired for Misconduct
Never
Fired

Fired,
Last Job

Fired,
Earlier
Job

Never
Fired

Fired,
Last Job

Fired,
Earlier
Job

19
(19,280)

318
(1,175)

57
(1,024)

21
(19,977)

427
(800)

70
(702)

Black

14
(2,049)

401
(210)

9
(198)

17
(2,224)

457
(129)

6
(104)

Hispanic

11
(2,519)

470
(212)

14
(154)

12
(2,649)

553
(137)

21
(99)

Male

15
(21,451)

335
(1,441)

27
(1,288)

17
(22,327)

442
(986)

46
(867)

Female

61
(2,750)

406
(180)

55
(98)

75
(2,892)

692
(92)

36
(44)

18
(937)

509
(55)

158
(36)

26
(977)

664
(30)

269
(21)

Associate’s

16
(3,401)

322
(247)

42
(179)

18
(3,538)

498
(162)

70
(127)

Bachelor’s

12
(6,982)

327
(347)

11
(270)

13
(7,236)

404
(210)

15
(153)

Master’s

18
(1,436)

376
(58)

75
(69)

19
(1,491)

642
(33)

90
(39)

17
(24,205)

350
(1,621)

28
(1,386)

18
(25,223)

450
(1,078)

46
(911)

Gender

Race

White

All

Education

High School

TABLE A5.

subsequent firing by professional history, 1996-2013
Fired

Panel A: Firings

Panel B: Firings
for Misconduct
Panel C: Rookie

Fired for Misconduct

n

Ever

3 Years

Ever

3 Years

Never

21,693

7.6%

4.0%

5.3%

2.3%

Fired, last job

1,200

16.8%

10.8%

11.3%

6.7%

Fired, earlier job

1,143

13.9%

7.0%

10.1%

5.0%

Never

22,603

7.8%

4.1%

5.4%

2.4%

Fired, last job

761

18.1%

11.3%

12.6%

7.2%

Fired, earlier job

672

14.4%

7.4%

10.1%

5.4%

39,007

9.4%

5.4%

6.0%

2.5%
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TABLE A6.

subsequent firing by professional history with one-, three-, and five-year
time windows, 1988-2013318
Fired

Panel A:
Firings

Panel B:
Firings
for Misconduct

Fired for Misconduct

n

1-Year

3-Year

5-Year

1-Year

3-Year

5-Year

Never

29,888

2.7%

4.5%

6.0%

1.5%

3.0%

4.3%

Fired,
last job

1,969

7.3%

11.2%

13.7%

4.8%

7.9%

9.8%

Fired,
earlier job

1,631

4.6%

7.5%

9.9%

3.2%

5.6%

7.5%

Never

31,182

2.8%

4.7%

6.1%

1.6%

3.1%

4.4%

Fired,
last job

1,297

7.7%

12.2%

14.8%

5.4%

9.0%

11.2%

Fired,
earlier job

1,009

5.2%

8.1%

10.7%

3.6%

6.2%

8.1%

54,476

3.8%

5.8%

7.3%

1.6%

3.2%

4.5%

Panel C:
Rookie
TABLE A7.

subsequent firing by professional history for matched comparators based
on timing, geography, and agency desirability, 1996-2013

Panel B: Firings
for Misconduct

Panel A: Firings

Fired

318.

Ever

3 Years

Ever

3 Years

10%

5.4%

7.1

3.3

Wanderer

16.7%

10.3%

11.3%

6.2%

Comparator

9.03%

5.3%

6.2%

2.9%

Wanderer

13.8%

6.7%

10.1%

5.0%

Comparator

9.8%

5.4%

6.4%

2.7%

10.1%

5.5%

7.2%

3.3%

Never
Fired, last job

Fired, earlier job
Never
Fired, last job

Fired, earlier job

Fired for Misconduct

Wanderer

17.5%

10.8%

12.2%

6.7%

Comparator

9%

5.3%

6.0%

2.9%

Wanderer

14.5%

7.2%

10.2%

5.4%

Comparator

9.6%

5.3%

6%

2.6%

For the 5-year time window, we exclude all job stints beginning after 2011 to ensure that we
have at least 5 years of follow-up for each observation. The sample sizes are thus slightly
smaller for these estimates.
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TABLE A8.

number of complaints by professional history with one-, three-, and fiveyear time windows, 1993-2013

All Complaints

Panel A: Firings

Panel B: Firings
for Misconduct

Panel C: Rookie

Violent and
Sexual Complaints

Panel A: Firings

Panel B: Firings
for Misconduct

Integrity Complaints

Panel C: Rookie

Panel A: Firings

Panel B: Firings
for Misconduct

Panel C: Rookie

n

1-Year

3-Year

5-Year

Never

24,711

0.01

0.02

0.04

Fired, last job

1,394

0.02

0.07

0.09

Fired, earlier job

1,295

0.02

0.05

0.06

Never

25,686

0.01

0.02

0.04

Fired, last job

934

0.03

0.08

0.10

Fired, earlier job

780

0.02

0.05

0.07

Panel C: Rookie

44,584

0.01

0.03

0.04

Never

24,711

0.00

0.01

0.01

Fired, last job

1,394

0.01

0.02

0.03

Fired, earlier job

1,295

0.01

0.01

0.02

Never

25,686

0.00

0.01

0.01

Fired, last job

934

0.01

0.03

0.03

Fired, earlier job

780

0.01

0.01

0.02

Panel C: Rookie

44,584

0.00

0.01

0.01

Never

24,711

0.00

0.01

0.01

Fired, last job

1,394

0.01

0.03

0.03

Fired, earlier job

1,295

0.01

0.02

0.03

Never

25,686

0.00

0.01

0.01

Fired, last job

934

0.01

0.03

0.04

Fired, earlier job

780

0.01

0.02

0.03

Panel C: Rookie

44,584

0.00

0.01

0.01
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TABLE A9.

number of complaints by professional history for matched comparators
based on timing, geography, and agency desirability, 1996-2013
Violent/
Sexual

All

Panel A:
Firings

Never

Ever

3
Years

Ever

3
Years

Ever

3
Years

0.08

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Fired,
last job

Wanderer

0.13

0.06

0.04

0.02

0.05

0.02

Comparator

0.08

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Fired,
earlier job

Wanderer

0.13

0.06

0.03

0.01

0.05

0.02

Comparator

0.07

0.03

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.01

0.08

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Never
Panel B:
Firings for
Misconduct

Integrity

Fired,
last job

Wanderer

0.16

0.07

0.04

0.02

0.06

0.03

Comparator

0.08

0.04

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

Fired,
earlier job

Wanderer

0.14

0.06

0.03

0.01

0.06

0.02

Comparator

0.07

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.01

TABLE A10.

predicting if wandering officers are fired for misconduct again, 1988-2013
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept

0.062**
[0.008]

0.060†
[0.030]

0.011
[0.056]

0.114*
[0.054]

Fired from
Last Job

0.029*
[0.011]

0.036*
[0.015]

0.063*
[0.026]

0.021
[0.022]

2

0
[0.023]

-0.021
[0.049]

-0.03
[0.037]

3

0.007
[0.023]

-0.009
[0.049]

-0.002
[0.038]

≥4

0.023
[0.026]

0.016
[0.053]

-0.012
[0.039]

Age
(At Start)

-0.001
[0.001]

0
[0.001]

-0.001
[0.001]

Male

0.007
[0.021]

-0.005
[0.034]

-0.031
[0.036]

Any Past
Complaints

-0.002
[0.013]

-0.011
[0.020]

-0.006
[0.017]

Job
Number
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Associate’s

0.033
[0.024]

Bachelor’s

0.051*
[0.024]

Master’s/Doctorate

0.047
[0.034]

Education

Proportion Black

-0.086
[0.062]

Proportion Hispanic

-0.043
[0.039]

Violent-Crime Rate
(Per 100,000)

0
[0.000]

Property-Crime Rate
(Per 100,000)

0
[0.000]

County-Level
Unemployment Rate

0.129
[0.365]

Expenditures Per Officer
(2008)

0
[0.000]

Hiring Requirement
Score

-0.001
[0.004]

Training Requirement
Score

-0.001
[0.007]

Number of Officers

-0.002
[0.001]

Number of Officers

-0.001
[0.001]

Hiring
Agency

Separating
Agency
n

2,272

2,272

848

882

TABLE A11.

number of fdle-initiated complaints by professional history, 1993-2013

Panel A: Firings

Panel B: Firings
for Misconduct
Panel C: Rookies

n

Ever

3 Years

Never

24,711

0.02

0.01

Fired, last job

1,394

0.04

0.02

Fired, earlier job

1,295

0.05

0.02

Never

25,686

0.03

0.01

Fired, last job

934

0.05

0.02

Fired, earlier job

780

0.06

0.02

44,584

0.03

0.01
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TABLE A12.

subsequent firings and number of complaints by professional history and
agency size, 1988-2013319
Firings for
Firings
Complaints
Misconduct
Size

n

Ever

3 Yr.

Ever

3 Yr.

n

Ever

3 Yr.

2,295

10%

6%

7%

4%

1,822

0.07

0.04

Fired, last job

413

21%

12%

15%

9%

314

0.12

0.09

Fired, earlier job

268

19%

10%

15%

9%

210

0.12

0.06

Rookie

2,001

12%

7%

9%

5%

1,554

0.07

0.03

Never

27,593

9%

4%

7%

3%

22,889

0.07

0.02

Fired, last job

1,556

18%

11%

13%

8%

1,080

0.14

0.06

>15
Officers

≤15
Officers

Never

Fired, earlier job

1,363

14%

7%

10%

5%

1,085

0.12

0.04

Rookie

52,475

10%

6%

7%

3%

43,030

0.08

0.03

TABLE A13.

subsequent firings and number of complaints by professional history and
timing, 1993-2009320
Firing for
Firing
Complaints
Misconduct

Panel A:
Firings

Panel B:
Firings
for Misconduct
Panel C:
Rookie

319.

n

Years
1-3

Years
4-7

Years
1-3

Years
4-7

n

Years
1-3

Years
4-7

Never

26,346

4.6%

2.3%

3.2%

2.0%

21,169

0.024

0.024

Fired,
last job

1,811

11.2%

4%

8%

3.4%

1,236

0.070

0.038

Fired,
earlier job

1,487

7.5%

4%

5. 9%

2.8%

1,151

0.050

0.042

Never

27,516

4.8%

2.4%

3.3%

2.0%

22,020

0.025

0.024

Fired,
last job

1,198

12.1%

4.4%

9.1%

3.7%

835

0.079

0.044

930

8.3%

4%

6.6%

2.6%

701

0.056

0.054

47,371

5.8%

2.4%

3.3%

2.1%

37,479

0.026

0.033

Fired,
earlier job

The ﬁring data is based on employment stints beginning between 1988 and 2013, and the
complaint data is based on stints beginning between 1993 and 2013.
320. We exclude all employment stints that began after 2009 to ensure that we have a full sevenyear window for each employment stint through which to observe ﬁrings and complaints.
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